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Every population maintains collective memories which provide meaning and 
identity for members (Langenbache, 2003). Elites have exerted influence on what is 
being remembered and the interpretation of the remembrances for specific objects, 
through the concept of historical memory. Wang (2012) has shown that authoritarian 
governments leverage historical memory to increase legitimacy. Similarly, Bernhard and 
Kubik (2014) have demonstrated that transitioning democracies also benefit from elite 
use of historical memory for consolidation. The lack of studies concerning consolidated 
democracies’ use of historical memory raises many questions, including whether 
consolidated democracies manipulate historical memory for the purpose of legitimacy? I 
contend that, similar to Wang’s findings, elites within consolidated democracies 
manipulate historical memory for the purpose of enhancing party legitimacy and that the 
concept of historical memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites after 
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I. Introduction: The Influence of Historical Memory and Nationalism    
 
 In his book, Never Forget National Humiliation, Zheng Wang states, “The past is 
not solid, immutable, or even measureable; rather, it is a fluid set of ideas, able to be 
shaped by time, emotion, and the political savvy” (2012, 17). In his case study focusing 
on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1989-2011, Wang demonstrates the power 
of an authoritarian state in manipulating the collective memories of the past for the 
purpose of legitimacy. The PRC influences historical memories by controlling messages 
within textbooks, monuments, and political statements with the purpose of increasing 
nationalism within the population. The development of nationalism in turn increases the 
legitimacy of the regime (Wang, 2012). I contend that similar to Wang’s study of an 
authoritarian government, democratic governments also manipulate historical memory 
with a goal of increasing nationalism to bolster political parties’ legitimacy. This 
exploitation of historical memory by democratic governments also provides an avenue in 
which to understand the state’s democracy, and worldview of the public.  
Historical memory is a focused awareness that repeats certain significance and 
current relevance about the past in close connection to the present and the future, without 
holding to the accurate retelling of history (Toshechenko, 2011, 3). This concept is often 
created or manipulated by elites for specific purposes. Thus it does not follow factual 
aspects of history but uses history instrumentally to have the collective purposely 
remember or forget specific events to achieve the manipulators goals, such as increasing 





Historical memory also aids in the development of other concepts such as 
collective identity, national identity, nation building and nationalism as it provides 
members with a past, and an additional way to define the group. Historical memory’s 
potential depth in defining the collective also impacts the worldview of the population. 
Scholars of history, psychology, political science, and sociology have demonstrated that 
history can be a powerful tool in which to bring a population together and that the control 
of such an influence can also mobilize a population (Wang, 2012; Hutchinson & Smith, 
1994; Johnston, 2012).  
 Historical memory is a relatively new concept, emerging nearly 30 years ago, and 
has centered on traumatic events that occurred within the 20
th
 century; such as the World 
Wars, the Holocaust, and the fall of the Soviet Union (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Such 
events created vast amounts of disturbing memories for many populations, changed how 
people defined themselves, and their view of the world (Tolvaisis, 2013). Generally, the 
study of historical memory provides descriptive information with which to understand 
how the public views the past and the present in relation to those traumatic events. 
However, there is a growing area within the study of this concept in providing new or 
better understanding of government through the analysis of the manipulation that elites 
are engaging (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Ghodsee, 2014; Paabo, 2014).  
Historical memory has also been identified as a tool in creating internal and 
international conflicts. Conflicts in relation to this concept have been recognized as 
disagreements between two populations over the remembrance of specific events and the 
way in which past events are remembered (Wang, 2012; Cui, 2012). Historical memory’s 





prevalence of violent struggles. Such case studies on conflicts and tense relationships 
related to historical memory include Serbia where historical memory crystalized two 
distinct groups and “othering” based on ethnicity that quickly led to a violent conflict 
(Tolvaisis, 2013),  Israel where the historical memories of the Palestinian 1948 exodus 
changed over the years, and how the new Israeli state used historical memory to aid in the 
creation of a new nation (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Gabel, 2013), Japan, China, and South 
Korea currently demonstrate active historical memories on events surrounding World 
War II (WWII) causing tense international relations (Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka, 
2011), and Estonia in creating a new identity as an individual nation after the fall of the 
Soviet Union (Lanko, 2011). 
As illustrated in the above mentioned cases, an important trait of historical 
memory is its link to nation building by providing the ability for elites to construct a past 
and influence the identity of a population. A noticeable feature of state formation is the 
development of nationalism.  Nationalism can be utilized as a way in which to promote 
unity among a population by creating an accepted in-group and out-group with a strong 
loyalty to the in-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). Nationalism is defined as a positive, 
emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a mentality of loyalty coupled with a 
negative view of the out-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). The Soviet successor states 
have exemplified the relationship of historical memory and nationalism as many of the 
new state governments work to reframe history in a way that supports the emergence of 
new states such as in creating new individual democracies while developing space to 





The message of historical memory is commonly dispersed through history 
textbooks, memorials, museums, and statues, and can ignite tense relationships between 
states. Such tense disagreements have been demonstrated through the relationship 
between Germany and its neighbors, such as Poland, in the remembrances of events from 
WWII (Wang, 2012; Kucia, Duch-Dyngosz, & Magierowski, 2013). The idea of correct 
remembrances through these items has also caused stressed international relations 
throughout the Asian region, most notably between China, South Korea, and Japan 
(Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka, 2010). Struggles stemming from how the past is being 
remembered continue to illicit strong public responses which are commonly displayed in 
the form of protests (Lawson & Tannaka, 2010; Yoshida, 2014 f). 
While every nation has a form of historical memory, Europe and Asia have been 
common areas where this concept has been studied. Such studies have frequently focused 
on how nations’ worldviews have changed since the impact of the specific historical 
event (Watson, 2012; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Nets-Zehngut, 2011), in understanding 
how specific events are being remembered and for what purpose (Wang, 2012; 
Unger,1993; Selling ,2011) as well as understanding how populations are choosing to 
understand and carryout reconciliation between groups and or other states (Wang, 2012; 
Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Hovland, 2013).   
The concept of historical memory has the ability to provide greater understanding 
of a population and its respective government. As such there is a growing emphasis on 
the analysis of government manipulation of historical memory to achieve specific 
purposes such as authoritarian regimes’ use to influence or repress a population as well as 





regime type, the specific government, and the government and populations relationship 
(Wang, 2012; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Crenzel, 2015; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).  
Democracies are an under analyzed field within this area of study.  Given the limited 
scope of scholarship involving democracies involvement with historical memory 
questions arise, such as do consolidated democratic governments utilize historical 
memory? What do democratic governments gain from manipulating historical memory? 
Can historical memory be used by consolidated democratic governments for legitimacy?  
In this research I will explore how consolidated democracies utilize historical 
memory through a detailed analysis of two prominent historical events; state visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine and Comfort Women.  
II. Literature Review 
The literature demonstrates a strong relationship between historical memory and 
nationalism. Many scholars have illustrated how state builders and elites utilize historical 
memory as a way to unify a population in an effort to create a new state, to gain support 
for specific policies, or to uphold government legitimacy; as exemplified by case studies 
on Israel (Shelef, 2010), Belarus (Marples, 2012), Slovenia (Luthar, 2013), and South 
Korea (Park, 2010) among others.  Along with governmental actors’ involvement with 
history, three core concepts emerged within the literature: historical memory, 
nationalism, and identity. Identity and historical memory have been widely agreed upon 
as interdisciplinary concepts with continued influence by such fields as history, 
psychology, political science, and sociology (Toshechenko, 2011; Hewer & Roberts, 






Historical Memory  
 Historical memory is part of collective memory. Collective memories are built on 
the personal memories that each member carries, personal interpretation or not, and are 
shared understandings of selected, commonly experienced historical events with framing 
values entangled with the memories. These memories of the past are not necessarily 
historically accurate (Langenbacher, 2003; Gabel, 2013). Collective memory provides a 
member with an understandable, coherent story which gives the collective a past as well 
as defining who they are today (Paabo, 2014). Memories of the collective also allow the 
population to remember together, such as the traumatic events that have occured to the 
group. Such remembering as a collective is typically stifled under oppressive 
governments (Hewer & Roberts, 2012). Langenbacher (2003) claims, “Memory is a way 
of packaging and operationalizing shared history and becomes the means by which 
history becomes an influential attitudinal force within a political culture.” As illustrated, 
memory is a personal and often an emotional portion of a person’s identity.  
 Historical memory is instrumentally crafted to create a specific vision within a 
population through selective remembering and forgetting of history that shapes a 
population’s memory of the past to achieve the crafters’ goals. The writing of history has 
been associated with power as the manipulation of the past and the collective’s historical 
memory have been a source of legitimacy for “mass-incorporating regimes” (Bernhard & 
Kubik, 2014). Thus elites have utilized historical memory as a way to support the 
legitimacy of their government or political policies (Selling, 2011). But elites are also 
constrained by the history they are manipulating through the collective memories of the 





constructed a history that they deem true. Thus, influence of this history works within the 
constraints of what the population will regard as true; once elites cross the unstated 
threshold of what is acceptably believable in historical memory they lose the trust of the 
population and are not able to achieve their goals (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).  
Nationalism 
Nationalism is a positive emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a 
mentality of loyalty. Group members’ become loyal to a defined group through the 
development of affection for the homeland and receive a form of identity and self-esteem 
from group membership. Nationalism aids in the definition of the ‘in-group’ or ‘we’ 
through the development of group loyalty as well as creating an ‘out-group’ or ‘other’ 
that is counter to the in-group. The out-group is often portrayed as the aggressor or source 
of contention toward the in-group. With nationalism’s development of a strong sense of 
love for the in-group, often an aggressive dislike for the outside group also develops 
(Druckman, 1994). Patriotism is very similar to the concept of nationalism, as they both 
have a love for the nation but, according to scholar Elie Kedourie, nationalism also 
contains a sense of xenophobia against the outside group along with the intense love for 
the ingroup. This conglomeration of patriotism with xenophobia gives nationalism a 
distinct style of politics (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 49).  
There are two major schools of thought in regards to how nationalism develops 
within a population: the instrumentalist and primordialist. The primordial scholars 
believe that nationalism is a natural development that occurs through commonalities 
among a population such as through language, ethnicity, region, religion, and customs, 





instrumentalists, like Eric Hobsbawm and Paul Brass, contend that nationalism is not a 
natural development but that it is purposefully crafted by elites to achieve goals such as 
political objectives and legitimacy of power (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). While the 
instrumentalist theory differs from primordialism, it does not refute primordial elements 
but utilizes them to promote the development of nationalism such as through 
manipulating history, culture, and education and at times can be constrained due to 
primordial elements (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 83). 
Identity 
Identity is defined as, “A deeply held sense of who a person is, where he or she 
fits in the political and social world” (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, & Preston, 2010). 
Individual identities make up the collective which aids in forming what a group is and 
what it stands for which in turn also shapes the identity of the individual (Brewer, 2001). 
This concept forms the worldview of a person, how they see themselves and their 
connection with others, including the state (Klandermans, 2014). The concept of identity 
not only provides understanding on how citizens define themselves individually and as a 
collective but also provides the ability to gain information on the worldview held by a 
collective (Enjelvin & Korac-Kakabadse, 2012).   
The identities of a person and the collective are prone to multiple influences 
(Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006). As such, elites have used this permeable 
concept as a tool to shape the collective’s identity and in turn their worldview for specific 
ends. History textbooks have been a common medium in which elites have crafted 
identity as the texts are commonly presented as legitimate forms of information (Ghosh, 





population is crafted to be connected to the past as well as provides understanding of the 
influences on the population’s worldview.  
Trends in the Literature  
History textbooks and newspapers are the largest area in which historical memory 
and nationalism have been studied. Through this channel, clear and concise messages are 
able to be distributed throughout the public. In the setting of education, history textbooks 
have a captive audience to receive the approved top down message.  National education 
is a powerful institution that employs cultural and collective memory to share 
governmentally sanctioned knowledge to the collective and new members for 
internalization (Paabo, 2014). “Textbooks are inherently political” as the country’s image 
of itself, of others, and of its past are presented within their pages and offered as 
legitimate knowledge to the public (Schneider, 2008). Commonly, textbooks have 
utilized and developed historical memory to achieve a national narrative, an identity 
within the nation, and creating an out-group to the nation’s in-group, thus aiding in the 
growth of nationalism (Paabo, 2014). Textbooks also play a “dual role” in that they 
bridge the gap between the past and the present through historical narratives and 
collective memory, and are thus employed to suit “contemporary needs” (Paabo, 2014). 
When history textbooks are approved by the state, such as in Japan and South Korea, they 
gain a “quasi-official character” and thus represent the voice of the state (Schneider, 
2008).  
Studies concerning history textbooks have been conducted in Norway, looking at 
the government’s objective of changing the populous’ negative view of Sweden 





specific national narrative or myth has been done on South Korea (So, Kim, & Lee, 2012) 
Belarus (Marples, 2012) Slovenia (Luthar, 2013) Japan (Lawson & Tannaka, 2011), and 
China (Cui, 2012). Benedict Anderson (1991) utilized newspapers as a channel in which 
to study a population. Anderson found that a population can be united through common 
language often found in newspapers that are widely distributed. Newspapers have also 
been utilized by elites and governments as another way to achieve the elements similar to 
those of textbooks such as demonstrated in studies on Israel’s historical memory and 
nationalism (Gabel, 2013; Shelef, 2010).  
Historical memory and nationalism have also been studied as channels for 
memory reconciliation through history textbooks. Europe and Asia have been analyzed in 
the area of reconciliation with focuses on Germany and Japan in their relations with 
regional neighbors (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Wang, 
2012).  
Monuments and museums are also a common area of study in historical memory 
and nationalism. Manipulation of history occurs in museums through what events are 
being displayed or not displayed as well as the type of objects being exhibited to 
remember specific events (Evans, 2011; Han, 2012; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014). Museums 
that are owned or supported by governmental agencies provide a second avenue in 
promoting specific identities or political messages beyond that of text (Wang, 2012; 
Emre Ates, 2014; Han, 2012).  Nationalism is reinforced within the population by how 
the group and the other are portrayed through these mediums. Statues are very similar to 
museums with physical representation being made of a piece of history or of a person 





sense of strong loyalty to the population (Tolvaisis, 2013). The location of statues and 
“memory sites” can also be a point of significance in regards to the manipulation or how 
an event is being remembered (Paabo, 2014). For much of Europe and Asia, the study of 
museums and statues has focused on traumatic events from the 20
th
 century, similar to the 
memory that is manipulated by elites.  
In Asia, the most common museum under study is the Yasukuni Shrine, as the 
shrine also maintains a museum as part of its structure as a memorial (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 
2014). The Shrine continues to illicit criticism and intense response from governments 
throughout Asia as well as around the world. Many studies on this site have focused on 
populations’ identity, remembrance, governmental manipulation, and reconciliation 
(Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014; Fukuoka, 2013; Deans, 2007; Ryu, 2014; O’Dwyer, 2010).  
Given technological advancements, mass media, including television, radio and 
film, have become another channel in which historical memory and nationalism are 
studied. Elites and independent organizations have utilized this technology as a way to 
easily spread their message to a majority of the public and the world. Mass media has 
been analyzed for the portrayal of the past, of the in and out group, and of the 
representation of the state and nation.  Recent studies have looked at popular icons, such 
as pop singers, and their influence on the growth of nationalism for instance with South 
Korea’s pop singer Psy and the ‘Korean Wave’ that followed with a growth of Korean 
nationalism (Joo, 2011). 
Trends in the literature have shown common ways in which historical memory 
and nationalism are studied, but as previously mentioned there is a trend in the type of 





regimes and dictatorships, to democracy is prevalent throughout the literature. Oppresive 
governments commonly inflict tramatic experiences on a population and repress the 
collective from understanding the events through collective remembering (Crenzel, 2015; 
Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). New democracies allow for the collective to remember and 
frame this remembering to support the new government by typically blaming the old 
regime. This framing has been studied to forecast whether a new democracy will 
consolidate and become stable (Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Brewer, 2008; Pridham, 2014).  
Elites have also used historical memory to propagate pro-democratic values to support 
and legitimize the new democratic state. The creation of pro-democratic values has been 
studied in transiting, unstable democracies to estimate the ability of the new state to 
survive (Langenbacher, 2003).  
Consolidated democracies have also been studied in their use of historical 
memory, although to a lesser extent compared to that of transitional democracies. Such 
studies have focused on democracies’ use of historical memory to retain legitimacy of 
political parties and to gain support for specific governmental legislation (Selling, 2011; 
Ghodsee, 2014) However, studies such as those done by Selling and Ghodsee, on Sweden 
and former communist states, fail to demonstrate the rise or fall in legitimacy through 
analysis of public approval ratings. The literature also illustrated a lack of studies 
concerning democracies use of historical memory in the Asian region as a majority 
focuses on former Soviet Union states.  Many journalists have asserted that democratic 
states, such as South Korea, manipulate historical memory for the purpose of nationalism  






III. Background Information  
Historical memory has been prominently displayed in East Asia, including South 
Korea and Japan. The memory of past events has been cited in newspapers, mass media 
coverage, and by political actors as the cause for the current strained relationship between 
the two states and as a mobilizer of the population.  A study of public opinion toward 
Japan within the Asia-Pacific region conducted by Pew Data in 2013 illustrates a low 
public opinion of Japan within the South Korean public. The unfavorable opinion held by 
the total population rates at 77%, which is higher by 25% since 2008 when the study was 
first administered. Pew relates this unfavorable public opinion to the South Korean 
population’s belief that Japan has inefficiently apologized for past actions that took place 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Pew Data Research, 2013). While there is currently no Pew Data 
on the view of South Korea within the Japanese public, such strong opinions toward 
another state due to actions that occurred more than 70 years ago highlights an active 
historical memory in which South Korea and Japan are engaged.  
Wang (2012) states, “Political leaders often use historical memory to bolster their 
own legitimacy, promote their own interests, encourage a nationalistic spirit, and 
mobilize mass support for social conflicts” (p. 26).  South Korean political parties have 
been driven by personalities since the transition to democracy in 1988. Party candidates 
have typically been chosen for their strength in pulling votes during the general election. 
Such tactics has led the political party system in South Korea to be seen as unstable with 
multiple political parties emerging and dissolving due to their centered nature around one 
particular candidate (Lee, 2014). President Park Geun-hye’s party, the Grand National 





campaign in 2012 to change the party’s image in an effort to revitalize it after multiple 
personal factions threatened to break up the GNP (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012).  
In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) has held political power since the 
transition to democracy in 1952, only losing power twice in 60 years. The Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) overwhelmingly defeated the LDP in the general elections in 2009, 
which was the second loss for the LDP. With the restoration of power in the 2012 general 
elections, it has been speculated that the LDP is facing a lack of faith from the public. 
This may be affecting their claim to power as the economy continues to stagnate with 
ongoing deflation and growing trade deficit coupled with a large aging population. It is 
also important to note that while the LDP returned to power in the 2012 election, it 
hosted 1,504 candidates which is the largest pool of candidates ever in Japan’s general 
election, even though there was only a 59% voter turnout which is claimed to be one of 
the lowest voter turnouts on record by the New York Times (Fackler, 2012). 
Specific events have been cited by political actors, nongovernmental organizations, 
and news agencies as reasons for the poor public opinion and cold relations between 
South Korea and Japan to include the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, 
commonly referred to as “Comfort Women,” the content and revisions of history 
textbooks as well as other government sanctioned literature, and the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Each event demonstrates government involvement with the remembrance of the past, 
which continually elicits public outcries against the offending state. In this research, I 
plan a detailed analysis of two historical events that impact international relations 
between South Korea and Japan; Comfort Women and state visits to the controversial 





The largest issue of contention between South Korea and Japan is the history of 
Comfort Women. The plight of the Comfort Women was brought to international 
attention in 1991 when three South Korean women filed a class action lawsuit against the 
Japanese government seeking reparations for the violence incurred against them as sexual 
slaves in the state led campaign of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery during 
WWII (Tanaka, 2002). As of late 2015 there are 53 known Comfort Women alive. Cho 
Yoon-sun, a former Korean Minister of Gender Equality and Family, attempted to meet 
each South Korean Comfort Woman individually during her term (Fantz & Armstrong, 
2014). President Park Geun-hye has also made the issue of Comfort Women a prominent 
concern for her administration through repeated public demands for the Japanese 
government to issue an official apology. President Park has also refused to meet with 
Prime Minister Abe, citing his “incorrect” view of history (Xinhua, 2014). 
The Japanese government has responded to these accusations from Seoul. In 1993, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei gave a statement apologizing on behalf of the 
Japanese government for the actions that brought about the Military Mobilization of 
Sexual Slavery. This apology has not been accepted by the former Comfort Women, 
South Korean Women’s organizations, or the South Korean government as it was not 
issued by the Prime Minister himself, is not deemed sincere, and does not compensate the 
former Comfort Women. Prime Minster Abe has publicly refused to issue a new apology 
and stands behind the current Kono Statement (Richards, 2014).  
But Prime Minister Abe has not always stood behind the Kono Statement in his 
current administration.
1
 In 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for a governmental review of 
                                                 
1
 Prime Minster Shinzo Abe was previously elected to the position of Prime Minister in 2006 and served 





the Kono Statement for its reliability on factual information which ignited public 
demonstrations and governmental outbursts in South Korea and China. After the study 
Abe ultimately chose to stand by the statement (Richards, 2014). Other governmental 
entities, such as mayors and Diet members, in Japan have also questioned the authenticity 
of Comfort Women and commonly claim that the Comfort Women system was a 
necessity during the war, not an evil (Tabuchi, 2013).  
Similar to the Kono Statement, the Japanese government under Abe has also pushed 
for a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special rapporteur’s report which details 
the plight of the Comfort Women at the hands of the Japanese military. The report 
recommends a governmental apology from the Japanese government to the women who 
were victimized as well as pay reparations (Panda, 2014).  While neither statement nor 
report was edited, the public retraction of a series of stories concerning the plight of 
Comfort Women by the popular Japanese newspaper the Asahi Shimbun, due to false 
personal accounts, has fueled Abe’s Administration’s doubt on the Comfort Women 
issues as a whole (Yoshida, 2014 b). 
History textbooks and other governmentally sanctioned publications have also caused 
public reactions and tense international relations between South Korea and Japan. Texts 
are approved by the Japanese and South Korean government before use in the educational 
system, which connotes governmental approval of the information contained within the 
publication. History textbook “incidents” against Japan occurred in 1982, 1986, 2001, 
2005, and 2009 where the South Korean and Chinese governments, and outcries from the 
respective public, claimed that the Japanese government was “down playing” past 
                                                                                                                                                 
than 2010. In Japan elections must occur no later than every four years after the Prime Minister is elected to 





atrocities by changing the words used to describe Japanese military aggression and the 
military use of sexual slavery (Yi, 2009). 
In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe expressed the mission of “restoring the 
country’s self,” which he contends has been stifled due to the explicitly negative views of 
Japanese action in past wars within educational texts. To achieve this “restoration of self” 
Abe aims to increase patriotism and a positive view of the past among the population 
through the revision of texts used within the educational system. Abe created a 
governmental committee to review possible changes to the textbook approval process, 
which suggested putting mayors in charge of their local school districts instead of the 
current national approval process. An advisory committee to the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) also proposed new standards 
requiring textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. Such actions are nothing 
new for Abe as during his first term as Prime Minister, he also vehemently pushed for 
educational textbook revisions to change books that cast Japan’s war time actions in an 
unfavorable light (Fackler, 2013).  
The South Korean government, under current President Park, has also been pushing 
for textbook revisions that restore pride in the nation’s past. Hwang Woo-yea, current 
Minister of Education, has begun pushing for the inclusion of Yu Kwan-sun, a young 
female martyr who resisted Japanese colonialization, into history textbooks. Hwang 
claims he is concerned of Yu Kwan-sun’s absence, and is contemplating government 






The publication of texts overseas has also become a point of contention between 
South Korea and Japan. In 2015, Prime Minister Abe publicly criticized an American 
textbook published by McGraw-Hill for producing a chapter that he claims depicts Japan 
as the sole aggressor during WWII and the portrayal of the Military Mobilization of 
Sexual Slavery. The Japanese Consulate General Office in New York met with McGraw–
Hill officials and demanded revisions to the text. McGraw-Hill rejected the proposed 
changes citing factual evidence for the claims. The rejection prompted the criticism made 
by Abe (Fackler, 2015).  
The South Korean government has engaged the United States in a different way 
compared to the Japanese government. In 2015, Media Joha, a South Korean online 
media company located in Palisades Park, New Jersey, announced that it would be 
distributing 20,000 copies of the book Can You Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of 
Comfort Women to U.S. politicians and public libraries for free in an effort to increase 
knowledge and awareness of the plight of victims in the Japanese Military Mobilization 
of Sexual Slavery campaign. The testimonies that make up the book were compiled and 
published by the South Korean Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims 
of Forced Mobilization Under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission). The 
book was first published in Korean and distributed by the Commission to the South 
Korean public in 2013 (Alvarado, 2015).  
The Yasukuni Shrine is also a medium of historical memory in contention 
between South Korea and Japan. The Shrine was fist established in 1869 to 
commemorate the fallen supporters of the emperor in the Boshin War (Ryu, 2007). The 





include all of Japan’s fallen military members. The ritual of the Japanese emperor visiting 
Yasukuni Shrine was also established by the Meiji government with the justification of 
ensuring the nation would continue to receive blessings from the divine spirits of the 
fallen which helped to institutionalize the Shrine in society (Breen, 2008).   
At the end of WWII, the International War Tribunals and the U.S. occupation of 
Japan changed the government’s association with the Yasukuni Shrine and the country’s 
relationship with the WWII war dead. With the commencement of Japan’s new 
constitution in May, 1947, the separation of church and state was instituted in Article 20. 
Due to this division, Yasukuni Shrine became a private religious institution (O’Dwyer, 
2010). The privatization of Yasukuni Shrine as well as the classification of war criminals 
created new difficulties in enshrining military members. The International War Tribunals 
found numerous Japanese military personnel, including top leaders, guilty of war crimes 
and classified them as class A, B, and C war criminals
2
 with varying punishments such as 
jail time or execution. The classification of Japanese military personnel as war criminals 
went against the ideology that had been promoted within Japan during WWII of fighting 
a righteous war in the name of the emperor (Higurashi, 2013).  
WWII war criminals were not immediately enshrined within Yasukuni Shrine.  
With the transition of the Yasukuni Shrine to a private religious institution, the Shrine 
was no longer able to access governmental records on military service in which to 
identify persons for enshrinement. This was a problem for hundreds of survivors who 
wanted to see their loved one memorialized within Yasukuni Shrine. In response, a new 
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 Class A war crimes refer to crimes against peace. The Class A war criminals were more widely known 
from the Tokyo Trials as they are comprised mostly of prominent leaders who are widely believed to have 
led the war throughout Asia and due to the publicity of these trials.  Class B war criminals refer to 






process for enshrinement was set up with the Yasukuni Shrine petitioning the Health and 
Welfare Ministry for information on the war dead. Once approval of the petition is 
granted, the Ministry gathers the needed information from the population and nominates 
persons from the gathered data for enshrinement at the Shrine. Yasukuni Shrine leaders 
then make the final decision on who will be memorialized (Higurashi, 2013).  
The process of enshrinement for the WWII war dead was completed in 1959; war 
criminals were excluded from this large enshrinement. After occupation, survivors of 
convicted war criminals began petitioning the government to have their loved one’s 
honored at Yasukuni Shrine. In response, the government reinstated convicted war 
criminals civil rights and made their survivors eligible for survivor benefits in 1953, 
similar to other military personnel who had died while serving. In 1959 the Health and 
Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief Bureau began sending the Shrine nominations of 
B and C war criminals for enshrinement. By 1967, 984 B and C war criminals had been 
honored, mostly without notice to the public. In 1970, the process of enshrining Class A 
war criminals began quietly. The complete honoring of this population at Yasukuni 
Shrine did not occur until 1978 due to the controversial issue of venerating class A war 
criminals. The public did not know about this commemoration until 1979, a year after the 
ceremony had already occurred (Higurashi, 2013).  
The emperor stopped his ritual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine at the news of the 
completed enshrinement of the Class A war criminals (Ryu, 2007). Regular visits by 
Prime Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, which had been a tradition since 1945, stopped 
briefly after the enshrinement of all war criminals in 1979, although it temporarily 





In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone was the first Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni 
Shrine since the enshrinement of war criminals. In 1996, Japanese Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto made one visit to Yasukuni Shrine during his term. The visit 
coincided with a tense period of Japanese relations with China and the quick return of the 
LDP to power after its first defeat in public elections (Deans, 2007). Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro visited the Shrine every year during his term from 2001-2006. 
Koizumi’s visits, while opposed outside of Japan, fulfilled a campaign promise of visiting 
Yasukuni Shrine on August 15
th3
 every year and he enjoyed considerable high levels of 
public support throughout his term (Deans, 2007). While he avoided the Yasukuni Shrine 
during his first term, current Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December, 
2013 which provided additional reasons for South Korean President Park not to meet 
with Abe during her first term and elicited public demonstrations in South Korea (Payne 
& Wakatsuki, 2013). 
Manipulation of facts is common within historical memory as elites use history to 
fit their needs (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). South Korea and Japan have had a long 
tenuous relationship, the history of the specific events being remembered have the 
potential to illustrate the importance of Comfort Women, history textbooks and 
governmental sanctioned publications, and the Yasukuni Shrine in relation to the 
populations’ collective identity and nationalism.   
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 August 15th is a significant date to both South Korea and Japan and is honored very differently in each 
country due to how each had been involved during WWII. In Japan August 15
th
 is remembered as 
Surrender Day, the day in which the Japanese government formally surrendered to Allied Forces which 
ended WWII (“Three ministers visit Yasukuni,” 2014). In South Korea August 15
th
 is celebrated as 
National Liberation Day, as with the surrender by the Japanese government in WWII, Japan lost control of 





Post WWII, relations between South Korea and Japan normalized in 1965 under 
President Park Chung-hee and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. The normalization of 
relations was a benefit to both economies but caused mass public protests in South Korea.  
The South Korean public was against the normalization due to the lack of reparations and 
acknowledgement of past wrongs by Japan, which the public demanded before the 
normalization was signed (Seth, 2011). Given the dictatorship of President Park Chung-
hee, public protests were forcefully put down and the normalization proceeded. However, 
with the settlement of normalization, Japan agreed to pay $800 million in aid to South 
Korea. Once the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed the issue of 
reparations and past wrongs were agreed to be closed (Seth, 2011 pg. 387). While the act 
of normalization was not government manipulation of historical memory, this event has 
continued in present day discussions of reparations in relation to the past. 
The Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery was a campaign of state 
approved human trafficking to appease Japanese soldiers who were given little to no 
leave during WWII.  Stations of captured women were set up for soldiers to visit during 
their free time (Tanaka, 2002). The campaign was very popular among soldiers, 
everywhere the Japanese military was present so were Comfort Stations. These stations 
drew upon invaded states’ native women and Korean women to fill the “women’s 
positions;” these women were commonly referred to as Comfort Women (Chung, 1997).   
It is estimated that 200,000 women were enslaved in this system, with 80% being Korean 
(Lie, 1997). The exact number of women enslaved during this time period is unknown as 





committed suicide themselves, or were causalities of war as Allied forces advanced and 
Japanese forces withdrew (Chung, 1997).   
During and after WWII, forced sexual slavery had been rumored among the 
public, especially in Korea. If a Comfort Woman had survived sexual slavery and been 
able to return home she typically suffered from severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), and many women had become sterile because of their ordeal. Survivors typically 
never spoke about the violence against them due to the public shame they would incur to 
their family and themselves. The Japanese government also kept the campaign secret by 
destroying documents related to Comfort Stations and Women at the end of WWII 
(Tanaka, 2002).  
The three South Korean women who had filed the reparations lawsuit against 
Japan had been supported by the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual 
Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council). The Korean Council is made up of 35 different, 
independent women’s organizations that came together to bring awareness to the specific 
issue of Comfort Women along with seeking compensation and an official apology on 
behalf of these women from the Japanese government (Pyong, 2005). Additionally, this 
issue had not been tried at the Tokyo War Trial at the end of WWII even though 
provisions in international law had made legal action for sexual violence possible 
(“Memory of an Injustice,” 2013). The Korean Council utilized government involvement 
for their cause by petitioning the South Korean government for support of the women 
identified as former Comfort Women and also in petitioning the Japanese state on their 





After the normalization of relations, history textbooks in both South Korea and 
Japan reflected the political tension surrounding the normalization. South Korean 
textbooks placed strong emphasis on the victimization of the Korean population by the 
Japanese during the colonialization period from 1910-1945 and events during WWII.  A 
number of Japanese textbooks have commonly downplayed Japanese atrocities during the 
same time period, reflecting the government’s stance against apologizing and reparations 
for the Korean population (Seth, 2011).   
Today, history textbooks within each state gain a “quasi-political character” 
reflecting state opinion since educational textbooks in Japan and South Korea are 
approved by the state before use in the education system (Schneider, 2008). Given this 
claim, it warrants a look at how texts are approved for education in each state. 
Japan has followed a governmental approval system of textbooks since 1947; 
before this time the government authored all educational texts. According to Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the process of textbook approval begins with 
nongovernmental publishers creating an academic text that fits the requirements of the 
Curriculum Guideline and educational standards set forth by the MEXT. Once the 
publisher’s book is complete it is then submitted to the Research Council who examines 
the text for compliance to the Textbook Examination Standards. From this review the 
MEXT can suggest changes, approve or reject the text. The final decision of approval lies 
with the MEXT. Upon approval of a textbook, sanctioned texts are presented as options 
for specific areas of study for the various local boards of education. Each board of 





MEXT bares all costs for publication of the chosen text for each institution (Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, 2014). 
The publication of educational texts in South Korea is similar to the process found 
in Japan. The Ministry of Education (MOE) classifies textbooks into three types; type one 
being texts whose copyright is held by the Ministry of Education, type two are textbooks 
authorized by the MOE and written by private publishers and type three are textbooks 
recognized by the Minister of Education as being relevant and useful. The MOE utilizes 
bureaus and review committees to scrutinize and create textbooks that follow the national 
guidelines and curriculum. The approved textbooks are presented to the local educational 
boards as texts from which they may choose when implementing the national curriculum 
(South Korea Ministry of Education, 2008). 
History textbooks first gained international attention within the Asia-Pacific in 
1982. During this year it was alleged that the MEXT ordered textbook authors to make 
changes to the wording of history texts; such as replacing the terms “aggression” and 
“invasion” to “advancement” when referring to Japanese action during WWII. This 
action incited public and government outcry from China and South Korea. While this 
event does not fall within a democratic South Korea, it spurred the creation of the 
“Neighboring Country Clause” which specified the consideration of neighboring 
countries perspectives in the creation and editing of Japanese texts (Yi, 2009). 
The contents of educational texts are also under scrutiny in South Korea. Since 
democratization in 1988, conservatives and more ‘left-of-center’ political groups have 
struggled against each other on how to present the past in history textbooks. Since her 





working to reinterpret her father’s, former President Park Cheung-hee who lead South 
Korea for twenty years, legacy in history texts more positively (Kim, 2014). 
IV. Methodology  
This research is based on Wang’s work (2012) and as such will follow closely his 
methodology. Similar to Wang, the independent variable in this study is historical 
memory. The dependent variables are nationalism and legitimacy, as it is hypothesized 
that democratic governments purposely manipulate historical memory for the growth of 
nationalism and thus legitimacy of political parties (Malici & Smith, 2013).  
 Comparative methodology provides the most beneficial framework in which to 
study historical memory in relation to the growth of nationalism and legitimacy. This 
methodology focuses on the internal pressures of a country, allowing a researcher to take 
into account multiple influences on the independent and dependent variables (Lim, 2010). 
I will conduct two case studies on Japan and South Korea and review the topics of the 
Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks as these historical events have 
been found to be the largest issues of the past with government involvement in South 
Korea and Japan. The most similar case study method provides the ability to employ 
process tracing and content analysis which aids in drawing connections between the 
dependent and independent variables throughout multiple sources of data. Wang also 
used case studies and is the dominant process within the comparative methodology which 
provides credence to its utility.  
The most similar case design has been selected as this approach offers the most 
control of variation between cases which allows for the influences to be identified in 





both demonstrate the use of active historical memory within each state which has 
influenced public opinion and internationals relations (Yoshida, 2014 f.) These two 
countries were also selected due to their similar regional location within Asia, their 
shared history, and democratic regime type as well as similar controversy over the 
amount of democratic consolidation within each state (George & Bennett, 2005).   
I will analyze the cases from 1988 to 2015. The starting point of 1988 was 
selected as this was the first point in time that both states were democratic; South Korea 
began free elections at the national level in 1988. Data collection from this time period 
will be gathered through public newspapers, government personnel speeches and press 
releases, as well as history textbooks or literature publications supported by the 
government. Newspaper sources will include The Japan Times and The Korean Herald. 
Google Alerts will also be utilized in retrieving newspaper sources from the internet from 
a wide variety of newspaper sources like CNN, Reuters, Yonhap News, the New York 
Times, the Wall Street Journal as well as other popular domestic and international news 
agencies. Key phrases such as “Comfort Women,” “Yasukuni Shrine,” and “history 
textbooks” will be screened in the sources to determine their usefulness to the research as 
well as any government involvement with the remembrance of the past. Information on 
history textbooks and government supported literature will be gained through official 
government websites. Government officials’ speeches will be accessed through news 
agencies, including those previously mentioned and official government websites.  
Statistical data will be gathered through Pew Research Center, The Genron Non-
profit Organization (NPO), and East Asia Institute as well as other potential 





governmental actions and of the populations’ “other” group. Statistical data will also be 
gathered on election results, in relation to election years or seasons, and the voter 
population as well as public support of candidates throughout their term in office. Such 
figures will be gathered from nongovernmental organizations and news agencies.     
While multiple tense events related to the remembrance of the past fall within this 
time period, the time frame does pose a challenge for the scope of this research. Process 
tracing and content analysis rely on careful review of multiple sources of data. Twenty 
seven years is a vast time frame for review. To aid in further limiting the amount of time 
under review, years of when specific events occurred, such as official visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine or the governmental release of literature, will be identified and reviewed.  
Language also poses a difficulty to the research as dominantly English sources 
will be utilized due to a language barrier. Sources only in English have the potential to 
have biases due to the material being written for a more “western” audience, therefore 
missing conceptual meanings or importance found within the original language. 
Additionally, popular English news agencies which present information that fit within the 
scope of research also present the data with a cultural bias. I will work with Wright State 
University (WSU) Japanese language students, WSU Asian Association as well as friends 
and family members who are fluent in Japanese or Korean to locate and translate Korean 
and Japanese source material such as newspaper articles and governmental documents to 
help offset the dominant English language sources. This form of data collection with 
translation has the bias of human error through the incorrect translation of meaning or of 







There are four expected findings in this research;  
1. Elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when faced 
with challenges to the state or population, such as an economic crisis;  
2. Historical memory is used similarly during elections in South Korea and 
Japan, even though both countries hold a different type of democracy;  
3. When historical memory is promoted by elites, public protests against the 
outside group will increase; and  
4. Similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will manipulate 
historical memory through textbooks, political speeches, and monuments. 
  
The subsequent chapters will proceed by first presenting the factual history of the 
issue involved within the historical memory of the Japanese and South Korean 
population. After the history is presented the chapters will review the governmental 
involvement of Japan within the specific topic of historical memory along with the South 
Korean government’s response to such action through the organization of a case study. 
Likewise, the case study will then review the South Korean government’s involvement 
with the specific topic and the response of the Japanese government. The chapters will 
conclude with analysis over the events discussed. Three case studies will be presented on 
the historical memory issues of the Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history 
textbooks.  
Chapter two will examine the historical memory of Comfort Women by first 
presenting the Comfort Women history and the events that led up to the exploitation of 
women within the Asian region during WWII. The case study will progress into a 
discussion of events where the Japanese government was involved with the remembrance 





will then delve into the events where the South Korean government was involved in the 
historical memory of Comfort Women and the response by the Japanese government. The 
chapter will close with an analysis of the governmental actions. 
 Chapter three will begin by exploring the history and significance of the 
Yasukuni Shrine. Once the history of the Shrine is presented, the case study will show the 
Japanese governmental involvement with the historical memory of the Shrine and the 
South Korean government’s response to Japan’s actions. The South Korean governmental 
action will then be detailed as well as the response by the Japanese government toward 
the South Korean government’s action. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the 
governmental actions.  
Chapter four will present the importance of history textbooks within a population 
and the history of the textbook conflict between Japan and South Korea. After the history 
and importance are discussed, the case study will review the government of Japan’s 
involvement with history textbooks and the South Korean elite’s response. Likewise, the 
government of South Korea’s involvement with history textbooks will be discussed along 
with the response by the Japanese government to the South Korean governmental action.  
Chapter 5 will provide a general analysis of the three case studies focusing on the 
trends in governmental action and the populations’ response, along with the tendencies in 
the growth and decline of public support of the respective government during the 
presence of historical memory. Since historical memory is a concept that is created by the 
population with unspoken boundaries, the constraints of elites will also be discussed. 
Additionally, since Japan and South Korea had distinctly different experiences within in 





period of time will also be included within the final analysis. The chapter will close with 





I.   “Comfort Women” in Historical Memory  
Rape has been used as a weapon of war since the beginning of war itself. 
According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High commissioner, the 
intent of rape as a weapon is to, “humiliate, dominate, instill fear, disperse and/or forcibly 
relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group” (United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2008). The Japanese Military Mobilization of 
Sexual Slavery was a campaigned of human trafficking that mercilessly exploited the 
women of occupied territories during WWII. This large enterprise clearly represents the 
definition of a weapon used in war as multiple societies lived in humiliation and fear of 
this specific act by Japanese Imperial forces.     
  Japan had been involved in military altercations with China that began in 1911, 
which stemmed from the Japanese seizer of Manchuria (Drea, 2009). As the war with 
China prolonged and became stalled, the Japanese military came to view military brothels 
or “comfort stations” as a necessity since soldiers were not given leave to return home 
from war during this period of time. Comfort stations were provided to military members 
as a leisure experience while on deployment. The idea that comfort stations were a 
requirement of military forces led to the expansion of stations throughout all Japanese 
occupied territories, and further, wherever the Japanese military was present from 1932 
until 1945 (Tanaka, 2002). Accurate numbers of the amount of women victimized 





Slavery, are not available due to the destruction of evidence by Japanese forces at the 
conclusion of WWII (Tanaka, 1998). However, historians and human rights scholars 
estimate that 200,000 women had been brutalized through this system of government 
sectioned and supported human trafficking (Henry, 2013). 
 The earliest record of comfort stations identified in the Pacific region was found 
in a letter of request from Japanese Army Lieutenant Okamura Yasuji, dated 1932, who 
was stationed in Shanghai, China. The letter was sent to the governor of Nagasaki 
Prefecture to petition for the acquisition of women for comfort stations, commonly 
referred to as Comfort Women, for the Japanese troops fighting in the Shanghai War. 
Within the request Okamura stated that he found the idea of comfort stations from the 
Japanese Navy which was stationed in the same area during that time. His letter further 
suggests that Japanese overseas military brothels had been created prior to 1932 (Chung, 
1997).  
 As expansion progressed, Japanese leaders’ had rising concerns over the 
increasing anti-Japanese sentiment throughout occupied areas, which they attributed to 
the rape of occupied citizens by military members. Supporters of military brothels 
asserted that repressing sexual desires of military men would lead to the escalation of 
rape and other sexual crimes (Garon, 1993; Lie, 1997). Okamura claimed after the 
establishment of military brothels in his region that “he was pleased to see that soldiers’ 
rapes of Chinese women decreased after the arrival of women from Japan” (Chung, 1997, 
223).  
 Early military brothels were made available exclusively to officers and only 





undergo medical examinations from military doctors, which mimicked the standard 
examination process of prostitutes enforced within Japan. Along with controlling sexual 
crimes committed by military members, brothels dedicated to military use were also 
justified as being an effective way to control venereal diseases among soldiers since 
women without sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were being supplied to troops (Lie, 
1997; Tanaka, 2002).  A Ministry of Army survey conducted in 1938 found that 11 out of 
1,000 soldiers had a venereal disease (Lie, 1997).   
 In 1938, Japan created a full scale system of Military Mobilization of Sexual 
Slavery. The war in China was lasting longer than anticipated which increased calls by 
Japanese leaders for the mobilization of human resources. The mobilization of women for 
sex slaves occurred in war efforts throughout Japan, in the colony of Korea, and later 
throughout occupied territory. This mobilization effort increased the number of women 
being recruited and brought to places like China for comfort stations (Chung, 1997).  
 Recruiters were employed by the Japanese military to find women to fill the 
comfort stations, often by any means necessary. Women in poverty typically fell prey to 
recruiters as the promise of work or money was a common phrase to lure females into 
slavery. Korea became a prime location for the abduction of women as the population 
was made destitute by colonization which pulled resources from Korea for use in Japan 
thus obliterating the Korean economy. Forced kidnappings of women became prevalent 
as the sexual slavery campaign continued, especially as the populations became more 
aware of the recruitment lies and women increased in scarcity (Tanaka, 2002).   
 In the expansion efforts of the sexual slavery campaign in 1938, the Japanese 





comfort stations without interference from local consulates. The same year the Ministries 
approved access to comfort stations for all military members and banned attendance at 
non-military brothels. In response to new comfort station regulations, military units were 
told to prepare for an increase in comfort stations through the mobilization of women and 
the establishment of designated areas for stations. Comfort stations were provided with 
food, limited medical supplies, and condoms furnished by the Japanese military (Tanaka, 
2002). 
 Forced sexual slavery became part of the Japanese Imperial Army’s strategy as 
the Meiji government planned to conduct war against the Allied Forces. Stations began to 
be systematically established in country soon after occupation occurred. Comfort stations 
appeared throughout Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines while 
maintaining the stations in China (Chung, 1997).  
  While the Ministries of the Army and Navy regulated and helped to maintain 
comfort stations throughout the military, there were three different classifications of 
locations that were utilized by military forces. Permanent stations were attached to large 
supply bases located in or near major cities. When Japanese women were involved with 
comfort stations they were commonly found at permanent stations. Semi-permanent 
stations were attached to large army unites such as divisions, brigades, and regiments. 
Both the permanent and semi-permanent stations were rigorously controlled by the unit 
or branch they belonged too but were often directly managed by private brothel owners 
that had been contracted by the Japanese military.  Temporary stations were set up and 
maintained by small battalions, usually near the front lines. Native women of occupied 





population could be found throughout the Military Mobilization System in all stations 
(Tanaka, 2002).  
 Hundreds of thousands of women were needed to fill the demand for comfort 
stations. Scholars estimate that upwards of 200,000-400,000 women were victimized as 
Comfort Women, 80% of which were Korean. This “Korean hunting” relied heavily on 
force and deception. Comfort Women were treated like military supplies, with one 
woman for every 40 men (Lie, 1997). While Japanese women were not excluded from the 
Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, racism facilitated the exploitation of non-
Japanese women for the system as the nationalism promoted by the Meiji government 
depicted other populations as inferior, even the Korean population whom had been 
upheld as racially similar to the Japanese (Lie, 1997). 
 Women were procured through many different avenues such as state sponsored 
recruiters and brothel owners as previously mentioned, but records have also indicated 
that policemen, local officials, and leaders from the colonial government also took part in 
forcible trafficking (Chung, 1997).  Many Women were taken through means of deceit 
through promises of employment within factories and restaurants (Kim, 2014). Other 
women were physically kidnapped off the streets. During her testimony in 1992 at the 
first press conference held by the Task Force on Filipino Comfort Women, Maria Rosa 
Henson gave a detailed account of being forcibly kidnapped as she was traveling within 
the Philippines and held against her will for nine months where she was repeatedly 
brutalized (Henson, 1999; Chung, 1997).  
 The life of a Comfort Woman was brutal. Comfort station facilities were 





converted into stations, even school buildings and temples. As stations were set up closer 
to the front lines, military tents or part of the barracks were used. Facilities were typically 
divided with the use of thin screens or curtains. The women lived in small rooms usually 
with only a bed or futon in each room. Women were provided with a disinfectant, 
typically a cresol soap solution, and were instructed to wash after every encounter 
(Tanaka, 2002). Often times this instruction was not followed due to the large amount of 
soldiers arriving each day. As soon as the comfort station opened for service in the 
morning men often waited in line until the close of the station late in the evening 
(Henson, 1999).  
Maria Rosa Henson describes such days of not having any rest except for an hour 
at lunch and an hour at dinner. Comfort Women very rarely received days of respite, at 
times she was given rest days when she was menstruating or ill but this was not 
guaranteed. In addition, Women were only given a small ration of food each day, 
typically only enough to keep them alive. A Comfort Woman’s day was filled by being 
raped repeatedly anywhere from 10 to 30 men a day (Henson, 1999). 
Soldiers were allotted certain times they could visit the station with regular file 
and rank members usually allowed to visit on their off days once a week and officers 
allowed to visit any time they wished. Before their visitation, soldiers were often required 
to purchase tickets for their visits which were given to the Comfort Woman upon 
entrance into the room. At the end of the day or beginning of the next the woman would 
turn in the collection of tickets to the station manager. Military regulations stated that 
members were allotted 30 minutes with Comfort Women but on very busy days men only 





campaign was that Comfort Women received no part of the ticket sales even though 
regulations allowed for women to be compensated (Tanaka, 2002).  
Even though it was promoted as a way to prevent the spread of STDs, the comfort 
stations were unsuccessful in this promise. The Ministries of the Army and Navy 
provided stations with condoms that men were required to use during each visit. 
However, men would often refuse the condoms. In addition soldiers rarely disclosed 
venereal diseases to their senior officer for fear of punishment. Thus contracting STDs 
was a fear for Comfort Women. When STDs were discovered at the routine medical 
examinations, the woman would be injected with the highly potent “Number 606,” 
salvarsan, which has harmful side effects. Other women who were found to have serious 
venereal diseases were prohibited from returning to the comfort stations. It is not known 
where the women were sent or if they left the facility alive (Chung, 1997). 
Along with STDs, pregnancy was another health concern for Comfort Women. 
Due to the violent life they were forced to endure many women did not know they were 
pregnant until a miscarriage occurred. However, if a pregnancy resulted in a live birth 
Comfort Women were not permitted to keep the infant, the child was typically taken from 
the mother soon after delivery. It is not fully known what happened to the infant after 
being taken from its mother but it has been suggested by scholars that the child was 
killed. If a woman knew she was pregnant she would typically assist in bringing on a 
miscarriage herself by not eating or by drinking a certain strong herbal tea. The military 
doctors who performed the routine medical examinations would not perform abortions 





Physical abuse was also present in the daily lives of the Japanese sex slaves. 
Accounts from former Comfort Women detail events where they were beaten multiple 
times a day by men who would hit them with closed fists all over their body, or would 
smash their heads or other body parts against room walls or bed posts (Henson, 1999). 
Women usually sustained severe injures due to these encounters. Violence was fueled by 
soldiers who would take their anger out on the Comfort Women, were quick to anger if 
they did not feel satisfied after their visit, or were violent when they were drunk. 
Regulations stated that men were not to enter the station premise while intoxicated. 
Nevertheless nothing was done to inforce this regulation or to keep violence from 
occurring on site beyond controlling riots while the soldiers were waiting in line (Chung, 
1997). 
 Due to the lifestyle and mistreatment, the overall health of Comfort Women 
rapidly declined. Because of the amount of forced intercourse, the violent nature of such 
attacks, and home abortions, the women often became sterile or physically deformed 
(Lie, 1997; Chung, 1997). While enslaved, some women became addicted to drugs as a 
way of mental escape. Others committed suicide as the physical and mental trauma was 
too much to bear. Suicide was committed by drinking the cresol soap solution that was 
provided for washing or purposefully overdosing on drugs which were openly provided 
within the station (Tanaka, 2002). The women who survived were typically left with 
paralyzing PTSD. Maria Rosa Henson vividly recounts her physical response to her past 
mistreatment which included losing her hair, being unable to speak for years, and being 





mental scars she had sustained while the painful memories and panic attacks attached to 
them lasted the rest of her life (Henson, 1999). 
Women enslaved in this system were held for different lengths of time. Policy 
stated that women were “mobilized” for about twelve months. However, Korean women 
who were transported to foreign countries were enslaved for three to five years. If they 
were freed from captivity there was no support in returning to their home nation. Other 
populations, typically women native to the area, were held for less time, anywhere from 
three months to a year (Tanaka, 2002). 
 As the demand from comfort stations remained undiminished throughout WWII, 
the Japanese government had to increasingly rely on local, non-military personnel for the 
procurement of women as the military campaign became widely known and feared 
throughout the general public. In 1943, the Women’s Voluntary Labor Service Corps (the 
Corps) was organized in Korea by the Japanese government and quickly became 
synonymous with the forced sexual slavery campaign. Through the Voluntary Labor 
Service Law, enacted in 1944, any unmarried woman between 12 and 40 years old was 
required to serve at least 12 months in war time activities. Women in the Corps were 
moved across Korea and into Japan where they worked in factories, assisted medical 
personnel, and other war activities. But the law increased the difficulty and scarcity of 
women who could be mobilized for the comfort stations. Due to the shortage, some 
women were deferred to comfort stations to fulfill their required war time activities 
without notice of the sex work in which they were slated (Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).  
 Many Korean families tried to have their daughters married quickly as a form of 





great that neither age nor marital status were taken into account when kidnapping 
females. Women also searched from employment so as to already be employed in war 
time activities without service in the Corps. Unfortunately, official employment offices as 
well as promises of employment with local brokers created an easy way in which to 
capture women (Chung, 1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002). 
 As WWII was drawing to a close the comfort stations fell into chaos. As Allied 
troops advanced, Comfort Women became civilian causalities of war through the 
Japanese military neglect or with purposeful intent. Some women were forced to serve 
Japanese soldiers in underground shelters during bombing attacks, perishing along with 
them. Others were murdered while the Japanese forces committed suicide. Some were 
murdered by being placed in caves or submarines and then deserted. The most common 
response was for the Japanese military to abandon the stations with the women inside, but 
some battalions would burn the station with the women inside, as they left (Chung, 
1997).  
 Many of the women who were abandoned and survived had great difficulty 
returning home. Some were saved by U.S. military and aided in their return home. 
Unfortunately, some overseas Comfort Women were unable to return home or chose not 
to return due to the shame they felt they would incur to themselves and their family from 
their enslavement. It is not known how many women died as victims of warfare (Chung, 
1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).  
The settlement of peace between the Allied nations and Japan was a vast and 
complicated task. The end of WWII was made more complex given the expansive war 





where the Japanese military was present (Maga,2001). In 1945, the United Nations 
Crimes Commission (UN Commission) was created to ensure the detection, 
apprehension, trial, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes, with potential 
charges of Class A-crimes against peace, Class B-conventional war crimes, and Class C-
crimes against humanity. Due to the vastness of WWII, the majority of responsibility for 
field investigations and the preparation of charges fell to individual Allied nations in 
countries where the crimes occurred (Henry, 2013).  
 Of the many trails of Japanese personnel after WWII, the Tokyo Trails became 
the most widely known due to the high ranking military leaders and government officials 
indicted on crimes against peace. Laws establishing the protection of human rights and 
peace were first created for the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trails, as the UN Commission 
created a list of 32 crimes that were punishable at the subsequent trials which included 
rape and the abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution 
(Maga, 2001; Henry, 2013). 
While the Tokyo Trails, as well other WWII criminal trails, created important 
laws and precedence for the protection of humanity as well as settling the matter of peace 
after WWII, the Tokyo Trials have been met with criticism since their conclusion. Such 
criticism includes that the verdicts favored the victors, or Allied Nations, and that there 
was a lack of support for Asian victims within trial decisions (Maga, 2001). Sexual 
slavery has also become a point of contention in review of the trials as crimes conducted 
against women forced into sexual slavery were never brought to trial. No rape victims or 





other trials held across Japan. Additionally, rape was not counted as a crime against 
humanity or a war crime in the Tokyo Charter (Henry, 2013).  
While information was not brought before the courts for the crimes of rape and 
forced sexual slavery as the law had allowed, there was information available to do so 
given public knowledge of the campaign by participating Japanese military members, 
forced Korean laborers, testimony of surviving victims, and the U.S. military 
involvement in returning surviving Comfort Women home (Tanaka, 2002). Justice for 
Comfort Women was socially constrained at the time due to cultural and societal beliefs 
of not speaking of sexual relationships in public forums and the lack of women’s rights 
within the region and the world (Pyong, 2005; Henry, 2013).  
Relations normalized in 1965 between South Korea and Japan under South 
Korean dictator, President Park Chung-hee and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. 
While normalization occurred 50 years ago, details within this agreement continue to 
influence South Korean and Japanese relations today. The normalization of relations 
brought a boost to both states’ economies but it incited riots within the South Korean 
public. Riots broke out as the normalization process progressed as the public demanded 
reparations and Japanese governmental acknowledgement of past wrongs before normal 
relations were restored. Given Park’s control of the government, he forcefully put down 
the protests and the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed. With the 
agreement, both states consented to close the issue of reparations and past wrongs related 
to WWII and the colonization of the Korean peninsula, which included the issue of 
Comfort Women.  The Japanese government also agreed to pay $800 million in aid to 





The history of Comfort Women did not enter into the Japanese national discourse 
and discussion of WWII upon its conclusion. Information regarding the issue was not 
readily available to the public due to the destruction of information at its conclusion and 
information being contained within classified government documents. The national 
discussion and educational representation of the WWII in Japan focused more on the 
Japanese experience than that of also including the victimization of other nations due to 
Japanese action (Tanaka, 2002; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Harney, 2014).   
Even though the Japanese government did not directly acknowledge their 
involvement with atrocities such as the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, Japanese 
soldiers’ diaries and memoirs concerning events of WWII were published as books 
available for purchase by the public. The Japanese public had vague knowledge of the 
events of forced sexual slavery during the war, but it was often portrayed as freely chosen 
military prostitution or romanticized as love during the struggles of war (Hyun & Yi, 
2003).   
Rumors of the forced exploitation of women during WWII within the Korean 
public were rampant after WWII. Due to the Korean War, dictatorship, and the 
authoritarian regimes that followed WWII there was not an open social space to discuss 
and pursue the collective remembering to address the atrocity of Comfort Women fully 
until democratic elections in 1988. During the South Korea’s struggle for democracy in 
the 1970s and 1980s, women’s rights organizations grew alongside pro-democracy 
groups. These women’s rights organizations first started with the cause of equality in the 





Comfort Women when their plight came to light during the 1980s as women’s groups 
were continuing to increase (Cho, 1998; Pyong, 2005). 
I. Japanese governmental use and response to the history of Comfort Women  
In 1991, lawsuits filed by South Korean Comfort Women brought the atrocities of 
the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery to international attention. After the 
first South Korean case, similar lawsuits followed from Filipinos and Taiwanese women. 
Of the lawsuits filed by Comfort Women in 1991 to 1992, all were rejected by the 
Japanese courts. Comfort women from the around the world have continued to submit 
lawsuits requesting compensation and governmental acknowledgement of the pain the 
Japanese government inflected during WWII, as of yet no such lawsuit has won in the 
Japanese judiciary system (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).   
The first Comfort Woman to file a lawsuit against the Japanese government and 
publicly share her testimony was Kim Hak-sun from South Korea. Her testimony inspired 
Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki to conduct research on the Japanese government’s 
involvement in the Comfort Station campaign. Yoshimi’s research unearthed 
governmental documents pertaining to the organization of Comfort Stations within the 
archives of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. He published his findings in major 
newspapers around Japan in 1992 (Nozaki, 2002). Due to the strong accusations made 
against the Japanese government within the lawsuits and from Yoshimi’s evidence from 
governmental records, Prime Minister Miyazawa’s administration launched a 
governmental investigation in 1991 to assess government involvement in the Military 
Mobilization of Sexual Slavery (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.).  





 The governmental study on the issue of Comfort Women was carried out by the 
Japanese Cabinet Councillors' [sic] Office on External Affairs from December 1991 to 
August 1993. The study reviewed governmental agencies and their documentation related 
to WWII that included the National Police Agency, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, the Ministry of Labor, the National Archives, and the National Diet Library. 
Along with Cabinet officials exploring Japanese government documentation, they also 
visited the U.S. National Archives to gather relevant information (Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.). 190 documents pertaining to the issue of Comfort Women were 
found throughout the government agencies. Along with government documentation the 
Cabinet Councilors’ Office also collected personal testimonies from 16 former Comfort 
Women as well as Japanese military veterans (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).  
 The study concluded with results of the investigation being publically announced 
by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei on August 4, 1993. Kono stated that the study 
confirmed that the Japanese Imperial Military was involved with the establishment, 
organization, and recruitment of a great number of women whose totals were largely 
composed of Korean citizens. Kono further acknowledged that women forced into the 
Sexual Slavery Campaign suffered immense misery and indignity. He offered apologies 
on behalf of the Japanese government for the brutality that was inflicted on these women 
which is reflected in the full statement in appendix A. Kono’s public announcement is 
commonly referred to as the Kono statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 b.; 





The Kono Statement has been pivotal in framing the government response from 
Japan on the issue of Comfort Women, specifically towards South Korea, since its 
creation. After the Kono Statement, three Japanese Prime Ministers offered apologies for 
the comfort system campaign, which included, Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992, Hosokawa 
Morihiro in 1993, and Murayama Tomiichi in 1995, please see Appendix B,C, and D for 
full statements (Memory & Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific, 2007 b.; Appendix B,C,D 
respectively). Most notably, these apologies were on behalf of the Prime Ministers 
themselves and make a clear distinction between the current democratic government of 
today versus the Imperial government during WWII.  
While Japanese Prime Ministers have publicly offered their sincerest apologies to 
the Comfort Women, no compensation has ever been provided by the Japanese 
government. The Japanese government refuses compensation to individual South Korean 
Comfort Women citing the 1965 normalization agreement where the issue of reparations 
for past violence was agreed to be closed (Japan Daily Press, 2013).   
Current Prime Minister (as of 2016) Abe Shinzo has also been actively involved 
with the issue and remembrance of Comfort Women. Since the beginning of Abe’s 
second term in December 2012, there have been four incidents where the authenticity of 
the Comfort Women history has been publicly questioned through rhetoric or action.  
The first such event includes the possible revision of the Kono statement. As Abe 
began his second term, he was under suspicion by the international community for 
potentially revising the Japanese Comfort Women apology due to multiple statements on 





officially assumed office as Prime Minister. In March, 2014, Abe made a public 
announcement that he would not revise the statement (Quigley, 2014).  
 But in April 2014, Abe created a committee of five experts, in the fields of law 
and history from prominent universities with previous distinguished careers from around 
Japan to review the Kono Statement. The panel was given the task to evaluate the 
Statement for evidence of coercion by the South Korean government and the historical 
accuracy of information relating to the Japanese government’s involvement in the sexual 
enslavement of women. The panel reviewed classified governmental documents 
concerning the Kono Statement and historical evidence on the sexual slavery campaign. 
While the review was being conducted, Abe and his cabinet stated that they would not 
revise the Kono Statement no matter the outcome of the review. In June, 2014, the 
committee released their findings and stated that there was evidence of coercion by the 
South Korean government through specific wording to force the Japanese government 
take responsibility, that during the creation of the apology the South Korean government 
was not seeking compensation for Comfort Women, and that the statement was issued so 
that bilateral relations with South Korea would not deteriorate. The panel also claimed 
they did not find any evidence directly connecting the Japanese government to the 
recruitment of Comfort Women (Yoshida, 2014 a.). 
The intention of not revising the Kono Statement became uncertain again in 
August, 2014 when a large popular newspaper based in Japan, the Asahi Shimbun, 
retracted a number of stories published concerning the Comfort Women in the 1990s. The 
first publication of the Comfort Women articles was controversial due to the blame that 





lawsuits that were being filed by former Comfort Women. The articles were given 
credence due to their reliance on personal testimony from Yoshida Seiji, a man who 
claimed he kidnapped Korean women to work in comfort stations. These articles were 
retracted in August, 2014 as the Asahi Shimbun claimed they had evidence that Yoshida 
had falsified his testimony (Yoshida, 2014 b.). This retraction of Comfort Women articles 
by a leading newspaper has helped to fuel Abe’s apparent campaign of questioning the 
history of Comfort Women.  
On October 1, 2014 Abe weakly reaffirmed his commitment to not revising the 
Kono Statement (Richards, 2014). However, following this second claim of not revising, 
his cabinet vowed to correct “wrong” information circulating worldwide. On October 16, 
2014 Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide contacted Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission, and requested a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special 
rapporteur’s report on the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery she authored. Suga 
and the cabinet pressed for the revision due to the inclusion of testimony from Yoshida, 
which the Asahi Shimbun had found false. The request was denied citing that the report 
was based on multiple sources of evidence with a strong reliance on former Comfort 
Women’s testimony. Yoshida’s testimony was just one supporting piece of evidence that 
was included (Yoshida, 2014 e.). 
Response to Challenges 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996) set up the Asian Women Fund 
(AWF) in 1995 in response to the demands from regional governments and their 





the AWF was created so that the Japanese population could atone for the Military 
Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. This sentiment of country wide atonement is also 
reflected in the AWF’s mission statement.  While the Japanese government paid for the 
operational costs of the AWF, it was led by its own Board of Directors (Asian Women’s 
Fund, 2007). 
The AWF raised 600 million yen during its twelve operational years through 
donations from multiple sources throughout the population which included Diet 
members, Cabinet Ministers, companies, labor unions, political parties, and individual 
contributions in an effort to compensate and support former Comfort Women. Beginning 
in 1996, each woman who was identified by their respective government as a former 
Comfort Woman, and then whose name was sent to the AWF, received 2 million yen for 
her personal use and 3 million yen provided by the Japanese government for medical 
expenses through governmental agencies and welfare projects (Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). 
The Comfort Women who received the monetary offerings from the AWF 
included 211 women from the Philippines, 61 women from South Korea, and 13 women 
from Taiwan. Women from the Netherlands, and Indonesia were never identified by their 
governments and so the AWF conducted social welfare projects in the respective 
countries which included the construction of living facilities for the elderly in places 
where Comfort Women were believed to have lived with first priority occupancy 
provided to former Comfort Women. Grant money for the care and support of WWII 
survivors was also made available to Indonesia and the Netherland governments’ welfare 





 When a former Comfort Women received compensation from the AWF, an 
apology letter from the Japanese Prime Minister followed. The letter acknowledged the 
atrocity that Comfort Women were forced to endure and expresses atonement for the past 
in the form of monetary compensation on behalf of the Japanese people including the 
Prime Minister. The letter was first written and sent by Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Ryutaro and was subsequently resigned by Prime Ministers Obuchi Keizo, Mori Yoshiro, 
and Koizumi Junichiro. The letter stayed the same under each administration as shown in 
Appendix E. Unfortunately, rumors abounded that the women who accepted 
compensation from the AWF would be barred from filing lawsuits against the Japanese 
government for the atrocities they were forced to endure. The AWF published a statement 
on their website refuting these claims (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; 
Appendix E).   
 While the AWF’s main objective was to atone for the Japanese population’s 
misdeeds of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, it avowed in its mission 
statement that the fund would also support projects aimed at resolving contemporary 
problems concerning women such as domestic violence. In the effort to tackle women’s 
issues, the AWF created the Women’s Dignity Project where it supported various NGOs 
that championed women’s rights, held round table discussions, and led international 
conferences (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007). 
 In 2000, former Prime Minister and creator of the AWF, Murayama Tomiichi was 
elected as the fund’s President. Seven years later, under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the 
fund closed, as it was determined that the AWF had completed its mission of atonement 





Sexual Slavery on its website (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).  Funds, such as the 2 million 
yen for personal use and the 3 million yen for medical support is no longer provided to 
any additionally identified Comfort Women from the AWF or the Japanese government. 
Interestingly, on March 1
st
, 2007, the same month that the AWF closed, Abe gave a quote 
stating, “The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion," which supported a 
group of 120 LDP lawmakers in their proposal that same year to revise the Kono 
Statement (Tabuchi, 2007). 
The Internet has also become a point of contention where the Japanese 
government has had to respond to challenges on the issue of Comfort Women. On 
October 15, 2014, Japan’s Foreign Ministry took down a page of its website dedicated to 
the 1995 appeal for donations on behalf of the AWF. While the AWF has been closed 
since 2007, the Foreign Ministry page also included a deeply remorseful apology to the 
victims of the sexual slavery campaign. According to the Reiji Yoshida, the key portion 
of the donation appeal read: 
Particularly brutal was the act of forcing women, including teenagers, 
to serve the Japanese armed forces as ‘comfort women,’ a practice that 
violated the fundamental dignity of women. No manner of apology can 
ever completely heal the deep wound inflicted on these women both 
emotionally and physically (Yoshida, 2014 d.).  
 
The repeal of the page came after Yamada Hiroshi’s, Secretary-General of Party 
for Future Generations, request at the Diet session on Oct. 6, 2014 for the review and 
removal of government documents that erroneously cite government responsibility in the 
issue of Comfort Women. In response to protests from South Korea, Chief Cabinet 





natural maintenance of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website since the page was related 
to the AWF and further was not written by government officials (Yoshida, 2014 d.). 
Memorials  
Memorials have also been a point of contention between Japan and South Korea. 
Japanese leaders, including Ministers and Director-Generals, have been frequently vocal 
in their call for the South Korean government to remove statues commemorating Comfort 
Women within South Korea and around the world during their respective Minister and 
Director-General meetings.  
Of specific concern is the Comfort Woman commemorative statue placed outside 
the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The statue is of a young Korean woman, dressed in 
traditional garb, sitting solemn in a chair with an empty chair beside her. The statue is 
strategically placed across the street from the Japanese Embassy, facing the building’s 
front entrance (The Korean Herald, 2014). The Japanese government is also concerned 
about similar statues placed around the world commemorating Comfort Women. Of 
those, two have been erected in the United States, one in Paradise Park, New Jersey and 
the other in Glendale, California. Both sites are home to identical statues to the one in 
Seoul and were erected by Korean-American organizations (Schrank, 2013). 
The discussions on commemorative Comfort Women statues peaked in late 2014.  
Japanese leaders demanded the removal of the Comfort Women statues in Seoul to 
improve bilateral relations, but South Korean leaders responded saying that they were 
unable to remove the statues since they were erected by private organizations who had 





resolve the issue themselves through a correct apology and compensation to victims (The 
Korea Herald, 2014).  
II. South Korean governmental use and response to the history of Comfort 
Women  
Similar to the Japanese government, the South Korean government has been 
actively involved with the remembrance of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery 
campaign but, unlike the Japanese government South Korean leaders have acted in 
support of the former Comfort Women and their history. Government involvement with 
championing the cause of reparations, support, and remembrance of Comfort Women 
began most notably during the transition of the state from authoritarianism to democracy, 
specifically under the growth of South Korea’s Women’s Movement.  
The Women’s Movement within South Korea first developed under the 
authoritarian leadership of President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) in response to his 
agenda of rapid industrialization (Seth, 2011). This agenda left labor rights, protections, 
and safety nonexistent within the workplace. Women were specifically targeted during 
the industrialization campaign as they were seen as a source of cheap labor and easily 
controlled. Many women toiled long hours in factories that were unsanitary and 
dangerous. These women also typically experienced violence, such as sexual harassment 
and abuse, from supervisors who were usually male (Ching & Louhe, 1995).  
Women’s unions, composed mainly of financially poor factory women, developed 
in the late 1960s in response to the continued deplorable working conditions. A second 
major focus of the women’s movement developed around abolishing the Family Law in 





under South Korea’s first president, Rhee Syngman. This law institutionalized many of 
the Confucian values that were entrenched within Korean society as well as a Japanese 
family organization system that was used during colonialism (Lee & Lee, 2010).  
Lee Tai-young, the first South Korean female lawyer, advocated for the 
abolishment of the Family Law and constructed as well as sponsored nine organizations 
to support women around South Korea, which included the Women’s Issues Research 
Center and the Young Women’s Christian Association (Cho, 1998).  
Both movements came together for the cause of democracy. The South Korean 
public had strived for democracy since the end of the Korean War and had over thrown 
the first president, Rhee Syngman, through public protests over corruption. The 
movement for democracy continued under President Park Chung-hee, although it was 
severely oppressed through force. The Women’s Movement joined the cause of 
democracy in the 1970s. Through the democratic cause, the Family Law and women’s 
labor movement came together to become more organized, expand their objectives 
beyond that of labor and the Family Law, and develop a collaborative network 
connecting multiple women’s groups. A great influence from the democracy movement 
was the developed awareness of equality within a democratic state where women and 
men can equally shape the government.  
The democracy movement succeeded in 1988 with the free election of Roh Tae-
woo as President. The Women’s Movement blossomed at the dawn of democracy. In 
1989 there were 2,000 women’s organizations compared to 18 in the 1970s and 23 in the 
1960s (Lee & Lee, 2013). The large number of women’s organizations provided the 





objectives. In 1987, 27 women’s organizations came together to form the Korean 
Women’s Associations United (KWAU) with the fundamental objectives of passing 
legislation for the protection of women and children against sex trafficking and violence, 
to make such actions illegal, and the abolishment of the Family Law which was 
successfully repealed in 2005. An important feature of the KWAU, that continues today, 
is that while KWAU provides a platform for multiple women’s organizations to 
collaborate, it is also organized with the purpose of the Women’s Movement speaking to 
the government with one voice (Ching & Louhe, 1995).  
Another important collaboration of women’s organizations is the Korean Council 
for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council) which was 
created in 1989 from 36 independent women’s organizations that focused on combating 
sexual tourism and sexual violence. With the liberties that came with democracy many of 
the individual member organizations, like the Korean Church Women United, began to 
conduct research on the long rumored Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, 
which initiated the creation of the Korean Council for a combined effort in researching 
and addressing this issue (Pyong, 2005).  
Part of the research the Korean Council conducted was collecting testimonies 
from living former Comfort Women. The Korean Council took out newspaper ads as well 
as ads on the radio asking former Comfort Women to come out from hiding and share 
their story. One of the women was Kim Hak-sun. Kim, working with the Korean Council, 
held a press conference in 1991, in Seoul where she publicly shared her experience of 
being a Comfort Woman. After her public testimony, 200 women from South Korea and 





and Taiwan also chose to share their encounters with the Korean Council once Kim’s 
testimony gained international attention, which prompted the Korean Council to expand 
their call for testimonies beyond South Korea.  Later that same year in December, the 
Korean Council supported and encouraged three former Comfort Women as they filed 
lawsuits against the Japanese government for reparations due to violence against them 
during WWII (Pyong, 2005).  
Speeches and Pronouncements 
 Since the 1991 Comfort Women lawsuits, the South Korean leadership has been 
calling for the Japanese government to make a correct apology and reparations to living 
Comfort Women to atone for misdeeds in WWII. Such calls have come from standing 
Presidents, Foreign Ministers, Cabinet Members, and Chief of Commissions among 
others. The Minister of the Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) and the Chief of the 
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under 
Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission) have been two fervent outspoken 
leaders on the issue of Comfort Women as both organizations prioritize this issue within 
their respective mission objectives (The Korea Herald, 2013 a.; Fantz & Armstrong, 
2014). 
  Even though South Korean leadership had been pushing the Japanese 
government for redress on the issue of Comfort Women since 1991, some activists 
groups and survivors claimed that the South Korean government was not doing enough 
on the behalf of the former Comfort Women to reach a solution. In August 2011, South 
Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that “the Korean government had failed to make all 





2013), which “constitutes infringement on the basic human rights of the victims and a 
violation of the Constitution.” (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). The Constitutional Court 
ruling ignited an active whole of government response in making diplomatic effort to 
obtain compensation and solution for the former Comfort Women.  
After the Constitutional Court decision during a regular scheduled Foreign 
Ministers meeting in October, 2011, Kim urged Gemba for compensation and a 
governmental apology from Japan to the former Comfort Woman. Likewise, the 2011 
MOGEF Minister, Kim Kum-lae called for the Japanese government to make an official 
apology while former Comfort Women are still alive during a visit to a shelter for elderly 
women. The Chief of the Commission, Yoon Mi-hyang, also made a public statement 
calling the Japanese government to help the surviving Comfort Women regain their 
human rights and repair their reputation by issuing a government apology (Laurence, 
2011). 
 In December, 2011, President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) also participated in 
rectifying the issue of Comfort Women during his visit to Japan where he urged Prime 
Minister Noda Yoshihiko (2011-2012) to make the issue right, with an official apology 
and compensation, while surviving Comfort Women are still alive. Noda, like all of the 
Japanese Prime Ministers before him, stood behind the Kono Statement and the 1965 
Normalization of Relations Agreement (Foster, 2011). 
 The fervency of seeking acceptable governmental resolution on behalf of 
surviving Comfort Women did not end with President Lee. President Park Geun-hye 
(2013-present) has made the resolution of Comfort Women central to her administration. 





office. This freeze in relations has lasted nearly three years, since the beginning of Park’s 
term in 2013 until the first initial meeting in November, 2015 (Choe, 2015).  
 Park has been vocal in calling for Japan to acknowledge the history of Comfort 
Women to make amends for the state’s past atrocities through compensation and a correct 
government apology. Park has been quick to issue such statements and rebukes in 
response to Abe’s controversial actions such as over the committee review over the Kono 
Statement. In addition to publicly stating frustration over Japan’s actions and decision, in 
this event the Park administration also lodged a formal complaint with Japan’s 
ambassador to Korea. Additionally, other actions that have elicited responses from the 
Park administration include Abe’s visit to Yad Vashem, a memorial in Jerusalem for the 
victims of the Holocaust in January, 2015 (Yonhap News, 2015). Park has also been 
willing to criticize Japan’s incorrect view of history and its failure to address the Comfort 
Women issue around the world such as at the South Korean-European Union Summit on 
November 9
th
, 2013 (Hofilena, 2013). 
 Park has not been the only active member of her administration in addressing the 
issue of Comfort Women. While Park has not been holding high level meetings with Abe 
until late 2015, lower levels of government such as Foreign Ministers and MOGEF 
Ministers have been continuing to meet and address the Comfort Women. Foreign 
Minister Yun Byung-se made a public statement on October 23
rd
, 2014, while in the 
United States, urging Japan to resolve the Comfort Women issue. Additionally, MOGEF 
Minister Cho Yoon-sun (2013-2014) had been attempting to meet each South Korean 





 While the Japanese government continues to stand behind the Kono Statement 
and the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement and thus not issuing an apology or 
reparations, the Japanese government also believes that the AWF provided appropriate 
compensation to surviving Comfort Women. The South Korean government, as well as 
activist groups, does not see compensation from the AWF as an acceptable form of 
compensation for the atrocities former Comfort Women sustained as the funds are not 
directly from the government but by donations from private individuals and businesses 
(Asian Women’s Fund, 2007). 
 Of the registered surviving Comfort Women only 61 accepted the funds from the 
AWF before its closure in 2007 (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Many former 
Comfort Women were pressured by activist groups as well as governmental agencies not 
to take the compensation the AWF was offering. According to the project completion 
report from the AWF, President Kim Dae-jung created a fund to support surviving 
Comfort Women with money from the South Korean government as well as the Korean 
Council, but this money was only provided to women who did not accept AWF funds. 
142 women accepted this fund and agreed not to accept funds from the AWF (Asian 
Women’s Fund, 2007). 
Response to Challenges 
The Korean Council and the KWAU, have been, and currently are, active in the 
remembrance of Comfort Women. During the administrations of Presidents Kim Young- 
sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae-joung (1998-2003) women’s organizations enjoyed 
strong support from the government. Such support propelled the South Korean women’s 





Conference on Women in 1995 held in Beijing, China. One of the most important take 
away from both of these administrations was that it set the framework for increased 
government involvement into the Women’s Movement through a small commission on 
Women Affairs, which planned and carried out policies for women. The success of the 
Women Affairs commission in supporting women through government action led to the 
creation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Ministry of Gender Equality & 
Family, 2012).  
 The MOGEF was founded in 2001 by its first title, Ministry of Gender Equality. 
In 2005 the Ministry was renamed to include family. Objectives of this Ministry include 
implementation of “women, family and youth policies so that each member of the nation 
can be benefited through the whole life [sic]” (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 
2012). The MOGEF works directly with the KWAU, and as such places large emphasis 
on combatting human trafficking. Through the emphasis on human trafficking and 
KWAU’s work on the issue of Comfort Women, the MOGEF is a leading governmental 
agency with dedicated efforts to the issue of Comfort Women. The MOGEF has allocated 
funds for the support of Comfort Women with the objectives of “Support to stabilize the 
livelihood of comfort women and related commemoration business” (Ministry of Gender 
Equality & Family, 2012). 
 While the MOGEF includes support for former Comfort Women as part of its 
mission, this is not the only government agency within South Korea to do so. In 2005, on 
the 60
th
 anniversary of the conclusion of WWII and the end of the Japanese 
colonialization of Korea, President Roh Moo-hyun established the Commission. This 





President, and has been empowered by each successive President since 2005. Beginning 
in 2013, the Commission has been actively working toward becoming a standalone 
governmental agency (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).  
 The mission of the Commission is to provide awareness of the atrocities that the 
Korean people were forced to endure in WWII at the hand of the Japanese and to seek 
redress for the victims. Such reparations include the return of Korean people’s remains to 
South Korea, public Japanese governmental apology to the victims and their families, as 
well as financial compensation. The Commission also maintains a record of self-
identified victims (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).  
The Commission has estimated that 7.8 million Koreans were forcibly mobilized 
under Japanese occupation for labor, such as in factories and coal mines, for military 
service, and to service Japanese personnel, such as Comfort Women, throughout its 
growing empire. As of August, 2012 there were 226,000 registered South Korean forced 
labor victims (The Japan Times, 2012). 
 Under President Lee’s Administration, the Comfort Women issue reached a 
particularly tense period in February, 2012 when a former special rapporteur on the U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Gay McDougall, met with Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan to 
suggest forming an arbitration panel with Tokyo to reach a resolution for surviving 
Comfort Women. McDougall argued that, “The Japanese government remains liable for 
grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their 
totality to crimes against humanity.” Kim acknowledge the option that McDougall 





survivors, the South Korean government is determined to do everything it can to resolve 
the issue (The Korean Times, 2012). 
  While Lee again pressed for an apology and compensation from Prime Minister 
Noda during a second state visit in August, 2012 South Korean Foreign Ministry officials 
claimed that an arbitrations board would not be perused due to the potential deterioration 
of relations such an action would cause (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). 
Memorials  
 While the South Korean and Japanese governmental view of how to rectify the 
issue of Comfort Women has been at a standstill for a number of years, the beginning of 
meetings between Abe and Park have brought new matters to the forefront. The growth 
of commemorative Comfort Women statues around South Korea and the world, 
particularly in the United States, has become an additional point of contention within the 
Comfort Women dispute. Bilateral talks between South Korean and Japan are currently 
stalled as Abe has placed the condition of removing the statue outside the Japanese 
Embassy in Seoul for resolving the tense diplomatic relations surrounding the history of 
Comfort Women (The Asahi Shimbun, 2015). The commemorative statue outside of the 
Japanese Embassy was erected by the Korean Council in 2011 not only to honor former 
Comfort Women but to also highlight the 1,000
th
 weekly protest held by supporters of 
Comfort Women demanding an official apology and compensation. The Japanese 
government has requested the removal of this particular statue multiple times since its 
creation, first by Prime Minister Noda (Foster, 2011).  
 Such commemorative statues have been created and placed by private, student, 





South Korean leaders, Foreign Ministers, Director-Generals, and President Park, have 
stated that all of the monuments that have been raised, which have been in the last five 
years, are not of the South Korean government’s doing but by private donors who follow 
the law when they are established. South Korean leaders commonly refer the Japanese 
government back to the South Korean government’s approved method of resolving the 
Comfort Women issue and the most likely way of removing the Comfort Women statues 
issue (The Korea Herald, 2014). 
III. Chapter Analysis  
Japan and South Korea have both demonstrated involvement from the entire 
government in the history of Comfort Women as illustrated through the events detailed in 
the previous sections. There is a trend in the position of government involved with this 
history. Figure 1 below categorizes each event in the case study in relation to 



















Number of Gov’t Actions Officials Involved Category Event Description 
6 4 actions: Prime Ministers 
 




1. PM Miyazawa 
apologizes in regards to 
Comfort Women at the 
South Korean National 
Assembly, 1992 
2. PM Hosokawa 
apologizes for Comfort 
Women at the 127th 
session of the Japanese 
National Diet, 1993 
3. PM Tomiichi publicly 
apologizes to Comfort 
Women at the founding 
of the AWF, 1995 
4. PM Abe creates a 
committee to review the 
Kono Statement, 2014 
5. Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Kono issues the results 
of the Japanese Comfort 
Women Study, 1993 
6. Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Suga request revision of 
UN report on Comfort 
Women, 2014 
8 7 actions: Prime Ministers 
 
1 action: Diet 
Members/Lawmakers 
Response to Challenges 1. PM Tomiichi creates 
AWF, 1995 
2. PM Hashimoto creates 
apology letter for AWF 
compensation, beginning 
in1996 
3. PM Obuchi resigns AWF 
apology, 1998-2000 
4. PM Mori resigns AWF 
apology, 2000-2001 
5. PM Koizumi resigns 
AWF apology, 2001-
2006 
6. PM Abe closes AWF, 
2007 
7. PM Abe gives a public 
statement against the 
Kono Statement, 2012 
8. 120 LDP lawmakers 
draft a proposal to revise 
the Kono Statement, 
2007 
5 5 actions: Ministers and 
Directors 
Memorials and Offerings 1. 2014 Japanese and South 
Korean Ministers met 
during Director-General 














Number of Gov’t Actions Officials Involved Category  Event Description 
11 5 actions: President 
5 actions: Ministers 




1. Pres. Kim creates a South 
Korean Comfort Women fund, 
1995 
2. Pres. Lee calls for an 
official apology and 
compensation to PM Noda, 
2001 
3. Pres. Park refuses to meet 
with PM Abe, 2013 
4. Pres. Park lodges formal 
complaint against Japan, 2015 
5. Pres. Park publicly criticizes 
Japan, 2013 
6. At 2011 Foreign Ministers 
meeting, South Korea 
Ministers call for an official 
apology and compensation to 
former Comfort Women  
7. MOGEF Minister calls for 
apology an official apology, 
2011 
8. Chief of the Commission 
calls for compensation and an 
official apology, 2011 
9. Foreign Minister gives a 
public statement calling for an 
official apology and 
compensation, 2014 
10. MOGEF Minister publicly 
meets with Comfort Women, 
2014 
11.Constitutional Court ruling 
on government involvement 
with the settlement of the 
Comfort Women issue, 2011 
4 3 actions: President 
1 action: Minister 
Response to Challenges  1. MOGEF established under 
Pres. Kim, 2001 
2.Pres. Roh established the 
Commission, 2005 
3. Pres. Lee calls for an 
official apology and 
compensation after arbitration 
is cancelled, 2012 
4. Foreign Minister considers 
arbitration panel, 2012 
2 2 actions: President Memorials and Offerings 1. Pres. Lee told PM Noda an 
official apology and 
compensation will remove the 
statue, 2011 
2.Pres. Park told Japanese 
leaders that they have the 
power to remove the statue 














All of the events under review show the active involvement of high levels of 
government. Participation by multiple levels of government casts doubt on popular 
newspaper claims that engagement in the history of Comfort Women center around single 
political actors such as Prime Ministers Abe or Koizumi.  
For the category of Speeches and pronouncements, Japan had four events of 
government involvement while South Korea had eleven. In both governments, the 
Executive was equally as involved in addressing the issue. Likewise, the category of 
Response to Challenges also saw the most involvement from the President and Prime 
Minister while the category of Memorials was divided with the South Korea President 
responding more than the Japanese Prime Minister. The number of acts from the 
leadership of each respective government, as well as the involvement of high level 
officials, demonstrates a vested interest in how the history of Comfort Women is being 
told as well as perpetuating their specific understanding of what it means to have the 
issue of Comfort Women resolved.  
The majority of the Comfort Women issues between the Japanese and South 
Korean government has been over the idea of remedying the wrongs of the past on behalf 
of the former Comfort Women. The Japanese government has offered apologies for the 
event of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, as Figure 2 illustrates, but has never 
offered compensation as the Japanese government stands behind the 1965 Normalization 
of Relations Agreement as do the Japanese Courts (Asian Women Fund, 2007).   A chart 
depicting the ideas or words used by political leaders was not created as four out of the 
six Speeches and Pronouncement category were found to be apologies on behalf of the 





call for compensation and an appropriate apology. However, since apologies by the 
Japanese government have been issued in the two categories of Speeches and 
Pronouncements as well as Response to Challenges, Figure 2 provides some analysis of 
the data in relation to Japanese government involvement.  
Figure 2. Japanese government apologies for the Military Mobilization of Comfort 
Stations 
 
Number of Gov’t apologies             Officials Involved                  Event Description 
9 8 apologizes: Prime 
Minister 
1 apology: Chief Cabinet 
Sec. 
1. PM Miyazawa apologizes in 
regards to Comfort Women at 
the South Korean National 
Assembly, 1992 
2. PM Hosokawa apologizes for 
Comfort Women at the 127th 
session of the Japanese National 
Diet, 1993 
3. PM Tomiichi publicly 
apologizes to Comfort Women at 
the founding of the AWF, 1995 
4. PM Tomiichi creates AWF, 1995 
5. PM Hashimoto creates apology 
letter for AWF compensation, 
beginning in1996 
6. PM Obuchi resigns AWF 
apology, 1998-2000 
7. PM Mori resigns AWF apology, 
2000-2001 
8. PM Koizumi resigns AWF 
apology, 2001-2006 
9. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono 
issues the results of the Japanese 
Comfort Women Study, 1993 
which offers an apology and the 
history is reaffirmed as true. 
 
 Similarly, while the Japanese government has apologized through the Kono 
Statement, which is currently the government sanctioned way to resolve the issue of 
Comfort Women, the case study demonstrates that the South Korean government has 
continually rejected all of the apologies as an appropriate form of atonement for the past 
wrongs against Korean Comfort Women. South Korean leadership have continued to call 
for compensation and an official apology from the Prime Minister on behalf of Japan. 





South Korean politicians because they were not on behalf of the Japanese government but 
personal apologies and not accompanied with compensation directly from the Japanese 
government to former Comfort Women. The same message of an appropriate apology 
and compensation to surviving sexual slavery victims is found throughout all the 
categories by the South Korean leadership.  
While the Japanese courts have been involved with the issue of Comfort Women 
in relation to lawsuits, the South Korean Constitutional Court has also been involved by 
requiring the South Korean government to seek compensation and an appropriate apology 
from the Japanese government.  The case of government involvement in seeking and 
obtaining compensation for former Comfort Women was first brought to the courts 
through distressed activists and survivors for the cause. Such an action to prompt the 
Court to motivate the government illustrates a strong relationship of government 
legitimacy to the memory of Comfort Women. The population expects a competent 
government to work towards and achieve compensation and apology on behalf of 
survivors.  Additionally, in the 17 events of governmental involvement in the memory of 
Comfort Women, Japan is the sole perpetrator of crimes against Comfort Women and the 
only government that is able to provide the complete resolution to the history. This idea 
of a “sole perpetrator” is an act of othering by the South Korean elite towards Japan. The 
Korean Comfort Women are portrayed as part of the in group, one of the population’s 
own, who have been victimized by the out group. Thus, the population is motivated by a 
sense of nationalism to seek redress from the outside group.  
Likewise, the Japanese elite are developing a sense of nationalism within the 





apologies compensation is withheld as a point of national pride. The government seeks to 
separate itself from the dark past through the Normalization of Relations Agreement with 
South Korea. The government of Japan today is portraying itself as separate from the evil 
past and thus as a good government, population, and in turn as a positive “in group” 
through apologizing and moving forward. 
All the government officials involved in the case study have maintained the status 
quo of their respective government in relation to Comfort Women except for Prime 
Minister Abe. Abe and his cabinet have deviated twice in the four events under the 
Speech and Proclamation section, first in making a committee to review the authenticity 
of the Kono Statement and in his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requesting a revision to 
the UN report on Comfort Women. Through his actions, Abe has directly questioned the 
history of Comfort Women which has increased the negative response from the South 
Korean government.  
His actions to revise the Comfort Women history illustrate a motive in changing 
the narrative of the historical memory within the Japanese population. The goal of 
creating a more positive retelling of history has the potential to create a more positive 
view of the Japanese society and again developing a more positive view of the in group. 






I.  Yasukuni Shrine in Historical Memory  
Yasukuni Shrine (literally ‘peaceful national shrine’) (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014) is 
a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Japan that was created by the Meiji government in 1896 to 
memorialize and house the souls of those who died fighting on behalf of the emperor in 
the Boshin War (O’Dwyer, 2010). At Japan’s entrance into conflicts after the Boshin War 
(1868-1869), the Shrine was expanded to honor all of Japan’s citizens, military and 
civilian, who died on behalf of the country in military altercations. The conflicts 
memorialized at Yasukuni Shrine are the Saga Uprising (1874), the Seinan War (1877), 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the First 
World War (1914-1918), the Manchurian Incident (1931-1932), the China Incident 
(1937), and World War II (13-937-1945) (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008; Drea,2009). The 
Shrine proclaims, “the 2,466,000 divinities enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine all sacrificed 
their lives to the public duty of protecting their motherland” (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). 
These persons who gave their lives are honored as heroic souls (The Asahi Shimbun, 
2013). Among Japanese citizens there are also a number of former colonial Korean and 
Taiwan soldiers enshrined at Yasukuni who died while serving Japan in WWII (Inuzuka 
& Fuchs, 2014).  
Yasukuni Shrine follows the traditions and belief system of Shinto. A part of 
Shinto is the tradition of respecting and worshipping the deceased. It is believed that 





their loved ones. The act of worshiping the guardian deities becomes a way in which to 
show honor and respect to these persons (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). While Yasukuni 
Shrine honors the war dead and reveres them as deities who impart their blessings on the 
nation (O’Dwyer, 2010), there are no bodies or ashes contained on premise. 
Enshrinement is a ritual, or spiritual ceremony, conducted by the Shrine’s priests. 
The only physical connection to the person being honored is a small slip of paper with 
their name that is housed at the Shrine’s repository (Breen, 2008). 
Along with the repository of the enshrined names, Yasukuni Shrine is made up of 
other significant historical items that are specifically militant in nature given the original 
intent of the Shrine’s creation. Around the grounds and at the Shrine’s entrance are 
multiple statues of imposing military figures and tributes to military events.  Depictions 
include events from the Meiji (1868-1912) and Showa (1926-1989) periods (Perez, 1998) 
as well notable events from WWII, such as a statue depicting a Kamikaze pilot 
(O’Dwyer, 2010). Along with memorials such as these, Yasukuni Shrine also 
encompasses the Yushukan. According to Shaun O’Dwyer, the Yushukan is a museum 
dedicated to memorializing the history of sacrifice and weaponry of Japanese forces 
before the Meiji era until present day. Such artifacts include weapons, uniforms, battle 
relics and other memorabilia throughout these periods, however, materials from WWII 
dominate the museum (O’Dwyer, 2010).  
Yasukuni Shrine has had a unique history with the Japanese government since its 
creation. Yasukuni Shrine’s commemoration of war casualties and Shinto’s connection 
with the emperor became a tool used by the Meiji government. The emperor preformed 





Meiji oligarchs’ modernizing agenda. The Meiji government’s use of Shinto traditions 
was the beginning of the modern ideology known as State Shinto (Breen, 2008; 
O’Dwyer, 2010).  The tradition of the Emperor visiting Yasukuni Shrine and presenting 
the Shrine with offerings at the Great Rites of Autumn and Spring was established under 
the Meiji government as well (Breen, 2008). The commonality of Shinto and a shared 
place to mourn the war dead helped to unite Japan after the Tokugawa era (1600-1868) 
(Perez, 1998) and also aided in developing a sense of nationalism throughout the 
population.  
The Meiji government continued to utilize the Yasukuni Shrine as a source of 
nationalism and unity for the population throughout its time in power. Such use is 
exemplified in the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors (1882) as it stressed loyalty 
to the emperor as commander-in-chief and promised the reward of enshrinement as a 
divine spirit at Yasukuni Shrine. A customary farewell by kamikaze pilots to each other, 
as reported by Shaun O’Dwyer, was, “see you at Yasukuni” illustrating the power of the 
Shrine within society and the role of the Meiji government in promoting such a belief 
(O’Dwyer, 2010).  Due to the glorification of death on behalf of the emperor, the 
Yasukuni Shrine became identified with the virtues of loyalty, self-sacrifice, and 
nationalism within the population (Breen, 2008; Ryu, 2007).   
With the significance placed on the Yasukuni Shrine, the Meiji government directly 
oversaw its administration. The Shrine was overseen jointly by the Ministry of the Army 
and Ministry of the Navy. The Ministries handled the operations of Yasukuni Shrine such 
as determining the days of ritual, appointing priests, and managing the Shrine’s funding. 





provided the Shrine with ample amount of funds to cover expenses (Breen, 2008). With 
the government oversight, the Ministry of the Army and the Navy were able to directly 
nominate and approve persons for enshrinement (Ryu, 2007).  
The conclusion of WWII and the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945 to 1952) 
changed the Yasukuni Shrine’s relationship with the government. During occupation, the 
U.S. and the new Japanese government
4
 created a new constitution for Japan which 
included the separation of government and religion, this separation is still a part of the 
Japanese constitution today in Article 20 (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the installation of the 
new constitution, Japan had the option of making Yasukuni Shrine a non-religious 
governmental organization or a private religious institution. The Shrine today is a private 
religious organization separate from the government (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the 
separation, Yasukuni Shrine lost the status of Special state-funded Shrine as well as the 
direct relationship with the government that had aided it in receiving government records 
of deceased military members for enshrinement (Breen, 2008).  
While it became a separate entity apart from the government, the Shrine 
maintained its original mission of honoring citizens who died on behalf of the state 
through enshrinement. The Health, Labour, and Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief 
Bureau (today the Social Welfare and War Victims' Relief Bureau) (Japan Ministry of 
Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2015) provided former military members and repatriated 
citizens with social services. Since this bureau worked directly with the population who 
                                                 
4
 The pre-war Japanese Constitution, written in 1890, was found to be flawed in a post-war Japan, in part, 
due to the extensive power that was given to the military. The Japanese leaders created the Constitutional 
Problems Investigation Committee to draft a new constitution for Japan which was comprised of various 
Japanese groups and scholars. The first draft created by the committee was submitted to the MacArthur 
government for approval. The draft was rejected and returned with a suggested draft and edits from U.S. 
scholars. The second draft constitution was submitted to the Japanese National Diet where it was debated, 





had the potential to be honored at Yasukuni Shrine, the responsibility of gathering the 
information needed for the process of enshrinement, such as name, age, regiment, rank, 
place and date of death, was organized under the Repatriation Relief Bureau once the 
Ministries of the Army and Navy were reorganized (Breen, 2008). A new process of 
sending governmental records to Yasukuni Shrine was implemented.   
Instead of being readily supplied with the government personnel information as 
had been done previously, Yasukuni Shrine now has to officially request information on 
the war dead from the government. From this request the Health and Wellness Ministry 
sends each prefecture a survey to compile the necessary information. Once the surveys 
are completed, the Health and Wellness Ministry compiles information cards which are 
then sent to Yasukuni Shrine for consideration. The Shrine makes the final decision on 
who are honored and who are not (Higurashi, 2013).  
The new system of enshrinement was first practiced in April 1959. The vastness 
of WWII in the Asia-Pacific left a large number of persons available for enshrinement as 
well as numerous persons missing in action, unidentified, or left behind, who also had the 
potential for enshrinement albeit missing crucial information.  Honoring those deceased 
in WWII began slowly in 1945 and concluded in 1959 with a mass memorial service. 
There were no war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during these subsequent 
rituals (Breen, 2008; Higurashi, 2013).  
The label of war criminal was first established and tried in a court of law at the 
conclusion of WWII at the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Trials (Maga, 2011). With the 
conviction of nearly 5,000 Japanese military members as Class A, B, and C war 





Japanese war criminals in relation to honor at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi, 2013). During 
WWII, propagandists had promoted the divinity of the emperor and that through the 
pledge of loyalty to him any solider that died in battle died for a just cause since the 
emperor was divine (O’Dwyer, 2010).  
The enshrinement of war criminals occurred gradually. Class A war criminals 
were widely known, given the publicity of the Tokyo Trials where 28 military and 
government leaders were indicted on crimes against peace as they ordered and led the 
war in Asia. 25 men were sequentially charged, two died in prison before trial 
proceedings were finished, and one man’s case was dismissed due to mental instability 
(Maga, 2011). There were 4,830 military members convicted as either Class B or C war 
criminals (Higurashi, 2013). Due to Allied war crimes trials throughout the Asia-Pacific, 
and with the high volume of military members indicted for crimes, these persons were 
not widely known by the public (Maga, 2011).   
In 1958, the Health and Wellness Ministry quietly sent out the informational 
surveys to gather the personal information of Class B and C war criminals for 
consideration of enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine, due in part to the lobby of deceased 
war criminals’ loved ones. The public was not notified of the dissemination of the 
surveys or of the plans to pursue possible enshrinement of war criminals, due to the 
government’s fear of widespread negative public opinion and possible repercussions. The 
limited knowledge of war crime classification also helped to keep the process of 
enshrinement quiet (Higurashi, 2013).  
In 1959, under Head Priest Tsukuba Fujimaro (1946-1977) the first collection of 





sets of Class B and C war criminals had been enshrined, totaling 984 persons. Family 
members of the Class B and C war criminals were not notified of the enshrinement until 
after enshrinement occurred, even though some families had opposed enshrinement of 
their loved one (Higurashi, 2013). 
The enshrinement of Class A war criminals was not as simple as Class B and C. 
The Japanese government had to proceed with greater caution than before due to the wide 
spread knowledge on who constitutes a WWII Class A war criminal. In 1966, the Health 
and Welfare Ministry once again began quietly sending out informational surveys, this 
time for the collection of Class A war criminals’ personal information. The public was 
not notified of this collection of data with the intention of enshrinement (Higurashi, 
2013). 
In 1970, a group of 14 deceased Class A war criminals was submitted to the 
Yasukuni Shrine for consideration of enshrinement. The Lay Council of Yasukuni Shrine 
passed a resolution calling for the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals but left the 
timing of when to perform the ceremony up to the head priest. While Head Priest 
Tsukuba had worked quickly to honor Class B and C war criminals, he was not in favor 
of enshrining  Class A war criminals and held off the enshrinement for this population as 
long as possible (Higurashi, 2013). 
Tsukuba died in March, 1978.  That same year in July, Matsudaira Nagayoshi was 
installed as Head Priest. Matsudaira moved quickly to honor the Class A war criminals. 
In October, 1978 all 14 Class A war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during 





In April 1979, it was announced to the public that all of Japan’s war criminals had 
been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. According to Higurashi Yoshinobu, the public had a 
limited reaction to the news (Higurashi, 2013). However, the enshrinement of Class A 
war criminals did affect the relationship between the Emperor and the Yasukuni Shrine. 
The Showa Emperor stopped his visits to the Shrine as a show of opposition to the 
Shrine’s decision to honor Class A war criminals. The last visit by the Emperor to 
Yasukuni Shrine was in 1978. Currently, while the tradition of an Emperor visiting 
Yasukuni to pay respects to the war dead have been informally stopped, an imperial 
emissary continues to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and provides offerings on behalf of the 
Imperial Family (O’Dwyer, 2010; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014). 
While Imperial visits stopped after 1978, visits by Japanese prime ministers to 
Yasukuni continued. It had become a tradition since the conclusion of WWII for prime 
ministers to pay their respects to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine during their 
administration. According to Phil Deans, every prime minister from 1945 until 1985, 
except for Prime Ministers Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1955) and Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-
1957), visited the Shrine at least once during their time in office.  While the tradition of 
visiting Yasukuni Shrine by sitting prime ministers still occurred after the enshrinement 
of Class A, B, and C war criminals such visits came under scrutiny once the 
enshrinement of all war criminals was brought to light (Deans, 2007).  
The scrutiny of prime minister visits stemmed from the discussion of separation 
of religion and government detailed in the Japanese Constitution (Article 20). Many 
prime ministers, such as Prime Minister Miki (1974-1976), declared that he was visiting 





with his official title or using any state funds and properties to visit the Shrine which he 
claimed did not violate Article 20 (Deans, 2007).  
Visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine briefly stopped in 1985 under Prime 
Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) in response to the negative international reaction to his 
visit. Prime Minister Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985 in honor of 
the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of WWII. His visit was met with protests from 
China and South Korea who believe that such visits to Yasukuni Shrine by prime 
ministers honor the atrocities committed by war criminals enshrined there. 1985 was the 
first time a prime minister had been criticized internationally for visiting Yasukuni. 
Nakasone personally did not visit the Shrine again as Prime Minister out of respect for 
Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea. An incumbent Japanese prime minister 
did not visit Yasukuni Shrine again until 1996 with a visit by Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Ryutaro (Deans, 2007).  
I. Japanese governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine  
Memorials and Offerings   
Visits by Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine have continued to be the largest 
part of neighbors’ complaints in regards to the Shrine itself. As such the section of 
memorials and offerings was chosen to be discussed first in this chapter. Beginning in 
1996, there have presently been eight visits by an acting prime minister to the Yasukuni 
Shrine as illustrated in Figure 3 below, each was met with criticism from the Asian area, 
including South Korea. 
 
Figure 3: Japanese Prime Minister’s Visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
 
Date      Prime Minister   Political Party  Event for visit 








August 13,2001 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; 
Honoring the end of 
WWII while avoiding 8-
15 
April 21, 2002 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; 
Annual Spring Festival 
January 15, 2003 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; New 
Year 
January 1, 2004 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; New 
Year 
October 17, 2005 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; 
Annual Fall Festival 
August 15, 2006 Koizumi Junichiro LDP Campaign Promise; 
Anniversary of end of 
WWII  
December 26, 2013 Abe Shinzo LDP Honoring 1
st
 anniversary 
of administration in 
office 
 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998) was the first acting prime 
minister to visit the Shrine in over a decade since visits stopped in 1985 with Prime 
Minister Nakasone. When questioned about his visit to the Shrine as a government 
official as well as its potential impact on relations with other states in the region, 
Hashimoto stated, “Why should it matter? It’s time to stop letting that sort of thing 
complicate our international relations.” Further, Hashimoto signed the Yasukuni Shrine 
guest book with his official title. Additional questions concerning his visit were directed 
to the Prime Minister’s Office where they were left unanswered (The New York Times, 
1996).  
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) has gone to Yasukuni Shrine 
more than any other incumbent prime minister since 1996. Out of the eight prime 
minister visits since 1996, Koizumi attended the Shrine six times; once a year during his 
administration. The visits came as the fulfillment of a campaign promise where he 
pledged to visit Yasukuni Shrine every year while in office, even on August 15
th
, the 





Koizumi’s first visit occurred on August 13, 2001, purposely avoiding the August 
15
th
 anniversary so as not to further infuriate regional neighbors. The visit brought 
criticism from China and South Korea as well as reproach from supporters and some LDP 
party members who had pressed for the first visit to occur on August 15
th
 (Strom, 2001). 
However, his final visit as Prime Minister occurred on August 15
th
 to commemorate the 
61
st
 anniversary of WWII (Onishi, 2006; Keck, 2013).  
The eighth visit by a serving prime minister was made by Prime Minister Abe on 
December 26
th
, 2013 in honor of the 1
st
 anniversary of his administration taking office 
(Abe, 2013). Multiple television stations documented his motorcade as well as his 
entrance into Yasukuni Shrine. After his time in the Shrine, Abe told reporters, “There is 
criticism based on the misconception that this is an act to worship war criminals, but I 
visited Yasukuni Shrine to report to the souls of the war dead on the progress made this 
year and to convey my resolve that people will never again suffer the horrors of war” 
(Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013).  
While visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine have elicited harsh 
international attention, they are not the only governmental officials who pay their 
respects at the Shrine. It is a common practice for lawmakers to visit Yasukuni Shrine 
during high ritual days every year which occur during the Spring and Autumn festivals 








, respectively, as well as the anniversary of 
the end of WWII on August 15
th
 (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). Such attendance has occurred 






Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi brought greater media 
attention to the appearance of lawmakers at the Shrine as well as an increase in the 
scrutiny of Ministers’ and Cabinet Members’ attendance due to their rank in government. 
This has been evidenced by the lack of news articles focusing on other government 
representatives during Prime Minister Hashimoto’s administration from 1996-1998 and 
during his1996 visit within the Wright State University Library’s online database as well 
as through searches of popular newspapers’ archives such as The New York Times, CNN, 
BBC World News, The Japan Times and the Korean Herald. Figure 4 illustrates the 
attendance of lawmakers and cabinet ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine as reported by 
newspapers. 
Figure 4: Cabinet Ministers and Lawmakers visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
 
Date       Notable Ministers/Lawmakers        Political Party      Event for visit  
October 17, 2006 84 lawmakers, 8 ministers  Annual Autumn Festival  
October 17, 2007 67 lawmakers, 4 ministers  Annual Autumn Festival  
 August 15, 2009 Koizumi, Abe, Minister 
Noda Seiko, 35 lawmakers 
Koizumi, Abe, and Noda-
LDP 
Commemoration of WWII 
end 
October 18, 2012 Abe, 2 cabinet ministers LDP Annual Autumn Festival 
April 21, 2013 168 lawmakers, 3 ministers-
which included Finance 




Annual Spring Festival 
December 23, 2013 159 lawmakers, 2 ministers Ministers-LDP Birthday of current 
emperor 
January 1, 2014 Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal 
Affairs and Communications 
Minister 
LDP New year  
August 15, 2014 83 lawmakers, 3 ministers Ministers-LDP Commemoration of WWII 
end 
October 17, 2014` Newspaper reported 
Lawmakers attended 
 Annual Autumn Festival 
April 21, 2015 106 lawmakers  Annual Spring Festival 
August 15, 2015 66 lawmakers, 3 ministers Ministers-LDP 70th anniversary 
commemoration of WWII 
end 
October 17, 2015 169 lawmakers, 2 ministers Ministers-LDP Annual Autumn Festival 
 
Koizumi did not announce his visits to the Shrine and varied the dates of his 





with the high ritual days where the tradition of attendance by political leaders is in 
practice.  
Both Koizumi and Abe also made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine while they 
were out of office as prime minister on August 15
th
, 2009 along with the Cabinet Minister 
of Consumer Affairs, Noda Seiko. Noda told reporters that her visit reconfirmed her 
belief that “we should never have a war. Peace is not something that naturally exists—it 
is something that has been built” (Nagata, 2009). This was not Abe’s only appearance 
while out of office as he made a second visit to the Shrine on October 18, 2012, the same 
week as the annual Autumn Festival where he was accompanied by two cabinet ministers 
(FlorCruz, 2012).  
While the annual Spring Festival at Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 was welcomed by 
168 lawmakers as well as three Cabinet ministers who paid personal visits to the Shrine, 
it is notable that among the three ministers was Former Prime Minister and current 
Finance Minister Aso Taro. While Aso did not attend the Shrine during his tenure as 
prime minister, his appearance at Yasukuni Shrine as a cabinet minister was noted among 
the public and international community (Kim & Liang, 2013).  
Abe’s December 26
th 
visit was prefaced on December 23
rd
 by visits not only of 
lawmakers but also of two cabinet ministers, one of which was Abe’s brother, Senior vice 
Foreign Minister Kishi Nobuo. The lawmakers gave a group supported statement saying, 
“How the war dead are commemorated is determined according to each country’s own 
culture and tradition. This long tradition of homage and commemoration is a matter of 
national sovereignty and should not be subjected to distortion by outside interference and 





Commission Cabinet Minister, Furuya Kiji who also attended, made a statement stating 
that he did not wish to anger regional neighbors, only to fulfil his duty as a national Diet 
member by praying for the peace of Japan and honoring their heroic fallen (Park, 2013).  
Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal Affairs and Communications Minister claimed he 
visited the Shrine on January 1, 2014 to, “pay respects to those who lost their lives in war 
and to pray for peace” (Qatar News Agency, 2014).  
The same year on August 15
th
, 2014 three Cabinet Ministers claimed their attendance 
were private visits. Cabinet Minister Furuya stated, “It’s only natural to extend sincere 
condolences to people who dedicated their lives to their country. I paid a visit to pray for 
peace.” (Yoshida, 2014 c.).  
The following year on August 15, 2015 in honor of the 70
th
 anniversary of the end 
of WWII, again three Cabinet Ministers made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine. Armura 
Haruki, Minister of Women’s Empowerment, stated “I offered my prayers in the hopes 
that Japan will continue to make efforts to contribute to the safety and peace of the 
world.” (Osaki, 2015).  
While Cabinet Ministers have participated in high ritual holidays, they have not 
attended every one as noted in Figure 4 on October 17, 2014 and April 21, 2012. The 
gathering of lawmakers at the Shrine has also incurred criticism from the South Korean 
government, similar to the visits of prime ministers and cabinet members (Zheng, Ueda, 
& Wang, 2015).  
While not an elected government official, Abe’s wife, Akie, has also made public 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. On May 22, 2015, Mrs. Abe posted photos of herself in front 







 anniversary of WWII. While paying her respects, Mrs. Abe stated she prayed and 
reflected upon the pain and suffering endured by soldiers and their families (Kageyama, 
2015). The First Lady made a second similar visit to the Shrine on August 19
th
 again in 
honor of the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of WWII. Like her first visit, photos of her 
second visit were also posted on her Facebook page (The Japan Times, 2015). 
Many visits by lawmakers, cabinet members, and prime ministers are 
accompanied by personal offerings to Yasukuni Shrine. Such offerings have included 
monetary donations, tree branches from a sacred Shinto tree, wreaths, plaques, and 
ordainments. Figure 5 shows the offerings made by Prime Ministers’ Koizumi and Abe 
during their time in office. 
Figure 5: Offerings made to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe 
 
Prime Minister                Date                  Type of Offering       Event for Offering  
Koizumi August 13, 2001 $250 wreath with name and 
title 
Campaign Promise; Honoring 
the end of WWII while avoiding 
8-15 
Koizumi April 21, 2002 $230 cash donation Campaign Promise; Annual 
Spring Festival 
Koizumi January 15, 2003 Flowers Campaign Promise; New Year 
Koizumi January 1, 2004 Flowers Campaign Promise; New Year 
Koizumi October 17, 2005 Flowers Campaign Promise; Annual Fall 
Festival 
Koizumi August 15, 2006 Flowers Campaign Promise; Anniversary 
of end of WWII 
Abe December 23rd, 2013 (not stated by news reports) Emperor’s Birthday 
Abe April 21, 2014 Wooden plaque with his name 
and title 
Annual Spring Festival 
Abe August 15, 2014 Tamagushi tree branch Commemoration of WWII 
Abe October 17, 2014 Tamagushi tree branch Annual Autumn Festival  
Abe April 21, 2015 Wooden plaque with his name 
and title  
Annual Spring Festival 
Abe August 15, 2015 Cash Offering Commemoration of WWII 
Abe October 15, 2015 Tamagushi Tree branch Annual Autumn Festival 
 
Koizumi presented offerings to Yasukuni Shrine during his personal visits (Strom, 
2001; French, 2002; The Daily Yomiuri, 2004).  Since his personal appearance, Abe has 





Festivals and August 15
th
. Offerings were accompanied at times by statements from Abe 
such as on August 15, 2014 were he wished to, “extend sincere condolences to the people 
who fought and died for the state and to pray for eternal peace” through his donation 
(Yoshida, 2014 c.). Abe’s offerings have been identified as private donations by the 
Japanese government (Sieg, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015).  
Speeches and Pronouncements 
 The Japanese district courts have been involved with upholding Article 20, the 
separation of church and state, in relation to the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni 
Shrine. Beginning in 2004, 900 people have filed eight lawsuits with six district courts 
seeking a court ruling on the constitutionality of Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine as Prime 
Minister as well as compensation for mental anguish plaintiffs claimed they incurred due 
to the annual visits (The Japan Times, 2005 b.).  
 Out of the eight lawsuits, only two district courts ruled that the visits by Koizumi 
were unconstitutional, while all denied compensation to plaintiffs. In 2004, Fukuoka 
District Court decided that the 2002 visit made by Koizumi was unconstitutional as his 
appearance was made as a government official (The People’s Daily, 2004). Likewise, in a 
case brought to the Osaka High Court by 236 people, comprised of Japanese and 
Taiwanese citizens, also ruled that Koizumi’s visits from 2001-2004 to the Yasukuni 
Shrine were unconstitutional because his attendance was carried out in an official manner 
at a religious institution. The Yasukuni Shrine gave a public statement saying that the 
court decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.). As evidenced through the 
documentation of newspapers and the Yasukuni Shrine guest log, the court rulings did 





 Similar to Koizumi, the Osaka District Court also heard a case concerning Abe’s 
2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The case was brought before the court by a group of 765 
people comprised of Japanese and Korean citizens living in Japan. The plaintiffs sought 
an injunction barring Abe from visiting the Shrine as well as compensation from him, the 
Japanese government, and Yasukuni Shrine due to the violation of Article 20. The Court 
dismissed the case. While it did not provide a verdict on the constitutionality of Abe’s 
visits, it did release a statement saying that the Yasukuni Shrine has a different 
significance than other shrines due to its history and that the act of visiting Yasukuni 
Shrine does not impair another’s belief or life.  Upon the Court’s dismissal, Hagiuda 
Koichi, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated that the “state’s claims have been upheld” 
while the Yasukuni Shrine welcomed the ruling as, “it hoped it would foster proper 
historic understanding of the shrine among the greater public” (The Japan Times, 2016).  
 While the Japanese district courts have made pronouncements on the 
constitutionality of visits by the Prime Minister, the Prime Ministers themselves have 
also given speeches on their attendance to the Shrine. On the day of his first visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, Koizumi gave a statement declaring his remorse for the victims 
of WWII and his pledge in the belief that Japan should never hold war again. He included 
in his speech his decision not to attend the Shrine on August 15
th
, as he had originally 
promised, as he felt a visit on that day would cast doubt on Japan’s denial of war and 
pledge to cultivate peace. In addition to his announcement of a new visitation date, 
Koizumi also called for meeting with the leaders of China and South Korea to discuss the 





process for peoples of the Asian region to pay respect while honoring feelings toward 
Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery (Koizumi, 2001). 
 Koizumi again made a statement on the day of his second visit to the Shrine in 
2002. In his reflection, Koizumi reaffirmed his visits’ intention of mourning those who 
had given their lives for Japan as well as to once again promising to never resort to war. 
Additionally, Koizumi mentioned that Yasukuni Shrine is a central institution for many 
Japanese citizens to mourn the fallen and thus he had no intention of causing stress on 
relations at home or abroad (Koizumi, 2002).    
 Koizumi continued to address international concern that was raised from his 
annual appearance at Yasukuni Shrine by using a portion of his speech at the Asian-
African summit in 2005 to reassert the understanding that Japan caused a great amount of 
suffering to many people and states during WWII, promising that “…Japan squarely 
faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and 
heartfelt apology always engraved in mind…”, Japan moves forward in to the future 
cultivating peace and prosperity at home and abroad (Koizumi, 2005).  
 Equivalent to his predecessor, Abe also gave a statement regarding his appearance 
at the Shrine the same day after his visit.  In his observation he stated that his attendance 
was to pay respects and pray for the souls who made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of 
Japan at Yasukuni Shrine and also Chinreisha National Cemetery, where he meditated on 
the sufferings the fallen, as well as their families, had endured. Abe further stated that the 
purpose of his visit was to also report to the souls of the war dead the progress of the first 
year of his administration while renewing the pledge to uphold peace and never to wage 





 While Abe has not currently made a second visit to Yasukuni Shrine, during a 
plenary session of the House in February, 2015 Abe included in his speech 
encouragement for Cabinet members to decide for themselves if they would like to attend 
the Shrine or not. Abe stated, “It is natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit 
Yasukuni Shrine to pay their respects to those who died for the country,” emphasizing the 
importance of leaders paying their respects and praying for those who gave their lives on 
behalf of Japan (JiJi., 2015). 
Response to Challenges 
 Koizumi, Abe, and the Japanese government have responded to the various 
criticism stemming from the appearance of active prime ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Nearly All of the responses centered around the claim that prime ministers were visiting 
the Shrine as private citizens, with no bearing on the issue of  Article 20 or international 
relations since they would be in their personal right to worship freely. While the visits to 
the Shrine were publicized as private by the Japanese government and the politicians 
themselves, for Koizumi his attendance did fulfill his campaign promise of attending the 
Shrine every year while in office. 
 Koizumi was vocal in regards to the lawsuits levied against him by Japanese and 
foreign citizens. After the first unconstitutional court ruling in 2004 by the Fukuoka 
District Court, Koizumi declared that his visits to the Shrine were made in a private 
capacity as a citizen, citing that the Japanese government had already asserted his visits 
did not violate the Constitution. Within his statement, Koizumi lamented his uncertainty 
as to why visits to Yasukuni Shrine elicit criticism as being unconstitutional whereas 





considered religious places as shrines. Koizumi declared his visits were based on 
personal beliefs; as such he would not change the style of his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. 
Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo also gave a statement in regards to the 
Court ruling saying the Court’s decision went against the position of the government as it 
believed the visits were made by Koizumi as a private citizen (The Daily Yomiuri, 2004).  
 The 2005 Osaka District Court’s verdict of unconstitutional visits prompted 
Koizumi to again publically assert that he did not believe his visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
violated the Constitution as he was not paying visits as an official and was confused as to 
why the Court would make such a ruling. Koizumi declare that he ultimately won the 
lawsuit while adding that the Court verdict would have no impact on his future decisions 
to visit the Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine also gave a public statement saying the Court’s 
decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.). 
 Prompted by the two district court rulings as well as the harsh disapproval from 
regional neighbors, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a memo outlining 
the basic position of the Japanese government toward Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine in 
October 2005. The document reiterated Koizumi’s personal belief that Yasukuni Shrine is 
a place of mourning to honor the war dead, emphasizing that his personal appearances at 
the Shrine were as a private citizen. The message is also very clear in stating that the 
belief of Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shine as a glorification of Japan’s aggressive 
military past is wrong and further summarizes two of Koizumi’s public statements 
describing Japan’s deep seeded feelings of remorse. The memo ends with declaring the 





priorities and thus places great importance on friendly relations with regional neighbors 
including South Korea and China (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). 
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not published a memo on Abe’s initial visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine, however, Abe has altered the way he honors the war dead from 
personal attendance to the donation of personal offerings on key dates, such as the 
seasonal festivals and the anniversary of WWII, in response to severe reproach from 
China and South Korea.    
II. South Korean governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine  
Memorials and Offerings 
 The South Korean government claims they view the Yasukuni Shrine as a 
commemoration of Japan’s militaristic past. A sentiment often reiterated by South 
Korean officials is that each visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese leaders glorifies the 
atrocities that were committed against the Korean population by the Japanese state, 
including the brutalities that occurred during the forced colonization period and crimes 
committed during WWII. 
South Korea maintains their own specific memorials and traditions 
commemorating the war dead and notable evens of the past, but beyond the Comfort 
Woman statue located outside of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, the state does not 
maintain a memorial that receives negative attention from regional neighbors like that of 
the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.   
However, while the similarity between a physical South Korean memorial and a 
Japanese memorial is non-existent, both states have an overlapping day of 
commemoration. August 15
th
 is observed as a national day of mourning in Japan, 





forces and the Japanese war dead.  Commemorations of this day include visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine by some and a memorial service commonly held at Nippon Budokan 
Hall. The Emperor and his family commonly attend this ceremony due to the informal 
hiatus with the Yasukuni Shrine (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002; O’Dwyer, 
2010; Smith, 2015).   Whereas in South Korea this day is celebrated, and referred to as, 
National Liberation Day.  National Liberation Day celebrates the end of the Japanese 
colonization of the Korean peninsula. This national holiday is filled with official 
ceremonies, parades, performances, and a key note address by the South Korean 
president (Korea.net, 2012). While a comparison of a physical structure is not applicable 
in this instance, the South Korean presidents have often used their key note address to 
focus on the South Korean-Japanese relationship which has included criticism and 
recommendation toward Japan on their shared history. 
The government of South Korea maintains an online archive of presidential 
speeches two administrations at a time. The two administrations currently available are 
the Park and Lee, which span from 2008 to the present.  Out of Lee’s five National 
Liberation Day addresses, only his 2009 speech did not use explicit language to highlight 
Japan’s military past. The other four, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012, contained pointed 
statements toward Japan calling for such actions as, “Japan should face up to history and 
refrain from making the foolish mistake of repeating the unfortunate past again today” in 
his 2008 address (Lee, 2008) and “Japan has a responsibility to teach its young 
generation the truth about what happened in the past” within the 2011 speech (Lee, 
2011). The 2010 address was milder toward Japan on historical issues compared to the 





citing a Japanese government apology on the forced colonization of the Korean peninsula 
that year (Lee, 2010).  Lee’s 2012 address was very critical of Japan as he cited the crime 
committed against Comfort Women by the Japanese government in WWII and urged the 
state to take “responsible measures in this regard” (Lee, 2012). While Lee did not 
specifically address past visits to Yasukuni Shrine, his broad statements on historical 
issues eluded to multiple concerns which encompasses the South Korean state’s alarm 
over elite visits to Yasukuni Shrine.  
As of this writing, President Park has currently given three National Liberation 
Day speeches. Her first address in 2013 directly dealt with historical conflicts as she 
stated;  
…Yet the recent situation surrounding historical issues has cast a dark 
shadow on the future of our two countries. In the absence of courage 
enough to face the past and determination enough to care for another’s 
pain, it will be difficult to build the trust necessary for our future.  
… it is time for the political leaders of Japan to show us a leadership 
of courage that seeks to bring healing for the wounds of the past.  
Yi Am, a great scholar of the later Goryeo Kingdom, said the nation is 
the body of a people and their history is their soul. What nation or 
what people would consent to the affliction of their soul, or the taking 
of any part of their body? Japan must confront this issue. I look 
forward to seeing responsible and earnest action that will seek in 
particular to heal the pain of those who, even now, carry with them the 
scars of history (Park, 2013, 5).  
 
Park’s first address set the tone for the rest of her keynote presentations as they did not 
shy away from expressing negative opinions against the government of Japan’s actions 
and attitudes toward historical events as well as pointedly requesting a change in the 
behavior of Japan’s elite. 2014 marked the 49
th
 anniversary of the South Korean-Japanese 
relations, as such Park purposely included in her speech the statement, “It is now time to 





friendly, cooperative relations. To do so, efforts must be made to heal the wounds of 
history that persist to this day. …Yet in Japan, the actions of some politicians have 
caused rifts between our two peoples and brought serious pain” (Park, 2014). Likewise, 
the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of WWII in 2015 provided Park with fodder to continue 
the criticism of Japan, specifically of Abe’s address commemorating WWII, of which 
Park found fault with as being less than what was hoped for in apologizing for past 
atrocities. In her 2015 speech she also called for Abe to follow the lead of past Japanese 
cabinets who have issued apologizes like that of the Kono Statement (Park, 2015).  
President Park’s 2014 and 2015 National Liberation Day speeches specifically 
mentioned the historical remembrance of Comfort Women but all of the addresses did not 
exclude Yasukuni Shrine from the difficult relationship with Japan even though it was 
not specifically mentioned.  
Speeches and Pronouncements 
Each time a Japanese prime minister personally visited Yasukuni Shrine, 
statements of denouncement have been quickly produced from a spokesman of the South 
Korean government. In response to Hashimoto’s 1996 visit, the South Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) released a statement the same day condemning his 
appearance at the Shrine (The New York Times, 1996).  
Due to Koizumi’s public campaign promises of an annual visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine, in July 2001 before his first visit the same year, the South Korean Ambassador to 
Japan, Choi Sang-yong, issued a statement to the press underling the impending negative 
impact on South Korean-Japanese relations if such promises were to be carried out, “I 





his visit has on countries in Asia” (Tolbert, 2001).  After the visit, the MOFAT released a 
public statement issuing deep regret and concern over the Koizumi’s attendance at the 
Shrine where he paid respects to war criminals, “who destroyed world peace and inflicted 
indescribable damage to the neighboring countries” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2001).  
In an act of goodwill, on August 25
th
, 2001, twelve days after his visit to the 
Shrine, Koizumi publically made known that he would like to meet with the leaders of 
South Korea and China in an effort to smooth the tense relations that had begun to 
develop due to the MEXT’s approval of a controversial textbook. The potential meeting 
between Koizumi and current South Korean President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was 
speculatively set to occur during the U.N. Special Session on Children in May, 2002. 
Instead of publically rejecting Koizumi’s meeting request, Kim laid out preconditions 
that Koizumi had to abide by before Kim would agree to a meeting. The terms required 
Koizumi to issue a new apology that reaffirmed the 1998 Apology for Wartime Atrocities 
published by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo (1988-2001) within the Japan-Republic of 
Korea Joint Declaration, for Koizumi to adhere to the agreements contained within the 
declaration, as well as publicly acknowledge that the decision by the majority of local 
school boards within Japan not to use the controversial history textbook was the correct 
choice in regards to the national approval of the text (Stuck, 2001).  
The 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration details the public apology by 
Obuchi where he expressed acknowledgement of the facts of history, through a spirit of 
humility, that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of South 





Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). The declaration further details multiple avenues of 
increased integration of South Korean and Japanese relations through cultural, economic, 
and military activities. While the terms of a meeting set by Kim were acknowledged as 
lofty by some reporters, ultimately, Koizumi never fully satisfied the preconditions to the 
South Korean government’s approval. After his 2001 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Kim did 
not hold one-on-one meetings with Koizumi while he was president (Stuck, 2001). 
 The MOFAT issued negative statements toward Koizumi and his personal 
attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine after each visit from 2002 to 2004 under the Kim and 
Roh administrations. These statements followed a similar structure of expressing regret 
towards the visit due to the Shrine’s representation of Japan’s militarism and honor to 
war criminals. The 2002 statement exemplifies this format in stating, “Our government 
expresses deep regret toward Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni 
shrine, which represents Japan’s militarism” (Los Angeles Times, 2002).  In 2003 the 
Foreign Minister included within the statement a call “for a sensible determination from 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government so as not to damage the 
sentiments of the Koreans who suffered from the Japanese invasions” (South Korea 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). Koizumi’s 2004 visit increased the hostile 
verbiage used in a statement from the South Korean Foreign Ministry which read,  “We 
cannot understand why the Japanese prime minister continues to pay homage to war 
criminals, and express much disappointment and anger that the national sentiments of the 
Koreans have been damaged once again” and expressly called for Koizumi to end his 






 Visits to Yasukuni Shrine increased in sensitivity during 2005 as the year marked 
the 60
th
 anniversary of WWII’s end. While Koizumi did not attend the Shrine on August, 
15
th
 that year, his attendance in October was met with harsh criticism from the South 
Korean government. The Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement of regret akin to 
those issued before it and included a call for the Prime Minister and other Japanese 
leaders to, “halt acts that nullify its apology and reflection of past wartime atrocities,” the 
South Korean government also summoned Japan’s Ambassador and lodged a formal 
protest (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005; Onishi, 2005 a.).  
 Likewise, Koizumi’s visit to the Shrine on August 15
th
, 2006, brought harsh 
condemnation from the South Korean government and continued the standstill of high 
level meetings that had been ongoing since 2001 (Faiola, 2006 b.).  The Foreign Ministry 
again issued a statement condemning Koizumi’s visits declaring such actions damaging 
to South Korean-Japanese relations and urged Japanese leaders in “responsible” positions 
not to “hinder the development of friendly relations” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2006).  
 While not formally in office, Abe’s visit in 2012 prompted a statement from 
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Cho Tai-young, saying, “It is regrettable to 
hear about the irresponsible behavior that ignores the feelings of the people in 
neighboring countries, who have been victimized by Japanese imperialism in the past” 
(FlorCruz, 2012). 
 2013 was a turbulent time in the South Korean-Japanese relationship in relation to 
the issue of Yasukuni Shrine. Abe’s December, 2013 visit was the first by an acting 





 Days before Abe’s 2013 visit, the Spokesperson on behalf of the South Korean 
MOFA issued a public statement condemning the attendance of leading politicians and 
cabinet members at the Shrine. The Spokesperson expressly stated that the visits were 
deemed “deeply deplorable” and through the disregard of repeated concerns from South 
Korea and the international community about governmental visits to Yasukuni Shrine, 
Japan is physically illustrating that the government is still “turning a blind eye to their 
history” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013).  
 In 2013, with the beginning of the Park Administration, the MOFAT began 
issuing statements against the offerings made by Prime Minister Abe and visits by 
Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. With Abe’s first offering on April 22, 2013 while as 
Prime Minister, the South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Kim Kyou-hyun, lodged a formal protest with the Japanese 
Ambassador on the, “latest retrograde comments and behaviors by the Japanese 
government officials and political leaders”. In his formal protest Kim declared, “it is 
completely incomprehensible that Japan, which deeply values honesty and trust, turns a 
blind eye and a deaf ear to excruciating loss and pain that Japan inflicted on neighboring 
countries through its aggression and colonial rule” further adding a call for Japanese 
leaders to reflect on past atrocities and in correct actions for the future (South Korea 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013).  Such sentiments were reiterated again on 
August 15 and October 17
th
, 2015 by an official statement by the MOFAT (South Korea 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 c. and d.). 
 Abe’s personal attendance at the Shrine elicited even greater criticism from the 





concerns and regret” the same day as Abe’s visit (Yamaguchi, Gillian,& Lee, 2013) 
President Park also issued a public statement where she declared, “Japan needs to face up 
to the issues of history, I expect the country to take responsible and sincere measures to 
alleviate the agony of those living in pain, and scarred by history” (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Additionally, South Korea’s Minister of Culture, 
Sports, and Tourism, Yoo Jin-ryong, broadcasted his message against Abe’s visit live on 
television where he stated, Abe’s visit was an “anachronistic act” that “hurts not only the 
ties between South Korea and Japan but also fundamentally damages the stability and co-
operation in Northeast Asia” (Yamaguchi, Gillian,& Lee, 2013). 
 While Abe has not visited Yasukuni Shrine since December, 2013, the political 
leadership of South Korea has continued to strongly scrutinized and criticized current 
events involving the Shrine since his attendance. In 2014 the MOFAT issued public 
statements against Abe’s offering to Yasukuni Shrine for the annual Spring and Fall 
Festivals as well as on August 15
th
 saying it deplores the offering to the Shrine that 
glorifies “Japan’s colonization and invasive war” adding that “Japan should move 
forward to a bright future based on serious reflection on the past, not locking itself in the 
dark past” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014 a., b., c.; 
Adamczyk, 2014).  
 2015 also brought statements against Abe’s offerings and Japanese leaders’ visits 
to the Shrine. Statements of public denouncements and regret were issued on April 22, 
August 15
th
, and October 17
th
 against the honoring of Japan’s militaristic past and war 
criminals which caused devastating harm to the South Korean population and Asian 





that year due to the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of WWII with the anticipated apology 
from Abe, the MOFAT also included within their criticisms that without proper actions 
and reflection such public statements of regret are hollow (South Korea Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 a., b., c.). 
Response to Challenges 
 On August 13
th
, 2001, 20 men stood in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to 
protest the impending visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine. During 
the public demonstration the 20 men chopped off one of their little fingers as an act of 
defiance towards Koizumi’s decision to voluntarily visit the Shrine (Prusher, 2001).  
Such a strong negative reaction within the public illustrates a deeply held adverse belief 
of the Yasukuni Shrine within the South Korean population.  
 While there currently is no record of an active government official participating in 
self-mutilation in response to Japanese officials visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the South 
Korean government has vigorously acted to deter Japanese Officials, specifically prime 
ministers, from using the Shrine as a place of commemoration.  In 2001, after Koizumi’s 
first visit to Yasukuni Shrine, President Kim Dae-jung refused to meet with the Japanese 
Prime Minister until Kim’s list of conditions were met (Stuck, 2001). This standoff 
between Kim and Koizumi lasted beyond Kim who he left office in 2003.  When Roh 
Moo-hyun became president in 2003 he chose to continue the status quo of impasse due 
to visitations to the Yasukuni Shrine until 2005. 2005 was the 60
th
 anniversary of the end 
of WWII as well as the 40
th
 anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two 
states. In an effort to end the stalemate, President Roh met with Koizumi for two hours in 





by government officials to Yasukuni Shrine was “the core of the history related problems 
between the two countries” and pressed for the creation of an alternate facility to 
commemorate the fallen of Japan without war criminals. No agreement was reached from 
the meeting and South Korea and Japan were again at a standstill on head of state 
meetings (Onishi, 2005 a.). 
 On August 5, 2013 Cho Tai-young, the MOFAT Spokesperson, released a public 
request asking Japanese officials to abstain from visiting Yasukuni Shrine on August 15
th
.  
Cho’s appeal stated, “Worshipping at the Yasukuni Shrine by the Japanese government 
and political leaders is something that should not happen. The stance of our government 
is clear and known to the world” (United Press International, 2013).    
 While attendance by Japanese lawmakers occurred even though the MOFAT 
Spokesperson requested officials to withhold their public visit, a strong governmental 
response was enacted as a result of Abe’s personal attendance in 2013. Coupled with the 
many vocal denouncements of his visit, the South Korean Defense Ministry cancelled 
multiple defense meetings and military exchange programs that were scheduled for the 
following year (Emirates News Agency, 2013). President Park also added Abe’s visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine as an additional reason to prolong withholding heads of state meetings 
with Japan (Xinhua, 2014). 
 Meetings between Park and Abe did not occur until November 1, 2015 where the 
leaders met to discuss accelerating talks on repairing the strained relationship that stems 
from historical grievances. The meeting was an effort to protect other areas of the South 
Korean-Japanese affiliation such as economic interests and military collaboration. Park 





for South Korea to look toward the future. While the meeting was a break from Park’s 
Administration’s staunch stance against engagements with Abe until Japanese leaders 
acknowledged past wrongs, no issues were resolved at this meeting (Choe, 2015).  
III. Chapter Analysis  
 
 Similar to the historical issue of Comfort Women, leaders in South Korea and 
Japan have been actively involved in the remembrance of the past in regards to Yasukuni 
Shrine and in promoting how they believe the Shrine should be viewed by the Asian 
region and the world. Figure 3 below illustrates the position of government officials and 















































































Number of Gov’t Actions Officials Involved Category Event Description 
901 14 actions: Prime Minister  
 
29 actions: Cabinet Ministers 
 
858 actions: Lawmakers and 
lower political leaders* 
Memorials and Offerings 1.PM Hashimoto visited once in 
1996 
2.PM Koizumi visited each year 
from 2001-2006 
3.PM Abe visited once in 2013 
4.PM Abe made 6 offerings from 
2013-2015 
5.Public newspapers indicated 
there were 29 visits by Cabinet 
Ministers from 2006-2007, 2009, 
and 2012-2015 
6.Public newspapers indicated 
that 858 lawmakers attended the 
Shrine between 2006-2007, 2009, 
2012-2015 
13 5 actions: Prime Minister 
 




1.Koizumi’s Observation on 2001 
visit 
2.Koizumi’s Observation on 2002 
visit 
3.Koizumi’s Speech at the Asian-
African Summit 2005 
4.Abe’s Observation on 2013 
visit 
5.Abe’s encouragement of 
cabinet members to visit 
Yasukuni during House Plenary 
meeting 2015 
6.6 Constitutional visit rulings 
7.Unconstitutional visit rulings 
5 3 actions: Prime Minister 
 
1 action: Cabinet Minister 
 
1 actions: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Response to Challenges 1.2 responses from Koizumi due 
to unconstitutional court rulings, 
2004 and 2005 
2.Abe alters the way he pays 
respects at Yasukuni from visits 
to offerings 
3.Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda 
statement that the 2004 court 
ruling went against the 
government’s position 
4.Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
memo on the Basic Position of 
the Japanese government toward 
Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni 
2005 
 
*Newspapers have highlighted visits by political leaders during the years that a prime minister attended the Yasukuni 
Shrine, or due to tense statements denouncing such visits from regional neighbors like South Korea. Given the Japanese 
tradition of political leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine that dates back to the Meiji era, the number of cabinet members 












































 Both governments have an all-of-government approach with multiple persons and 
offices addressing the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Top offices initiate the event of 
concern and respond to the action of the other. Within the South Korean state, Japan is 
portrayed as the sole perpetrator of the issue, in an effect of othering, where Japan is the 
South Korea 
Number of Gov’t Actions Officials Involved Category Event Description 
7 7 actions: President Memorials and Offerings 1.Lee’s National Liberation Day 
Speeches 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 
2.Park’s National Liberation Day 
Speeches 2013, 2014, 2015 
19 2 actions: President 
 
3 actions: Cabinet 
Ministers/Ambassadors 
 




1.Pres. Kim Dae Jung issue 
preconditions for a Leaders of 
State meeting between himself 
and PM Koizumi 2001 
2.Pres. Park public statement 
against Abe’s 2013 visit 
3.South Korean Ambassador to 
Japan’s statement against PM 
Koizumi’s impending 2001 visit  
4.Formal protest lodged with 
Japan’s Ambassador to South 
Korea, 2005 
5.Minister of Culture, Sports, and 
Tourism broadcasts live message 
against Abe’s visit 2013 
6.Pronouncement against PM 
Hashimoto’s 1996 visit 
7.Pronouncement against PM 
Koizumi’s 2001-2006 visits 
8.Statement of regret over 
Abe’s2012 visit to Yasukuni 
while Abe was out of Office as 
prime minister 
9.Pronouncement condemning 
attendance of Japanese leaders at 
Yasukuni 2013 
10.Statement of deep concern and 
regret over Abe’s 2013 
appearance 
11.Issues statements deploring 
Abe’s offerings and lawmakers 
visits to the Shrine 2013-2015 
Spring and Autumn Festival 
6 4 actions: President 
 
1 action: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
1 action: Cabinet Ministers 
Response to Challenges 1.Pres. Dae Jung stops State 
leader meetings with Koizumi 
2.Pres. Roh stops visits with 
Koizumi 
3.Roh meets with Koizumi to try 
and reach an agreement over 
Yasukuni 2005 
4.Park refuses to meet with Abe 
5.Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
and Trade public request for 
Japanese officials not to visit 
Yasukuni 2013 
6.Defense Ministry cancels 
defense meetings and exchange 
programs for 2014 in response to 






villain by glorifying past wrongs through visitations and offerings by leaders to Yasukuni 
Shrine. Likewise, the Japanese government differentiates itself from other Asian nations 
by promoting Yasukuni Shrine as a uniquely Japanese place of worship and respect for 
Japanese people while justifying the promotion and action of visitation by relating it to 
the rights of every other nation to honor their dead. Both states actively embrace the 
concept of nationalism in promoting the good or evil of Yasukuni Shrine in relation to 
their population, or in group. 
 Within the case study of events surrounding the Shrine, it is evident that speeches 
and pronouncements were the largest area for the South Korean government in 
addressing the issue, in part, due to Yasukuni Shrine’ s location in Japan. However, the 
Japanese government and political leaders also worked to define their actions through 
government statements and press interviews. Since there is data on the statements and 
words used to describe the Yasukuni Shrine, a comparison was charted to analyze the 
similarity, difference, frequency of political actors engaging in public communication 
about the Shrine, and the medium in which the message was delivered to the public. The 
full chart comparison is located in appendix K.  Figure 7 below is a summary of the 
larger comparison of the type of words used between the two states and how it was 
presented to the public. The selection of statements under review were taken from the 
accounts presented within the case study, however, many of the assertions used in the 
chart were taken out of larger documents or statements as to gain more focus on the 
sections specifically related to Yasukuni Shrine. For the chart summary, phrases relating 
to the Yasukuni Shrine were organized by statement idea and at times exact words used. 





government statements refers to accounts written and released directly from the 
government itself while statements to newspapers refers to the causal interactions with 
newspapers by government officials where they are not necessarily highlighting their 
governmental role or asserting their personal opinion. A chart was not created to analyze 
smaller portions of the event data, as was conducted in chapter 2 on Japanese apologies, 
as there was believed to be not as many similar occurrences between the different 
categories in which to equally compare, since all of the categories hinged on state leaders 
visits or offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine.  
Figure 7: Summary of the comparison of Government Statements regarding the Yasukuni 
Shrine 
Japan: 12 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine 
 
 
PM Abe: 4 
PM Koizumi: 2 
Cabinet Minister Furuya: 2 
Minister Armura: 1 
Cabinet Minister Noda: 1 
Group of Lawmakers: 1 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
1 
Osaka District Court: 1 
 
Died in the battle for 
country: 7 
Promise to never wage war 
again: 6 
To express mourning: 3 
To express remorse: 2 
To express condolences: 2 
To express my belief: 2 
Natural to visit: 2 
Honor victims of war: 2 
Duty of a Diet member: 1 
Different significance than 
other shrines: 1 



















South Korea: 21 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade: 18 
Ministry of Culture , Sports, 
and Tourism: 1 
President Park: 1 
Ambassador to Japan, Choi 
Sang Yong: 1 
Call for sincere response 
from PM and Japanese 
government: 16 
Honor national sentiments 
of neighbor countries: 12 
Call for the correct 
understanding of history: 11 
People and countries 
suffered as a result of 
Japan’s invasion and 
imperialism: 7 
Praying to/Honoring war 
criminals: 2 
Visits impact countries in 
Asia:1 
Visits are disappointing: 1 
Visits cause anger: 1 
Official Government 
statements: 17 
Statements to Newspapers: 
3 
Broadcast on Television: 1  
 
 
 Figure 7 shows that the South Korean officials’ dominant form of communication 
concerning the Shrine is by official government statements. Out of 17 instances, only 
three are not government statements but government officials making comments to the 
press. However, in Japan’s communication out of 13 instances only four were made as an 
official government statement while nine were made as statements to the press. 
 Additionally, the message relayed by Japanese political leaders did not have as 
similar messages as did the South Korean leaders. The largest similarity in the statements 
from Japanese leaders were on the ideas of “to never wage war again” and “for those who 
died in battle” while those were only found in six and seven instances of the messages, 
respectfully. The difference in wording of the message could be that as a religious 
institution the Shrine holds different meaning to every person. However, in this 
difference of meaning, the Shrine’s portrayal either as a place to remember and promote 





peace or as a national memorial may not be uniformly agreed upon within Japanese 
political leaders as the ideas, “Natural to visit,” “Duty of a Diet member,” and “Country’s 
own culture and tradition,” which reflect more of the Shrine being a national memorial, 
combined marks four instances which places it in the top three of common ideas 
delivered. 
 The South Korean leaders had very similar messages which is due in part to the 
majority of communication on the Shrine being delivered from the MOFAT. The most 
common idea was the “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister and Japanese 
government leaders” while “Honor national sentiments of neighbor countries” was 
second, followed closely by the “Call for the correct understanding of history.” The 
majority of messages with the idea of “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister 
and Japanese government leaders” instead of the “call for the correct understanding of 
history” reflects that the South Korean government views the physical action of visiting 
or worshipping at the Shrine as more offensive than the incorrect understanding of 
history behind the action. 
 For Japan such a governmental silence on the issue of Yasukuni Shine 
demonstrates an approval of the Shrine as being a personal decision for Japanese citizens 
which also upholds the various arguments of Koizumi and Abe on Yasukuni Shrine. 
Likewise, from the statements of Abe and Koizumi, the “natural duty” of Japanese 
lawmakers to pay respects at the Shrine has not been met with any denouncement from 
the Japanese state. As demonstrated by lawmakers’ statements to public newspapers 
coupled with the various statements from prime ministers there is an idea that it is good 





It’s important to also note Koizumi’s promise of attending Yasukuni Shrine 
during his campaign for election as Prime Minister. While this promise may not have 
been the whole basis of his argument for election, however, such a promise illustrates the 
use of historical memory as a tool to gain public opinion and support in obtaining 
political power.  
 The majority of governmental responses from the MOFAT tend to follow the 
same structure and wording. Exemplifying this similarity are the statements issued on 
Koizumi’s visits from 2002-2004 whose wording are nearly identical. Statements from 
the MOFAT and other governmental officials increased in severity in 2013 before Abe’s 
visit to the Shrine, beginning with the MOFAT statement against offerings and 
lawmakers’ visits along with the governmental protest from the 1
st
 Vice Foreign 
Minister’s summons of Japan’s Ambassador over Japan’s wrong perception of history in 
April, 2013.  
 Whereas the South Korean government issued statements against lawmakers and 
Prime Ministers’ attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine, under Park’s administration the state 
included offerings made by Prime Minister Abe. The expanse of criticism from the South 
Korean state to include offerings correlates with the strong stance President Park’s 
Administration initiated upon the start of her presidential term.  
 With the timely statements against the involvement of prime ministers and 
lawmakers at the Yasukuni Shrine, the South Korean government has portrayed such 
responses as duties of the state. The state has championed the specific time period of 
colonialism of South Korea and atrocities of WWII, relating such violence back to the 





the specific memory the Korean government’s wishes to remember and the way in which 
they want it remembered; through a narrative of victimization. The framing of 
victimization allows the South Korean government to bolster nationalism in that the 
government, through political parties, are creating an environment based on a uniquely 
Korean experience that must be made right before time ends for those who had a 





I. Manipulation of Historical Memory within History Textbooks  
  
In his popular novel, 1984, George Orwell penned the statement, “Who controls 
the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1949, 35; 
Kim, Moon, & Joo, 2013, 1). Orwell’s quote encompasses the contention innate within 
history textbooks as these educational materials are a tool utilized by the state to cultivate 
loyal citizens. According to Heiko Paabo, every state develops a national narrative that is 
used to guide the writing of history textbooks. As he states, the national narrative 
“provides the general framework explaining what the nation is, where it comes from, and 
what its future is;” this includes inundating the younger generation and new citizens with 
shared values, norms, and beliefs which shape their national identity (Paabo, 2014). This 
framed understanding is presented within the educational system as legitimate, accurate 
knowledge (Schneider, 2008).   
The development of national identity, which is advanced through the national 
narrative, is the primary object of history textbooks, where the national narrative is 
presented. Elites define and give meaning to the collective memories held by a 
population, which are then used to help craft the narrative through connecting the past to 
the present (Paabo, 2014), similar to the concept of historical memory. Thus, political 
agendas influence textbook content in an effort to achieve specific goals such as shaping 
national identity and cultivating patriotism or nationalism (Shin & Sneider, 2011). This 





(Paabo, 2014). Shin Gi-wook claims that “vocabulary is significant in describing events 
in the creation of national identity” as the overall story of a textbook, through the “events 
described,” leads students to a very distinct understanding of the past which in turn 
influences their current worldview and potential future of the state. The power of history 
textbooks in shaping the population and the potential future fuels the anger within the 
parties involved in a history textbook dispute (Shin & Sneider, 2011).  
In addition to the political burden they are endowed with, textbooks are inherently 
political as they gain a “quasi-official” character in representing the voice of the state 
through the involvement of the government in control mechanisms. The process of 
approval or regulating textbooks occurs not only in a system of state sponsored texts but 
also in pluralistic textbook systems, which ultimately empowers history textbooks with 
the near official status beyond whatever system is implemented (Yi, 2009). This 
representation of the voice of the state has the potential of spurring tense relations 
between countries due to the idea of a government’s acceptance and promotion of what 
others may believe is an incorrect understanding of the past.  
As described in chapter 1, both Japan and South Korea maintain a pluralistic 
textbook system where the Ministry of Education  outlines general topics that are to be 
included in the text that are written by private publishers. In each state, the final approval 
of the privately produced educational material lies with the Ministry of Education. The 
texts that are approved are provided to the schools without charge as the respective 
governments bear the burden of printing costs (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 





Beyond the information constraints set forth by governments, the physical format 
of textbooks also plays a role in how history is portrayed to the intended audience. In 
Japan, history textbooks are limited to 220 pages and are required to go over the 
country’s entire history which spans approximately 1,300 years (Shin & Sneider, 2011). 
While the page limit enables the Japanese government to regulate printing costs, the 
expanse of the time frame required for history textbooks coupled with the traditional 
year-round school calendar, limits the amount of time educators are able to spend on each 
era. Additionally, with the cultural pressure of college entrance exams, “teaching to the 
exam” is also a common practice throughout the Japanese educational system which adds 
a level of distortion to the history presented (Shin & Sneider, 2011). 
 South Korea faces many of the same challenges with textbooks that Japan does 
such as the government’s burden of financing textbook printing and the cultural emphasis 
on entrance exams. However, South Korea’s recent history of military dictatorship and 
authoritative rule after liberation in 1945 has had a lasting impact on the educational 
system. In 1974, Dictator Park Chung-hee set up a system of state controlled history 
textbooks where the government wrote and published the educational text used in 
schools. This state production of history textbooks was not revised until 2003 under 
President Roh Moo-hyun when the current system, as of this writing, was set in place for 
a more liberal and pluralistic educational framework (Denny, 2015). 
The history textbook controversy between Japan and South Korea centers on 
events that occurred during WWII and how they are portrayed within educational 
material, as well as a the territorial dispute of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands.
5
 While 
                                                 
5
 The Takeshima/Dokdo Islands are a grouping of uninhabited land formations within the East Sea located 





Japan and South Korea were involved in the same war, they had vastly different 
experiences largely due to the colonization of the Korean peninsula by Japan which has 
shaped the nations’ view of the past. With the retelling of history, Shin claims, “Involved 
nations are simultaneously bound together and separated by distinct-often contradictory 
historical accounts and perceptions” (Shin & Sneider, 2011).  
South Korea’s history textbooks concerning this time period focus on its own 
nation’s plight during WWII with comparatively little mention of the ensuing battles and 
destruction outside of the peninsula (Shin & Sneider, 2011). Japan’s textbooks, likewise, 
place strong emphasis on what Alexander Bukh describes as “Japanese victimhood” 
which delineates between the Imperial military as perpetrators and the Japanese 
population as victims of the military’s transgressions.  Before 1982, Japanese textbooks 
focused largely on Japanese victimhood with limited information on regional neighbors’ 
suffering. After 1982, textbooks increased the incorporation of regional neighbors’ 
sufferings and the complacency of the Japanese public (Bukh, 2007). However, the 
vocabulary used to describe these events has become points of contention domestically in 
Japan and abroad which relate back to the concept of national identity formation and the 
potential future of the state. This tension over vocabulary has led some history textbooks 
within Japan to become more reflective of a time table of events, lessoning the national 
narrative but adding to the burden of the educator in disseminating historical 
understanding (Shin & Sneider, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                 
ownership of the islands and both use historical documents dating back thousands of years to state their 
claim; South Korea claims Japan recognized the formations as Korean territory in 1696 stemming from a 
skirmish between Korean and Japanese fishermen.  South Korea has occupied the islands with a coastguard 





Textbook controversies between Japan and South Korea first began in 1982, 
ignited by a prominent Japanese historian’s challenge of Japan’s textbook approval 
system, charging that it was a form of censorship (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.). 
Ienaga Saburo filed his first of three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) in 1965 for suppressing intellectual freedom 
when his history textbook was rejected for containing “too many illustrations of the ‘dark 
side’ of the war, such as an air raid, a city left in ruins by the atomic bomb, and disabled 
veterans” (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.). In 1982, Ienaga’s textbook was again 
rejected by the MEXT with recommended changes to 41 different passages that included 
softening words used to describe the Japanese military action during WWII such as 
replacing “aggression” to “advancement.” The Japanese press had been closely following 
the textbook approval process that year, and unlike the 1965 rejection, Japan’s regional 
neighbors picked up on the 1982 denial of Ienaga’s text (Woods Masalski, 2002).  
North and South Korea, along with China, responded to the MEXT’s dismissal 
with public and formal protests from the respective governments and populations. 
Additionally, Vietnam also formally requested changes to approved textbooks. The 
Japanese government responded to the large outcry by sending senior LDP Diet leaders 
to South Korea and senior MEXT officials to the Chinese government to explain the 
MEXT’s decision of accepting and denying the year’s textbooks (Shin & Sneider, 2011). 
In addition to the government visits, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi 
also issued a statement to help smooth diplomatic relations with South Korea and China 
the same year. In his statement, Miyazawa acknowledged that the Japanese educational 





regards to past atrocities that is contained within the Joint Communiques, issued between 
the respective countries and Japan when relations normalized after WWII. To achieve 
this end, Miyazawa promised that Japan, “will pay due attention” to criticisms from 
neighboring countries from a “perspective of building friendship and goodwill.” 
Miyazawa further stated that the guidelines for textbook authorization would be revised 
and future textbooks would also, “give due consideration” to criticisms from regional 
neighbors. Miyazawa’s complete statement can be found in appendix L. (Miyazawa, 
1982; appendix L).  Miyazawa’s statement is known as the Neighboring Countries Clause 
and continues to provide a basis, according to Daniel Sneider, for “Asian nations to 
intervene regarding the content of Japanese textbooks” (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 249).  
The year 1986, the culmination of the traditional four year cycle of textbook 
authorizations in Japan, also brought another round of controversy. The “National 
Conference to Defend Japan” was formed after the publication of the Neighboring 
Countries Clause in 1982
6
 and promised to publish its own textbook that year. According 
to Sneider, in September, 1986 the National Conference to Defend Japan submitted their 
textbook to the MEXT and received approval due to political pressure (Shin & Sneider, 
2011).  
The adoption of this text once again prompted outcries from the South Korean and 
Chinese governments as the countries contended the textbook did not adequately address 
the Japanese atrocities committed against their nations in WWII, citing the Neighboring 
                                                 
6
 Miyazawa’s statement, known as the Neighboring Countries Clause, required the textbook authorization 
process in Japan to take regional neighbors’ concerns as well as objections to textbook content under 
careful advisement before any text is published. This clause provides neighboring countries with an official 
pathway to submit apprehensions and recommendations for change to the MEXT on any pending textbook. 
A channel for regional involvement within the MEXT’s textbook approval process had not been available 





Country Clause. Frustrated by the criticisms made by South Korea and China as well as 
the new constraints of consideration by the Neighboring Countries Clause, Education 
Minister Fujio Masayuki made public comments denying the wrongdoing associated with 
the Nanjing Massacre, questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials, and claimed the 
colonialization of Korea was mutually agreed upon by the Korean and Japanese 
government. This was the third of such comment by the Education Minister who had 
taken office in July, 1986. The South Korean government lodged a formal complaint 
concerning the comments, cancelled multiple scheduled foreign ministers meetings, and 
threatened to cancel an official visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to Seoul in honor of the 
opening of the Asia games. Fujio was removed from office for his remarks and lack of 
incorporation of the Neighboring Country Clause (Jameson, 1986; Shin & Sneider, 
2011).  
II. Japanese government’s use of history textbooks  
The Neighboring Countries Clause was first used in Japan after the Japanese 
Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign was brought to light in 1991. 
Beginning in 1992, approved history textbooks all contained some reference to Comfort 
Women and increased the portrayal of regional neighbors’ history. However, the 
incorporation of multiple understandings of the past within history textbooks also spurred 
the growth of conservative organizations with the mission of creating textbooks that are 
more “balanced” in comparison to regional histories as well as casting Japan’s own 
history in a more positive light (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 251).  
 In 1997, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Japanese Society) 





promote “self-denigration” within the Japanese population, while promoting a “healthy 
form of nationalism” (Prusher, 2001 c.; The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The Japanese Society 
has been a leader in the campaign of creating a “balanced” history within Japanese 
schools through the publication of texts that heavily casts Japan’s history in a positive 
light. The Japanese Society’s textbooks have been approved every year of the textbook 
approval cycle since 2001. This organization maintains an objective of having its 
textbooks in 10% of Japanese public schools (The Japan Times, 2005 a.).   
 Speeches and Pronouncements  
 Japan’s history textbook controversies did not end in 1986. Since 1988, there have 
been 15 controversial events within Japan concerning the content of history textbooks. 
Figure 8 below outlines the events which occurred during the 1988 to 2015 time frame.  
Figure 8. Japanese Textbook Incidents 1988-2015  




1995 1995 Murayama Statement  Prime 
Minister 
Murayama SDP 
2001 Textbook Approval  MEXT Koizumi LDP 
2001 MEXT Denies 2nd Textbook Review MEXT Koizumi LDP 
2005 Textbook Approval MEXT Koizumi LDP 
2007 Deletion of Imperial Military’s role in Okinawa Mass 





2009 Educational Program to Increase Education on Japan’s 





2009 Textbook Approval MEXT Aso LDP 
2012 Textbook Approval  MEXT Noda DJP 
2012 Abe’s mission of “restoring the country’s self” Prime 
Minister 
Abe LDP 
2013 National involvement in Local Textbook Adoption MEXT Abe LDP 
2013 Proposed new Textbook Screening Standards Minister of 
Education 
Abe LDP 
2013 MEXT Advisory Committee proposal to reject texts that do 
not foster patriotism 
MEXT  Abe LDP 
2014 New Screening Standards for textbooks Approved MEXT Abe LDP 
2015 Japanese Diplomats speak with U.S. Virginia Lawmakers MOFA Abe LDP 







 As textbooks began to change in light of the 1992 Neighboring Countries Clause, 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi went further to advance the diversity of perspectives 
within Japan’s compulsorily education through his 1995 WWII commemoration address. 
His statement focused on the remembrance of history as he apologized for Japan’s past 
actions and urged reflection on the lessons learned from atrocities to promote peace and 
democracy, and to, “foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and 
trust” (Murayama, 1995). Murayama subsequently launched the Peace, Friendship and 
Exchange Initiative to cultivate this “deep understanding and trust” between Japan and its 
neighbors which supported historical research into their respective joint modern relations. 
Murayama’s full statement can be found in Appendix M (Murayama, 1995; appendix M). 
The expanded exchange program included the participation of educators in the 
compulsory education system as well as professors from multiple universities (Prusher, 
2001 a.). Murayama’s statement continues to guide Japan’s involvement with the past as 
purported by the MOFA (Suga, 2014).  
 Progress continued to be made within history textbooks on the content and 
description of events related to other nations until 2001, as Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro began his first year in office. In 2001, the MEXT approved a controversial 
history textbook authored by the Japanese Society, entitled New History Textbook, for 
junior high schools. The New History Textbook had been described as controversial by 
news media following the textbook approval process as it left out pertinent details of 
Japanese actions during WWII; including the history of Comfort Women, and insinuating 





textbook’s approval resulted in violent public protests within South Korea as well as 
harsh responses from Seoul. Likewise, Japanese teachers’ unions carried out a mass 
public campaign against the New History Textbook’s use in public schools (Prusher, 2001 
a.). One of the Japanese Society’s leading members responded to criticism saying the 
textbook, “merely balances out a distorted view of history and presents a more 
appropriate picture for young students” (Prusher, 2001 a.).  
 Citing the Neighboring Countries Clause, the South Korean government 
demanded 25 changes to the Japanese Society textbook and petitioned the MEXT for a 
second review. The MEXT granted the second review but only accepted two of the 25 
changes cited by the South Korean government. The two accepted changes concerned 
aspects of ancient history; no history of the 20
th
 century was revised. The South Korean 
government challenged the MEXT’s second review and pushed further for the acceptance 
of the full 25 changes. Further reviews were denied by the Japanese government (French, 
2001).  
In the 2002-2005 textbook cycle, the Japanese Society’s textbook was only used 
by six out of 532 public school districts, missing the organization’s goal of the textbook 
being in 10% of schools by a large margin at 0.04% (Prusher, 2001 c.). However, while 
the MEXT did not push additional revisions on the Japanese Society textbook beyond the 
two accepted from the South Korean government’s demand, the authors voluntarily made 
nine revisions, after the book become a national best seller, which included removing 
suggestions that Korea supported colonization (French, 2001). 
 In 2005, as Prime Minister Koizumi was nearing the end of his time in office, the 





approval to the MEXT for the next round of junior high school textbooks. While 
revisions were made before submission, the text still downplayed atrocities that occurred 
during WWII, did not mention Comfort Women history, and claimed Japanese ownership 
of the Dokdo Islands (The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The same year, Shimane Prefecture 
declared February 22 as “Takeshima Day,” incorporating various forms of celebration in 
honor of Japan’s ownership of the Takeshima/Dokdo islands (Konishi, 2005). Takeshima 
Day sparked outrage within the South Korean public and government (BBC World News, 
2012) and has aided in enhancing the Dokdo claims within educational resources.  
While the New History Textbook contained the most controversial portrayal of 
history, seven out of the eight history textbooks approved that year also did not mention 
Comfort Women, a change in the trends that began in 1992. Similar to the reaction in 
2001, the MEXT’s approval of the New History Textbook once again ignited violent 
protests and harsh responses from the South Korean public and government (Sakamaki, 
2005).  With their approved book, the Japanese Society still did not meet its 10% school 
adoption rate, however, use of the textbook in public schools increased to 0.44% that year 
compared to the 0.04% use in 2001 (Nakamura, 2005).  
 Abe had praised the MEXT’s approval of the Japanese Society’s textbook as he 
entered office as Prime Minister in 2006. He claimed the lessons contained in the book 
were tools for creating a “more confident nation” (Faiola, 2006 a.). During his campaign 
for office, Abe had made the objective of increasing patriotism within education part of 
his platform; promising to enact a “sweeping education bill” that would strengthen the 
idea of patriotism within Japan’s school system during his tenure as Prime Minister 





Abe’s textbook reforms began most notably in early 2007, during the beginning 
of the textbook screening process, as the MEXT ordered publishers to delete sections in 
history textbooks that stated the Imperial Army was responsible for ordering civilians to 
commit mass suicide during the Battle of Okinawa (Norimitsu, 2007 a.). During WWII, 
as the war was nearing its conclusion, Okinawans had been indoctrinated by the Japanese 
military to believe the lie that suicide would be a preferable death than being slaughtered 
by the advancing Allied forces (Norimitsu, 2007 b.). Public protests within Okinawa 
against the revision erupted after the MEXT’s announced the new requirements. Abe 
publicly responded to criticism of political involvement regarding the exclusion stating, 
“I believe the screening system has been followed appropriately.” (Norimitsu, 2007 a.). 
However, after Abe stepped down as Prime Minister in October, 2007 (succeeded by 
Fukuda Yasuo), the MEXT reconsidered the earlier requirements of silence on Japanese 
military involvement to softer language of involvement (Norimitsu,” 2007 b.). 
 Similar to the controversial textbook approvals in in 2001, and 2005, in early 
2009, the New History Textbook was once again approved by the MEXT, while Aso Taro 
was Prime Minister. The 2009 version of the textbook still maintained the controversial 
issues that many consider to be “whitewashing” history in Japan’s favor. The 2009 
approval once again saw public South Korean protests and incurred harsh responses from 
the South Korean government (UPI, 2009).  
 The beginning of the 2012 textbook screening process brought the textbook 
controversy to the forefront with renewed intensity. In March, 2012, under Prime 
Minister Noda, the MEXT approved three high school textbooks that claimed Japanese 





program supported by Aso’s administration in 2009 to increase territory related education 
in schools which was strongly reflected in the 2012 textbook screening process.  Of the 
39 total social studies textbooks undergoing review in 2012, 21 claimed Japan’s 
ownership over the Dokdo islands. Within those 21 books, three mentioned the 
ownership for the first time, while the other 18 had mentioned Japanese ownership in 
previous editions (Kim, 2012 a.). Likewise, 12 out of the 19 history textbooks submitted 
did not contain any reference to Comfort Women (Kim, 2012 b.).   
 Abe’s 2012 campaign for Prime Minister added to the intensity as he made 
history textbooks a central issue of the LDP party platform stating that, “Japanese schools 
take a self-deprecating view of history” and vowed to revise the textbook screening 
process in an effort to correct this interpretation. As such, contention over the portrayal of 
history has occurred every year of Abe’s administration. Abe’s Minister of Education, 
Shimomura Hakubun, expounded on the proposed revision after the election of Abe in 
December, saying that the intention for reform stems from the goal to develop the 
“Japanese spirt” the population is currently lacking and to teach Japanese youth the 
“2,000 year history of Japan’s wonderful traditions and culture” (Ito, 2012). 
 The goals that were set in the 2012 election began to take shape in 2013 through 
multiple events. In October, the MEXT ordered a local school board to use a 
controversial history textbook that had been selected by the school district for the 
upcoming four year cycle. A local school board within the district unanimously voted not 
to use the newly selected text due to its, “overtly revisionist content.” According to 
Martin Fackler, this was the first instance of the national government involving itself 





 Following the local dispute, the Education Minister proposed new screening 
standards in November that would require textbooks to portray a “balanced picture” of 
disputed history. A balanced history would be shown in textbooks by including the 
understanding of events from nationalist scholars on the two most controversial issues in 
Japan’s history; the Nanking massacre and the history of Comfort Women (Fackler, 
2013). The advisory committee to the MEXT took the proposed standards further in 
December, recommending that textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. The 
advisory committee’s recommendation came at the same time as a government appointed 
committee to the MEXT suggested changing the power of textbook selection to city 
mayors instead of school districts (Fackler, 2013).   
  Education Minister Shimomura’s proposed textbook standards were adopted in 
2014 and required that publishers “state the government’s unified views” within history 
and social studies textbooks. The standards were immediately put in place with the 
ongoing textbook screening cycle. Due to the adoption, in May, 2015, five textbooks 
were mandated to undergo major revision which included rewriting passages concerning 
Comfort Woman as well as past racial violence against Koreans living in Japan and 
forced labor during WWII (Osaki, 2015). The textbooks that were approved also 
strengthened Japanese ownership of the Dokdo Islands (Qatar News Agency, 2015 a.). 
 Differing from his predecessors, Abe has taken an international approach to 
history education and vowed to fight inaccurate interpretations of the past concerning 
Japan’s involvement during WWII abroad. The United States has become a notable 
foreground in the apparent battle to influence the understanding of the past against South 





concerning a pending requirement for new textbooks to include the name “the East Sea” 
to describe the body of water in between South Korean and Japan. The Japanese 
diplomates pushed the U.S. lawmakers to only use the name “the Sea of Japan” without 
success (Fackler, 2015).  
In January, 2015, Abe publicly denounced a U.S. high school textbook published 
by McGraw-Hill for its portrayal of the Japanese military involvement with Comfort 
Women and their forced service, saying he was shocked at such a depiction of history. 
The Japanese Consulate General in New York had met with leaders of McGraw-Hill in 
December, 2014 and demanded revision to the textbook. The denial of revision by 
McGraw-Hill, who backed their decision with factual evidence, sparked the public 
denouncement from Abe (Fackler, 2015). 
Response to Challenges  
 Japan’s revision of standards and approval of controversial textbooks have been 
met with international criticism to which the government has publicly responded. The 
2001 textbook approval and the subsequent denial of additional reviews, per request of 
neighboring countries, ignited a firestorm of diplomatic and economic repercussions 
which was led by the South Korean government. At the MEXT’s announcement of the 
approval of the New History Textbook in April, 2001, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda 
Yasuo, also issued an official government statement defending Japan’s textbook approval 
system. In his statement, (located in full within appendix N) Fukuda claimed that the 
textbooks selected for approval was done so without bias in an effort to include a diverse 
group of textbooks for use in schools. He further stated that while textbooks are reviewed 





“obvious mistakes or a lack of balance” which the MEXT then recommends for 
correction with support by academic research. Fukuda stressed that approved textbooks 
do not reflect the Japanese government’s views on history but that it continues to support 
the 1995 Murayama Statement and reiterated a general apology from Japan for actions in 
WWII with its commitment to promote mutual understanding and trusts with the world 
community (Fukuda, 2001). 
 Fukuda’s statement did not appease the international community as the South 
Korean government continued to threaten diplomatic and economic recourse for the lack 
of Japan’s action in remedying the controversial textbook. In May, 2001, in response to 
strongly worded governmental threats from South Korea’s MOFAT, Japan’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Makiko, issued a comment stating that South Korea’s positon 
was received by the Japanese government with sincerity and would be studied closely. He 
further encouraged the upcoming Japan-ROK National Exchange as a time for both 
countries to “join their hands” to further Japan-South Korea relations and to face the past 
squarely (Tanaka, 2001). 
 In July, 2001, the MEXT announced that no further revisions would be made to 
textbooks once the first neighboring countries’ petition was complete. A public statement 
was issued by the MEXT defending their position, according to Howard French, saying, 
“Under the current textbook screening system, it is up to the authors to decide what 
historical facts to include in their books. We [the MEXT] cannot force inclusions of 
certain points” (Tanaka, 2001). Koizumi also weighed in on the matter as he entered 
office a few days after the MEXT’s April approval, saying, in regards to the feelings of 





cooperate more peacefully. There is a need to turn our eyes to those areas. It is not good 
to only look at points of contention.” He also added that since a lot of work had already 
been done to adjust textbooks, he did not believe additional work would be required 
(Tanaka, 2001). 
 The second approval of the New History Textbook in 2005 brought a new round of 
international criticism. At a press conference held by the MOFA on April 5, the same day 
as the sanctioned history textbooks for the upcoming school year were announced, the 
Press Secretary defended Japan’s textbook approval system; reaffirming once again that 
approved textbooks do not reflect the governments’ stance on history but that its stands 
behind the 1995 Murayama statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 a.). The 
MOFA also publicly released a detailed description of the process involved in the 
textbook approval system which was placed on the MOFA’s website to support the 
MEXT claim of involvement within the educational process (Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2005 b.). Translated copies of Japan’s 20
th
 century history contained within the 
eight approved junior high school history textbooks were also placed on the MOFA’s 
website in an effort to eliminate any confusion of the Japanese history that is used within 
schools (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 c.). Koizumi also publicly called for 
“restraint of emotions” in regards to regional neighbors’ ignition while supporting the 
MOFA objectives of transparency (Sakamaki, 2005). 
 While Koizumi took a passive stance against the complaints of regional 
neighbors, not every political leader did so. In November 2005, during an appearance on 
a popular Asahi network television program, the DPJ leader, Maehara Seiji, urged 





President Roh’s understanding of Japan’s textbook policy and territorial claims “shallow” 
(The Japan Times, 2005 c.). 
 The MOFA has not published any new statements regarding the approval of 
history textbooks under Abe’s administration, but has upheld the 2005 publications 
produced under Koizumi and the 1995 Murayama statement in relation to the issue. 
However, Abe and his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga have released multiple general 
statements on issues related to the remembrance of history, concerning issues such as the 
Comfort Women and the commemoration of the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of WWII 
(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).  
 Even though it has been at the center of the issue, the MEXT has been largely 
silent on the controversy surrounding history textbooks. The focus of the MEXT’s 
webpage is posting reports on policy standards, general information on the Japanese 
educational system, as well as a few announcements such as new policy objectives for the 
educational system as a whole. In 2004, the MEXT released a statement on a program for 
compulsory education reform, entitled, “Japan! Rise Again!”  The program was created 
under Koizumi’s administration in acknowledgement that “It is necessary for Japan also 
to open up a new era and aim to foster spiritually rich and strong Japanese people, and, as 
a national strategy, to promote educational reform.” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 
2005).  
 Similar to Koizumi, Abe has also implemented a reform program in an effort to 
instill a greater love of the nation within the educational system. However, coupled with 
his stated campaign of patriotism, Abe has also created scholastic objectives to increase 





to international leaders such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as to 
increase Japan’s competency in the English language (Shimomura, 2014).  
A New York Times article published in October, 2014 described Abe’s education 
reform as a divided strategy that promoted an inward looking nationalism while striving 
for globalization objectives. The author, Michael Fitzpatrick, had used an email interview 
with the Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, as one of his resources for the 
article. As such, Shimomura posted a statement to the MEXT website defending the 
educational reform supported by Abe by claiming that the change positively shapes 
student’s national identities while improving areas of weakness within the current 
educational system, with no inherent dichotomy. Shimomura’s full statement can be 
found in appendix O (Shimomura, 2014). 
Memorials and Offerings  
 In 2012, the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul reemerged as a point of strife within 
the history textbook division between South Korea and Japan. As the South Korean 
government continued to demand revision of history textbooks that claimed Japanese 
ownership of the Dokdo Islands, Prime Minister Noda asserted the Comfort Woman 
statue outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul distorts historical facts. Noda specifically 
referenced the inscription on the statue as erroneous (Kim, 2012 b.). 
III. South Korean government’s use of history textbooks  
South Korea has sustained multiple turbulent events during the 20
th
 century which 
have now become points of contention in how the past is remembered. The disputed 
history begins in 1910 with the formal colonization of the peninsula by Japan and ends 





election. This time period includes not only colonialization, but also the Korean War 
which ultimately divided the peninsula, two dictators; one of which was Park Chung-hee 
who ruled South Korea for 18 years from 1961 to his death in 1979, vast political 
corruption, economic growth and the rise in living standards, as well as massive social 
movements in the struggle for democracy (The Japan Times, 2014; Seth, 2011).   
Park Chung-hee was the first South Korean leader to implement a system of state 
written textbooks with an objective of framing the understanding of current and past 
events. Upon taking power, Park employed the new textbook system to cast his military 
takeover of the government in a more positive light, referring to the event as a military 
revolution instead of a military coup. Even in the founding of a democratic state, 
government involvement with history textbooks have continued (The Japan Times, 2014; 
Choe, 2015).  
Speeches and Pronouncements 
 Comparable to Japan, South Korea has also experienced multiple controversial 
events regarding history textbooks from 1988 to 2015. 29 events have been classified 
under the Speeches and Pronouncement section and have been divided into two charts 
due to the large number of incidents. Below, Figure 9 illustrates government 
pronouncements and action concerning history textbooks within South Korea. Figure 10, 
presented later, displays the statements issued from the South Korean government against 









Figure 9. South Korean Textbook Incidents 1988-2015 




2003 Textbook writing is open to 3rd party publishers President Roh  DJP 
2004 The Commission is Created President Roh  DJP 
2005 Truth and Reconciliation Commission is Created President Roh  DJP 
2008 MOE “straightens facts” in history textbooks MOE Lee  SP 
2010 MOE announces revision to the national curriculum  MOE Lee  SP 
2010 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Closes  President Lee  SP 
2013 Textbook Approval MOE Park  SP 




Park  SP 
2013 MOE Recommends Changes to Approved Textbooks MOE Park  SP 
2014 Minister of Education suggest Yu’s history and single 
history textbook for compulsory education 
MOE Park  SP 
2015 2 million copies of information booklets on the Dokdo 
Islands given to public schools 
MOE Park  SP 




Park  SP 
2015 MOE announces state issued history textbook MOE Park  SP 
 
 The Ministry of Education (MOE) was established after the conclusion of WWII 
with the purpose of providing democratic education to the general public. While 
democracy was not fully achieved until 1988, the pre-democracy era set up a modern 
educational institution for the state. In the era of democracy, the MOE is charged with 
creating national educational policies that promotes not only high quality learning within 
schools, but also loyal and well-rounded citizens. Additionally, the MOE manages 
educator standards, national entrance exams, university standards, as well as financial 
elements related to educational services. An important role of the MOE is its involvement 
with educational material. Since the beginning of South Korea in 1948, the MOE 
compiled and freely distributed textbooks for compulsorily education (South Korean 
Ministry of Education, 2008).  
While the liberalization of history textbooks began with the establishment of 
democracy, the biggest impact of openness on textbooks occurred under President Roh’s 
administration from 2003 to 2008. During his first year in office, Roh reformed the 





maintained content standards set forth by the MOE. The system that Roh implemented is 
used today, as of this writing, and mimics the system used in Japan (Koo, 2015).  
 Roh took the idea of openness toward the peninsula’s 20
th
 century history a step 
beyond educational texts and established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) in 2005. The TRC’s goal, according to the first Commissioner Kim Dong-choon, 
was to, “create favorable conditions for achieving historical, political, and legal justice 
through revealing long-suppressed truths” (Selden & Kim, 2010). The TRC focused their 
efforts on giving a voice to Korean victims through the exposure of events that had been 
repressed which occurred under the rule of multiple dictators, the Korean War, and 
colonialization (Selden & Kim, 2010).  
 The TRC operated under a renewable four year mandate with a completion date 
set for early 2010. The TRC accomplished many projects and reports concerning 
atrocities in South Korea’s modern era but their work on the history of the Korean War 
proved to be one of the most sensitive issues. Their work on the Korean War 
inadvertently touched upon the national identity of South Korean citizens in relation to 
the formation of the state and its relationship with vital allies, including the United States, 
which increased tensions politically and domestically.   
Roh’s appointed officers’ term limit expired in 2009, under President Lee’s 
administration (which began in 2008). While Lee appointed new personnel to fill the 
TRC’s vacancies, he did not approve the TRC’s renewal. According to Kim Dong-choon, 
under the Lee administration the government was not open to working with the TRC for 





able to complete reports, specifically on events which occurred during the Korean War. 
The TRC officially closed in June, 2010 (Selden & Kim, 2010). 
 The Lee administration did not advance the liberalization of history education 
after Roh, but worked to once again constrain the content within textbooks. In 2008, the 
MOE announced that it would “straighten the facts” within history textbooks by requiring 
the textbook committee to necessitate changes in potential texts on the topics of the 1948 
Jeju Uprising, and South Korea’s past leaders. Specific changes included referring to the 
1948 Jeju Uprising, a large political protest that was violently put down by Korean 
soldiers, under US command, that resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, instead of as 
the Jeju Riot. The Rhee and Park years were to include positive aspects that occurred 
during their reign to balance the negative history of vast political corruption and 
authoritarian rule. Additionally, more aggressive descriptors against North Korea were 
also inserted (McNeill, 2008). The textbook revision was met with objection from the 
Democratic Party (DP), the largest opposition party at the time, who claimed Lee’s 
Administration was working to “beautify the past” (McNeill, 2008). 
 In 2010, the MEO announced a revision to the national history curriculum 
through increasing the information presented on the Dokdo Islets. According the MOE’s 
“Revision of History Curriculum” press release, which can be found in appendix P, “the 
content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the wrongfulness of 
Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise students’ awareness on 
Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an informed view of history” 





 Textbooks have continued to escalate as points of contention within the current 
Park Administration. In November 2013, the MOE approved eight history textbooks for 
use in the upcoming school year, one of which was published by Kyohak Publishing. The 
approval of Kyohak’s text ignited public protests against its use in schools, citing that the 
text presents past atrocities in a positive view; such as the history of authoritarian rule, 
leaves out specific brutalities, as well as downplays the struggle for democracy. DP 
lawmakers expressed outrage over the approved controversial text and called for its 
remove from the approved list (Nam, 2013). 
 The approval of the controversial text was part of a yearlong disagreement 
surrounding the textbook approval process. In 2013, President Park publicly cautioned 
advancing “ideological prejudices” in history textbooks in response to the criticisms of 
approved textbooks (Choe, 2015). In October, 2013 the MOE had proposed 830 revisions 
within the eight textbooks that had already been approved for use in South Korean high 
schools. The MOE claimed the recommended changes comprised factual errors, typos, 
and ideologically imbalanced descriptions of historical events. The publishers corrected 
all but 41 recommended changes.   However, after the completed 789 changes, the MOE 
ordered the publishers to make all 830 changes or risk suspension of their book. The 
publishers responded to the MOE by filing a lawsuit with Seoul’s Administrative Court 
citing that the order was based on a lack of evidence and that the government was 
requiring unnecessary revisions as the texts had all followed the mandated screening 
process and been approved, leveraging a Supreme Court ruling that requires additional 





 The history textbook dispute did not end in 2013 with the approval system. In 
2014, the Minister of Education, Hwang Woo-yea, began campaigning for the inclusion 
of a colonial era Japanese resistance fighter, Yu Kwan-sun, into South Korean history 
textbooks. Yu Kwan-sun was a 17 year old Koran girl who was imprisoned and tortured 
to death for opposing Japanese rule during the March First Movement.  
One March 1, 1919, nearly 1 million Korean colonists marched against Japanese 
colonial rule throughout the country in a largely peaceful movement throughout the 
spring, 1919. The Japanese colonial government brutally put down the protest with an 
acknowledged 553 deaths, 1,409 injured and over 14,000 imprisoned. However, Korean 
history estimates that more than 7,000 people died and tens of thousands were arrested by 
the Japanese for this protest for independence (Seth, 2011). 
Hwang found it problematic that only four of the eight history textbooks approved 
the previous year contained any mention of the young woman. In an effort to amend the 
missing piece of Yu’s history, Hwang publicly suggested a single history textbook be 
used for all South Korean schools which would also hedge against, “sowing seeds of 
division in public opinion” (The Japan Times, 2014). When the MOE was questioned 
about the possibility of a state led textbook, a spokesperson responded saying that 
creating a history textbook in today’s world is an open process that includes the 
involvement of multiple historians. The government only seeks “consistency” in the 
teaching of history (The Japan Times, 2014). 
  In the Education Minister’s push for inclusion of specific points of history, the 
Dokdo Islands once again became a point of national pride. In 2015, two million copies 





school to be used in conjunction with the approved history textbooks. The MOE released 
a statement concerning the booklet upon its circulation. The statement asserted that the 
booklets improved the learning material that was devised by the MOE in 2011, made the 
material easier for students to understand, and incorporated “new research outcomes” on 
the islands. For elementary students, the information was simplified and for high school 
students the information presented contained more, “in-depth legal grounds based on 
international law” which supported the Ministry’s overall educational goal of Dokdo Islet 
education, which states, “Students should be able to understand why Dokdo is Korean 
territory based on both historical and geographical facts, as well as by the perspective of 
international law” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2015). 
 South Korea’s internal struggle of how to portray the past within textbooks 
reached a peak in late 2015 when the Minister of Education announced that the state 
would be issuing one history textbook for required used in compulsory education 
beginning March, 2017.  Hwang assured opponents of the government textbook that the 
history presented would be “objective and balanced” as the MOE will invite a committee 
of historians to write the history book with a variety of persons to review the final draft 
before its use in schools. The Minister further defended the decision for a state issued text 
claiming that the main objectives of textbooks should be teaching “the proud history of 
South Korea” emphasizing the country’s achievement of democratic transition and its 
very quick industrialization and economic rise. The Deputy Minister of Education, Kim 
Jae-choon, bolstered Hwang’s assertions stating that the textbooks currently used in 
schools are lenient in their portrayal of North Korea and its direct involvement with 





history compared to the North (Choe, 2015). Park also defended the state issued text 
publicly asserting that textbooks and history classes must “inspire pride in students for 
being South Korean citizens” (The Japan Times, 2015 c.). 
 Opponents of the state issued text, including the DP and educators, claimed such a 
move by the state embarrasses the country globally and sets up a textbook system that is 
reflective of the repression of history under Park’s father. Likewise, critics asserted that 
the mandated text will whitewash history, and is an effort by Park to redeem her father’s 
reputation within the South Korean population (Jun, 2013; Choe, 2015). The Park 
Administration’s decision to author the history textbook ignited riots throughout South 
Korea; 50,000 people have signed a petition against the textbook (Kirk, 2015), historians 
from over 20 universities as well as 800 associated with the Korean History Research 
Association refused to participate in the government’s writing process for the book (The 
Japan Times, 2015 c.). The DP has also vowed to create a bill to ban the government 
from writing textbooks, even though such a bill would not likely pass due to the Senauri 
Party majority in the National Assembly, which supports the state issued textbook 
initiative (Choe, 2015).  
 While the MOE was dealing with controversies surrounding the approval and 
publication of history textbooks, The Commission on Verification and Support for the 
Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission) 
was publishing their own books for wide dissemination within South Korea and the 
world. As of 2015, the Commission has published 14 volumes of accounts from the 
Korean population who suffered under Japanese colonial rule as forced soldiers and 





In 2013, the Commission produced and released its 15
th
 book entitled, Can You 
Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of Comfort Women, a compilation of oral testimonies 
from 12 surviving Comfort Women and one civil activist on their experience with 
Japan’s Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign (Yonhap News Agency, 2015 
a.). The book’s stated objective is to spread the history of Comfort Women in an effort to 
lessen their secret pain and ensure their history does not fade from public knowledge. 
Coupled with the idea of increasing public awareness, the book also admonishes the 
Japanese government to make appropriate amends to resolve the Comfort Women issue, 
currently rife between South Korea and Japan (The Commission on Verification and 
Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 
2015). The book was first released in 2013 in Korean to the South Korean public (Yonhap 
News Agency, 2015 a.; The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of 
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). However, the 
Commission quickly set to work producing the text in English for global consumption, 
beginning first with the U.S. public.  This was the first book produced by the 
Commission that was distributed overseas (The Commission on Verification and Support 
for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). 
 The volume is set up in a similar fashion to a case study with methodology of 
collection and the history of Comfort Women mentioned before the section of transcribed 
testimonies. The personal accounts were gathered by the Commission employees from 
2005 to 2006, with one former Comfort Woman adding her testimony later in 2012 due 
her own personal choice. No personal identifiers of the women are given beyond their 





publication. The average age of the 12 women at the time of their interviews was 81 (The 
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under 
Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). 
The English version of Can You Hear Us? was completed in 2014, with the 
translation provided by the History Museum of Comfort Women (Media Joha LTD) (The 
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under 
Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). The translation was conducted in Palisades Park, 
New Jersey home to a well-known Korean American community. This particular town 
has been sympathetic to the issue of Korean Comfort Women as it is home to one of two 
US memorials to Comfort Women that are identical to the original statue located in 
Seoul, South Korea (Schrank, 2013; Alvarado, 2015; The Commission on Verification 
and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in 
Korea, 2015).  
As part of its mission to distribute the book within the U.S., the Commission 
worked to gain support from local, state, and national U.S. leaders. Political leaders’ 
support is also documented in front of the text though official letters produced by the 
officials themselves. In January, 2015, 20,000 copies of the book were available and 
distributed free of charge to US politicians and public libraries (Alvarado, 2015).  
 The South Korean government has not only focused attention on their own history 
textbooks but also on history textbooks of their regional neighbors, specifically Japan. 
Beginning in 2001, official statements against the content of Japanese history textbooks 
have been issued by the South Korea government each time the MEXT concluded their 





South Korean government beginning in 2001 until 2015. This figure comprises official 
statements issued directly from various governmental ministries as well as leaders’ 
statements gleaned through newspaper articles. However, Figure 10 is not fully 
comprehensive due to time limits placed on archival documents and the accessibility of 
websites available to English users.  
Figure 10. List of South Korean government statements against Japan’s history textbooks 
Year Gov’t Person Gov’t Department Statement Title 
2001 Han Seung-soo Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
MOFAT 
Statement of deep disappoint  
2001 Han Seung-soo, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 
MOFAT Korea’s Demand for 
Correction of Distortions in 
Japanese History Textbooks 
2001 Spokesperson of MOFAT MOFAT Statement by MOFAT 
Spokesperson on the Outcome 
of the Japanese Government’s 
Screening of History 
Textbooks 
2002 Spokesperson of the Task 
Force Team on the Issue of 
Distorted Japanese History 
Textbooks 
MOFAT Statement on the Outcome of 
the Japanese Government’s 
Screening of High School 
History Textbooks 
2004 Minister of Education MOE Ministry of Education issues 
strong protest and urged 
correction of Japanese history 
textbooks. 
2005 Minister of Education MOE Ministry of Education issues 
strong protest and urged 
correction of Japanese history 
textbooks. 
2007 Minister of Education MOE Ministry of Education issues 
strong protest and urged 
correction of Japanese history 
textbooks. 
2009 Spokesperson and Deputy 
Minister for Public 
Relations of MOFAT 
MOFAT Spokesperson’s Statement on 
Japan’s Approval of a Middle-
School History Textbook 
2011 Lee Ju-ho, Minister of 
Education 
MOE Minister Sends a Letter of 
Protest to Japan 
2012 Cho Byung-jae, Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson 
MOFAT Seoul rebukes Tokyo over 
textbooks 
2012 Cho Sei-young, Director-
General for Northeast 
Asian Affairs 
MOFAT Director-General for Northeast 
Asian Affairs Summons a 
Japanese Diplomate of the 
Textbook Issue 
2012 President Lee Executive Lee calls for Japan to muster 
up courage to face up to 
history 
2012 Spokesperson and Deputy 
Minister for Public 
Relations of MOFAT 
MOFAT Spokesperson’s Statement on 
the Outcome of Japan’s High 
School Textbook Examination 
2014 Spokesperson and Deputy 
Minister for Public 
Relations of MOFA 
MOFAT MOFA Spokesperson’s 
Statement on Japan’s 
Approval of Elementary 
School Textbooks 
2015 National Assembly National Assembly S. Korea’s Parliament 






2015 Lee Wan-koo, Prime 
Minister 
Executive S. Korean PM Warns Japan 
against History Distortion 
 
 While multiple ministries issued statements during each year of controversy, they 
all followed a similar structure of denouncement, such as utilizing the phrases, “The 
Government of the Republic of Korea strongly protests” (Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Spokesperson, 2012), “expresses deep regret” (South Korea Ministry of 
Education, 2011), “strongly appeals” (Kim, 2012 b.) the decision to approve. All the 
statements of denouncement go further to declare that the victims of the MEXT approval 
are the youth of Japan who will ultimately become Japan’s future. The statements also 
declare that the South Korean grievances are supported by the 1982 Neighboring Country 
Clause, the 1995 Murayama Statement, and the 1998 Joint Declaration on a new Korea-
Japan Partnership for the 21st Century.   
The MOFAT’s 2001 statement, “Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in 
Japanese History Textbooks,” seemingly sets precedents for future governmental action 
in relation to the history textbook controversy with Japan. This particular assertion 
discusses the 25 items submitted to the MEXT for correction within their history 
textbooks which were identified by a team of researchers commissioned by the 
government. After the explanation of the items submitted and their support through 
previous legal agreements, the South Korean government promised to, “demise mid to 
long term measures to prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer 
the world an accurate and objective understanding of Korea’s history” along with 
consideration in “reinforcing history education in the schools.” The complete statement 
can be found in Appendix Q (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001 





term measures” as the MOE has been involved with the petition of corrections within 
Japanese textbooks (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2011) and the governments 
continued involvement with its own history education.  
While Figure 10 demonstrates a wide array of government participation within the 
history textbook controversy, an interesting point of involvement is the resolution issued 
by the National Assembly in 2015. Since the disagreement’s outbreak in 1982, there has 
not been evidence of the National Assembly’s engagement in the issue as a whole until 
33 years later when a resolution was issued in 2015. The issued adopted by the National 
Assembly denounced Japan’s continued claims on the Dokdo islands, stating, “the 
parliament strongly denounces Japan’s repeated provocations of violating South Korea’s 
territorial sovereignty and distorting history.” The resolution passed with 181 votes out of 
a possible 182 (Qatar News Agency, 2015 b.). 
Response to Challenges  
While South Korea has used speeches and pronouncements to call for the change 
of Japanese history textbooks, this has not been the only means utilized to push the 
government of Japan to redress the issue. In response to the Japanese government’s 
refusal to correct history textbooks, South Korean leaders have used the threat of harming 
economic and diplomatic relations to pressure change within Japan’s educational texts.  
President Kim Dae-jung initiated strong repercussions in response to the MEXT’s 
decision to approve a controversial textbook coupled with Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine in 2001. In 1999, Kim had begun to ease restrictions on the imports of Japanese 
cultural items which had long been strictly controlled since the end of WWII. Kim 





(French, 2001). In addition to the threat of restricting trade, Kim refused to meet with 
Koizumi until his conditions of meeting the requirements set forth by the 1998 Joint 
Communique as well as publicly acknowledging that it was incorrect to approve the 
controversial textbook (Stuck, 2001). Kim did not meet with Koizumi during his 
presidency and the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan stalled (French, 
2001; Stuck, 2001).  
Cold relations between South Korea and Japan continued under President Roh’s 
administration, which began in 2001.  In 2005, with the creation of “Takeshima day” 
combined with the approval, once again, of the controversial New History Textbook 
ignited a formidable response from Roh himself. Roh published a three page letter to the 
nation on the current status of South Korean-Japanese relations (Konishi, 2005). In his 
letter, Roh called the claims on the Dokdo islands and the history textbook row as Japan’s 
attempt at justifying its colonialist and expansionist past to which he declared, “This 
government has no choice but to respond firmly.” While “Takeshima day” was organized 
by a local government, Koizumi nor his administration gave a statement against its 
production or comment on how such an event would affect regional neighbors, as such 
Roh remarked on the event specifically saying, “These actions are not just undertaken by 
a single local government or some thoughtless extreme nationalists, but they are done 
under the abetting of the Japanese leadership and the central government. That is why we 
can only look at them as the actions by Japan. These are actions that completely nullify 
repentance and apologies made so far by Japan.” Roh further stated that South Korea’s 





Korean people must be prepared for a “prolonged fight with economic and social 
implications” (Konishi, 2005). 
Presidents Kim and Roh took aggressive stances towards Japan’s textbooks, 
whereas Lee’s administration focused on bolstering South Korea’s own history within 
textbooks as evidenced by events outlined previously. While Lee had a large internal 
focus on educational texts, he met with Prime Minister Noda three times during Noda’s 
time in office; December, 2011, August, 2012, and October, 2012, where Lee discussed 
the correct presentation of history, specifically in relation to the issue of Comfort Women 
(Foster, 2011; The Asahi Shimbun, 2012, The Korean Times, 2012 b.). Park also took a 
hard stance against the portrayal of history within educational texts, citing such 
representation of histories like the Comfort Women, and refused to meet with Abe until 
November, 2014 (Xinhua, 2014). 
Memorials and Offerings  
 The Comfort Woman memorial in Seoul, South Korea was erected in 2011 at the 
beginning of Prime Minister Noda’s administration, as discussed in chapter 2. President 
Lee responded to Noda’s calls to take down the statue by saying, “The monument would 
not have been erected if only Japan had shown a little bit of concern” over the issue, 
warning, “second and third statues will be set up each  time one of the elderly women 
dies, unless sincere measures are taken” (Choi, 2012). President Lee stood behind this 
statement throughout the rest of his time in office.  
IV. Chapter Analysis  
Both Japan and South Korea’s national government have been actively engaged 





with the production of educational materials is innate in both educational systems 
reviewed, Japan and South Korea have displayed increased government involvement into 
the production of textbooks since 1988. Figure 11 below depicts the actions of 
involvement by government officials relating to history textbooks. 
Figure 11. Position of Government action in relation to history textbooks 
Japan 
Number of Gov’t Actions        Officials Involved   Category    Event Description  
15 5 actions: Prime Minister 
11 actions: MEXT 
1 action: MOFA 
Speeches and 
Pronouncements 
See Figure 8 for Event 
descriptions 
12 3 actions: Prime Minister 
3 actions: MEXT 
4 actions: MOFA 
1 action: Chief Cabinet Sec 
1 action: DJP Leader 




2. 2001 MOFA issued 
response to South 
Korea’s letter against 
approved textbook 
3. 2001 MEXT statement 
defending decision not to 
review a 2nd time 
4. 2001 Koizumi’s 
statement to newspapers 
on need to focus on 
positive elements of the 
Japan-South Korean 
relationship 
5. 2004 MEXT program 
“Japan! Rise Again!” 
released 
6. 2005 MOFA Press 
Secretary statement 
defending MEXT 
7. 2005 MOFA released 
description of textbook 
approval process 
8. 2005 MOFA translated 
passages of textbooks 
coverage of 20th century 
history 
9. 2005 Koizumi calls for 
“restraint of emotion” 
10. 2005 DJP leader calls 
Roh’s policies on 
Japan’s textbooks 
shallow and urged 
Koizumi to resolve the 
issue 
11. 2012 Abe’s proposed 
educational reform 
program begins 
12. 2014 MEXT responds to 














Number of Gov’t Actions    Officials Involved      Category                       Event Description 
29 6 actions: President 
10 actions: MOE 
8 actions: MOFAT 
2 actions: The Commission 




See Figure 9 and 10 for Event 
Descriptions   
 
6 6 actions: President Response to Challenges 1. 2001 Kim refused to 
meet with Koizumi until 
conditions were met; 
threat to reverse trade 
liberalization 
2. 2005 Roh threatens 
diplomatic war 
3. 12/2011 Lee meets with 
Noda to discuss 
historical issues 
4. 8/2012 Lee meets with 
Noda to discuss 
historical issues 
5. 10/2012 Lee meets with 
Noda to discuss 
historical issues 
6. 2012 Park refused to 




2 2 actions: President Memorials and Offerings 1. 2011 Lee refused to 
move or revise the 
Comfort Woman statue 
until an appropriate 
apology was issued by 
Japan 
2. 2012 Park has kept with 
Lee’s initial stance 
 
The respective Ministries of Education have had the most involvement with 
history textbooks since they are endowed with the power of approving and producing 
educational material, which sets this ministry at the center of the controversy. It is 
important to note that both Japan and South Korea’s Minister of Education are appointed 
by each incoming Prime Minister or President as part of their respective cabinets (Jun, 
2014). While both governments have proclaimed unbiased and historically accurate 
books (McNeill, 2008; The Japan Times, 2014; Fackler, 2013; Ito, 2012) the Ministry of 
Education typically follows the policy set forth by the President or Prime Minister, which 
is exemplified throughout the previous sections. Figure 12 below examines the number of 





Figure 12. History textbook events by administration  
Japan  
Administration  Number of Events by Section              Total Number of Events 
Murayama, SDP 1-Speeches and Pronouncements  1 
Koizumi, LDP 3-Speeches and Pronouncements 
10-Response to Challenges 
 
13 
Aso, LDP 2-Speeches and Pronouncements 2 
Noda, DPJ 1-Speeches and Pronouncements 
1-Memorials and Offerings 
2 
Abe, LDP 7-Speeches and Pronouncements 
2-Response to Challenges 
9 
 
South Korea  
Administration  Number of Events by Section              Total Number of Events 
Kim, Democratic Party  4-Speeches and Pronouncements 
1-Response to Challenges 
5 
Roh, Uri Party 6-Speeches and Pronouncements 
1-Response to Challenges 
7 
Lee, SP 9-Speeches and Pronouncements 
3-Response to Challenges 
1-Memorial and Offerings 
13 
Park, SP 10-Speeches and Pronouncements  
1-Response to Challenges 
1-Memorial and Offerings 
12 
  
While Koizumi had the most overall number of events dealing with history 
textbooks, Abe had the most events that occurred within Speeches and Pronouncements 
due to history textbooks being a part of his election campaign, whereas most of the 
history textbook events for Koizumi occurred as Response to Challenges. In South Korea, 
Lee had the most number of events while Park had the most events under Speeches and 
Pronouncements. Like Abe, history textbooks have become a major point of Park’s 
Administration but led by her Education Minister and supported by herself.  
 Both governments have described textbooks’ similarly with their objective being 
to develop a love for the nation within compulsory education. Such rhetoric has increased 
under Abe and Park with both using very similar phrases in describing the creation of 
educational policies or textbooks with words such as “instilling pride in the past” or 
“inspiring pride of being a South Korean” used. The case study suggests that both 





with specific political parties defending such a book by using rhetoric as “pride” and 
“love for the nation” to support such a text. While these phrases are not bad, as they also 
correspond with the description of patriotism, how the in-group is compared to the out-
group is of the utmost importance to political parties as well as to the development of 
patriotism or nationalism.  
According to the various news sources describing textbook revision in both 
countries, the out-group is portrayed as evil, or corrupt, or even lessoned in importance 
compared to the in-group within controversial texts. For South Korea, the Saenuri party 
supports the portrayal of North Korea as villainous and the inclusion of details of Japan’s 
brutal acts during colonialism and WWII. While the events being described, such as the 
division of the Korean peninsula and the atrocities by Japan are true, there fervent 
inclusion within history textbooks and the specific verbiage used to describe them is a 
form of othering. This othering not only separates the countries by experiences and 
population but also separates them through a sense of evil. The in-group encapsulates the 
good victims while the out-group are inherently evil villains. This love of the in-group 
coupled with viewing others as evil is a form of nationalism that is promoted by the 
Saenuri party.  
 Likewise, within Japan’s controversial texts, the out-group’s experience during 
pivotal events, such as colonialism and WWII is downplayed. Such a moderate portrayal 
of experiences lessens the importance such a population has on the in-group. This 
lessening of events ignores the out-group as a way of othering. The in-group is promoted 
by focusing on their own actions and losses while the out-group is forgotten. This form of 





 All of the administrations involved with the production of textbooks, except for a 
few policies under Roh in South Korea, have claimed to “straighten facts” or in some 
way present an idea of true history while achieving its goal of instilling pride within the 
reader. However, every administration has failed to promote the idea of intellectual 
freedom when producing textbooks. Civil society in both countries, has at some point, 
protested the government involvement in history textbook writing. But the lack of 
governmental support of intellectual freedom within the publication of history textbooks 
through government objectives like growing the love of the nation and rigorous policies 
that follow administrations, empowers both governments to present a manipulated and 
controlled version of history within the educational system. South Korea’s return to a 
state issued textbook increases the state’s ability to manipulate historical information for 
specific objectives.  
 The control of educational material, with intellectual freedom or not, is a point of 
national sovereignty in how a nation choses to educate its youth. Japan and South Korea 
have stated such a belief in response to challenges throughout the case study (South 
Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001; Cho, 2012; Prusher, 2001). 
Specifically, South Korea’s MOFAT stated in 2012 that textbooks have the power to 
influence a country’s future either positively or negatively (Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Spokesperson, 2012). This potential influence of a nation’s future that could 
negatively impact the region or neighboring countries has seemingly been cited as a 
security concern by South Korea. As such, the government of South Korea has responded 
to Japanese textbooks aggressively through the publication of its own educational 





used textbooks almost as a weapon. In response to the MEXT approval of conservative 
texts, South Korea has also increased its approval of controversial texts. With the issue of 
the Dokdo islands, where Japan has begun to increase education on Japanese ownership, 
so has South Korea in an effort to lay claim counter to Japan. Since textbooks are a point 
of national sovereignty, the South Korean government under Lee and Park have chosen to 
combat the future threat by creating a population that is opposite of Japan and the 
potential external security concern through the development of nationalism by 
manipulating the historical memory of the population. This work of influencing the future 
populations moves the potential losses such as monetary losses through trade embargos 
as well as losses related to war, to the next generation and bolsters their political party as 
they are seen as champions for the South Korean population against Japan.  
 The publication of texts for the general public has been prominent in South Korea 
through the work of the Commission. Whereas the Japanese government has not been 
involved with the publication of texts for the general public beyond approving 
educational texts that are also sold privately by the third party publishers, the 
Commission has published 15 texts of testimony concerning Japanese atrocity since 
2004. The book, Can You Hear Us? The UnTold Narratives of Comfort Women provides 
a unique opportunity to examine the Commission’s publication since this was the first 
copy produced in English.  
 Upon review, the text clearly presents political motives with statements of support 
from South Korean and U.S. officials and has an additional purpose of influencing 
Korean-Americans and the American public’s interpretation of the Comfort Women 





on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese 
Colonialism in Korea, 2015). The timing of the publication of the Comfort Women text is 
suspect as the testimonials were collected between 2005-2006, and one testimony in 
2012. Prior to the book, three fact finding survey results and six research studies were 
published on Comfort Women as well as 14 other books produced by the Commission on 
the topics of forced labor and military service. The Commission only addresses the nine 
year time span in testimonial and research collection to publication with the statement, “It 
is our regret that we could not publish this earlier…” (The Commission on Verification 
and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in 
Korea, 2015, 6). The Korean language version was published in 2013 as Park came into 
office. Interestingly, at the onset of her tenure in office, Park has made the issue of 
Comfort Women central to her Administration (Choe, 2015 b.).  
The text presents background information on the history of Comfort Women that 
is widely agreed upon within the academic community and sets up the text as a case study 
with mythology and limitations on research. Questions were asked by the interviewer to 
the survivor in an effort to gain an overall portrayal of her time in servitude. However, 
due to their varied experiences, not all the questions are similar and some questions were 
leading in their effort to gain a depiction of events. Such leading examples include asking 
for specific nationalities of the traffickers and persons who visited comfort stations such 
as, “Have you seen a Korean?” (referring to servicing Korean soldiers as a comfort 
Woman) (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced 
Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015, 71). Additionally, out of place 





a Japanese war song?” (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of 
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015 p. 170). While this 
question may give a view into life at the comfort station, learning a war song may have 
also been a part of life within the education system in Korea and in factories as well 
during colonialism, no information was presented demonstrating that learning a war song 
was unique to the comfort station. Moreover, the question, “Don’t you hate Koreans 
because it was a Korean who took you away?” (The Commission on Verification and 
Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 
2015, 174) led to an opinionated paragraph of how much the woman hated the Japanese 
because of their orchestrated violence which caused her pain. While the book does 
provide valuable testimonies from surviving Comfort Women, it is filled with biases as 

















I. Analysis of Case Studies and Final Conclusions 
Historical memory is a powerful influence within populations. Its basis of shared 
remembrances within the collective helps shape identity and provides elites with sensitive 
material in which to mobilize persons for a specific cause. The instrumentally directed 
selective remembering (and forgetting) of past events gives this concept a very distinct 
attribute when compared to collective memories. Both concepts place awareness and 
certain significance on specific events of the past, without holding to their accurate 
retelling. Every population develops and maintains collective memories that define who 
the population is and where they came from (Langenbacher, 2003; Toshechenko, 2011; 
Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Since every population holds collective memories, elites have 
the opportunity to exploit these remembrances for specific purposes as historical memory 
is the elite manipulation of collective memories.  
While historical memory builds into a person’s identity, it also helps to develop 
patriotism and nationalism, as well as the concept of nations. Elites have utilized 
historical memory for specific ends, such as legitimizing governments and political 
parties, legislation, and government programs.  Elites who instrumentally influence the 
perceptions of a population have come from different forms of government including 
authoritarian as well as democracies. With the case of modern China, Wang demonstrated 
that authoritarian governments have the ability to manipulate historical memories to 
increase the legitimacy of the ruling collective (Wang, 2012). Democracies have entered 





elites of successor states have utilized historical memory as a tool to aid the transition 
from an authoritarian state to a new democracy. Scholars have also relied on the new 
states’ use of this concept to gauge the ability of the new democracy to consolidate 
(Brewer, 2008; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Pridham, 2014).  
While the study of elite manipulation of historical memory has currently provided 
a new understanding of legitimacy in authoritarian states and in transitions to democracy, 
there is a dearth of information relating to consolidated democracies’ (Diamond, 1999) 
use of historical memory in relation to legitimacy. The lack of information raises many 
questions, largely centered on whether consolidated democracies manipulate historical 
memory for legitimacy.  
II. Revisiting Expected Findings  
The two case studies examined in this thesis presented three topics of Comfort 
Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks in Japan and South Korea. The four 
expected findings that were presented in chapter 1 have provided further focus to this 
research in relation to how democracies are impacted by the elite manipulation of 
historical memory. 
The first expected finding states that elites will use historical memory to 
legitimize their term in office when faced with challenges to the state or population. This 
expected finding was partially supported by the research. The case studies supported the 
hypothesis that elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when 
faced with challenges to the state such an economic crisis. Both elites in Japan and South 
Korea have been managing the effects of ongoing economic stagnation which began in 





Korea’s economy (Seth, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 1998). The 2008 recession 
also negatively impacted the small, positive changes that had been occurring since the 
1998 economic decline (The Economist, 2008; Seth, 2011). Other challenges both states 
endured between 1988 to 2015 included corruption of political officials and the loss of 
political power for the dominant political party.  
South Korean President Lee came into office with the promise of reviving the 
economy, which had made some gains through his proposed government initiatives 
(Onishi, 2008; The Economist, 2011). Along with new initiatives, Lee maintains the 
highest number of memory events out of all the South Korean Presidents, with a total of 
22 occurrences. Likewise, Abe is nearing the most memory events out of all of Japan’s 
Prime Ministers with 21 events. He has also prominently addressed the economic 
stagnation within his own government programs for the economy.   
South Korean Presidents have all had to contend with the image of corruption as it 
has become a trait of South Korean politics, most notably in regards to relationships with 
big business (Choe, 2012). President Roh had been suspected of corruption during his 
time in office and later committed suicide as he was being investigated on charges soon 
after he left office (Sohn, 2009). Additionally, Lee came into office under suspicion of 
corruption as a leading business executive (Onishi, 2008) and exited with renewed 
scrutiny when his political aids as well as his brother were charged with crimes of 
embezzlement and bribery (Choe, 2012). Both of these Presidents had been involved in 
more than ten events related to history. In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) had 
been facing issues with corruption before Koizumi was in office. During his 





the LDP (The Economist, 2006), his Administration also holds one of the highest number 
of historical memory events out of all of the Japanese Prime Ministers with 21 events.  
The LDP has been the dominant political power within Japan since the end of 
occupation in 1952. The LDP has lost power only twice since 1952, with the first loss 
beginning in 1994 to 1996. In 1996, the LDP regained power but had transitions in Prime 
Minister about every two years until Koizumi entered office in 2001. Koizumi entered 
office with a clear interpretation of history, particularly on the topic of Yasukuni Shrine 
and remained in office for six years. The LDP lost power again in 2009 to the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DJP) and returned to power in 2012. Abe entered office as Prime Minister 
in 2012 also with a distinct understanding of history, specifically on Comfort Women and 
has currently served for four years.  
The Grand National Party (GNP), now known as the Saenuri Party (SP), is the 
dominant political party in South Korea with three out of six Presidents identified as 
members. The South Korean President is limited to one five year term. As such, the 
number of years in office was not a significant factor in this analysis. However, the GNP 
first came to power in 1993 with Kim Young-sam who had two events of historical 
memory during his tenure. The South Korean GNP lost power from 1998 to 2008 to the 
most popular minority party, the Democratic Party (DP), as well as the short lived Uri 
Party who supported Roh (BBC World News, 2009). The GNP regained power in 2008 
with Lee and again in 2012 with Park, even though it suffered a split and rebranding 
under Park’s Administration (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012). Lee and Park had the highest 
amounts of historical memory events compared to the other South Korean Presidents, 





The case studies demonstrate that elites in democratic governments will use 
historical memory to legitimize their term or political party for office when faced with 
challenges to the party. Correlating evidence was not found to support the claim that 
elites would utilize historical memory when the population was faced with challenges.  
The second expected finding states that historical memory is used in similar ways 
during elections in South Korea and Japan, even though both countries hold a different 
type of democracy. This expected finding was supported by the case studies. Both 
governments are mature, consolidated democracies with multiple successful public 
elections and transitions of power. These democracies also provide two different 
structures of democratic government for review. Japan maintains a parliamentary 
(constitutional monarchy) democracy while South Korea is a presidential republic. The 
case studies illustrate that both countries’ governments manipulate historical memory in 
many similar ways. 
In the campaigns of President Park and Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, there 
were limited differences in how historical memory was portrayed during the campaign. 
Each presented an interpretation of history that crafted an image of elites championing 
the in-group (the governments’ respective population) and promised a specific resolution 
to a perceived historical injustice or actions that ignored the shame of the past. The 
specific resolution includes the South Korean acceptable form of apology from the 
Japanese government with compensation for the South Korean Comfort Women in 
regards to the Comfort Women history. These campaign promises also played upon the 
nationalist sentiments of the population in that not only was an image crafted of the elites 





through the same avenues and for similar purposes throughout the three topics under 
review.  
The similarities between Japan and South Korea continued even though there are 
differences in the process of elections. South Korean political parties are generally driven 
by personalities. The use of personalities within election campaigns has been a trait of 
South Korean politics since the transition to democracy in 1988 and has led to the quick 
creation and dissolution of political parties due to their often centered nature on one 
particular candidate. Candidates are often selected by political parties to run for office 
due to the amount of votes they are expected to gain. The estimated number of votes 
takes into account the political regionalism that is prominent in South Korea. The 
selection of candidates have leveraged support from specific regions to garner votes. At 
times, the candidates are also constrained by regionalism due to stereo-types and an 
internal mentality of an in-group, out-group idea based on the region a person is from 
(Lee, 2014). The use of historical memory may bolster the broad appeal of a particular 
candidate on a national level to balance the strong reliance on personalities and 
regionalism. This concept may also aid in helping to reframe and unite internal in-group, 
out-group identities into a broader understanding of a national in-group versus a national 
out-group such as Japan.  
The elections in Japan are not as personality driven as in South Korea. Political 
parties’ platform and position on issues such as the economy and nuclear power, hold a 
greater influence in gaining votes than necessarily the person running for office. As 
Martin Fackler claimed that during the 2012 parliamentary elections, the exit polls 





implemented by the incumbent party, which at the time was the DJP (Fackler, 2012). 
Historical memory provides political parties in Japan with the ability to bolster party 
platforms through the idea of historical support. Additionally, the political parties are able 
to focus an internal in-group, out-group mentality within the election by promoting their 
own support of the population while ostracizing the opposition party through manipulated 
selective remembering. The LDP has a long history of successful time in power to draw 
from within the population’s collective memory due to the nearly consecutive rule since 
1952. The research purports that democracies will use historical memory similarly during 
elections no matter the different structural forms democracy may take.  
The third expected finding states that when historical memory is promoted by 
elites, public protests against the out-group will increase. This expected finding is 
partially supported by the case studies. In South Korea, every historical memory action 
such as Prime Minister visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the approval of controversial history 
textbooks, doubting Comfort Women history and denouncing reparations ignited public 
protests.  The elite perpetuated the intense mood of the public through publicly 
responding to every action related to historical memory by Prime Ministers, such as 
Park’s inclusion of offerings in her rhetoric of reproach towards the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Additionally, the rebuke of Japan from multiple governmental agencies for the same 
cause also aided in strongly motivating the public to action. 
In Japan, there was limited evidence of public protests on each topic. Japanese 
protests against Prime Ministers’ attendance at Yasukuni Shrine were small, the approval 
of history textbooks saw one large protest against the MEXT (Ministry of Education, 





additionally, and there was no mention of public protests against Prime Ministers action 
within the issue of Comfort Women beyond that of a few criticisms from Japanese 
scholars. Albeit, newspapers’ accounts may have overlooked Japanese protests against 
governmental action in favor of covering the international response on Comfort Women.  
The limited public protests throughout Japan in relation to historical memory may 
stem from how the out-group is portrayed within Japan’s historical memory. The elites’ 
message within historical memory has consistently been regaining pride in their own past 
through manipulated interpretations of memories that promote a nationalistic love for the 
nation. The out-group to the Japanese in-group has been downplayed as exemplified in 
the New History Textbook, the Yasukuni Shrine where the purpose was to remember 
Japanese sacrifices and not necessarily the sacrifices of colonial citizens, as well as 
diminishing Japan’s role in the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery even against its 
own citizens. The out-group, relating to regional neighbors, has been lessoned in 
importance to the Japanese in-group. In comparison, the South Korean elites have 
identified Japan as the sole perpetrator and thus the villainous out-group. Where the 
Japanese public has had limited response to the out- group as they focus more on their 
own history, the South Korean public has directed all of their anger from the contentious 
history to their out-group of Japan. This leads to the finding that when historical memory 
is promoted by elites against a specific out-group, public protests against that group will 
increase. 
Within this thesis, the in-group has referred to the country’s own population. This 
is understood as South Korea’s in-group is the South Korean population where as Japan’s 





populations not within the country’s in-group on an international scale such as the out-
group to South Korea’s in-group is Japan. This in-group, out-group relationship is only 
one way in which an in-group out-group mentality can be used. Domestically, elites are 
able to frame the idea of an in-group against an out-group in terms of political parties 
such as during an election. In an election, a political party can portray themselves as a 
party for the in group or as supporting the in-group against the other political party who is 
portrayed as the out-group. The designation of in-group or out-group can be facilitated by 
the use of historical memory to highlight specific historical understandings to support 
their framed image. Within the case studies of Japan and South Korea, both conservative 
parties, the LDP and the SP, had the most rhetoric that bolstered the framed 
understanding of supporting the in-group through the use of historical memory as they 
crafted an image for themselves as being the champion for the nation in the resolution of 
the perceived unresolved history like that of Comfort Women and thus the best supporter 
of the in-group.  
III. Comparison of Japan and South Korea within Historical Memory 
The democracies of Japan (post-1945) and South Korea (post-1987) have 
demonstrated government involvement in historical memories through the previous three 
topics within the case studies. Both governments influence historical memory through 
speeches and pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorials and offerings 
which are similar to the ways in which the People’s Republic of China, in Wang’s study, 
also manipulated historical memory. This observation supports the fourth expected 
finding which states; similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will 





In all three topics within the case studies, speeches and pronouncements were the 
most used where the elites addressed historical memory, followed closely by response to 
challenges, and finally memorials and offerings. Speeches and pronouncements are 
straightforward ways for both governments to present their interpretation of memories as 
part of the required and traditional duties of elected officials which involve speeches as 
well as issuing pronouncements on a regular basis. This has been exemplified with in the 
case studies by the key note address in South Korea on National Liberation Day and 
addressing the Diet during the plenary session in Japan. Both governments unashamedly 
included the issue of history in both these addresses, as well as in many others.  
While the Japanese and South Korean governments have many similarities with in 
speeches and pronouncements there were differences in how they were used. In Japan, 
speeches and pronouncements were commonly used within the topics of Comfort Women 
and Yasukuni Shrine to justify actions or to offer regrets for past events with nine out of 
thirteen speeches and pronouncements doing so. This majority is most likely due to the 
South Korean elites’ criticism against Japan. The South Korean elite used speeches and 
pronouncements as a means to criticize Japan for past and present actions as evidenced 
by 29 out of 30 speeches and pronouncements on the topics of Comfort Women and 
Yasukuni Shrine. History textbooks were different for both Japan and South Korea in that 
the Japanese elite focused speeches and pronouncements on issues specifically of interest 
to the Japanese population, such as educational programs and textbook approval, which at 
times also offended the South Korean elite. There was only one out of 15 speeches and 
pronouncements that justified or apologized on behalf of Japanese officials.  Such a 





related to the notion of national sovereignty in educating the nation’s youth through 
textbooks. In South Korea, while the amount of speeches and pronouncements related to 
the South Korean population increase on history textbooks compared to Comfort Woman 
and Yasukuni Shrine with 10 out of 26 given, the number of speeches and 
pronouncements against Japan also increased with 16 out of 26 made. The actions of 
including a perspective of history within governmental duties illustrates that elites can act 
with historical memory in the boundaries of democracy.   
Japan and South Korea have used responses to challenges as a means to bolster 
the image of the person in office, and their respective political party, as a champion for 
the in-group. For South Korea, responding to challenges became the central opportunity 
for addressing historical grievances since Japan is depicted as the sole aggressor within 
the historical memory. The elite metaphorically stand ready to respond to challenges as 
the image that is being crafted is one opposite to victimization. The South Korean elite 
evoke power and the idea of champion through strongly responding to Japanese acts that 
are contrary to their sanctioned selective remembering.  
The response to challenges is different for Japan, compared to South Korea. The 
Japanese elite have more of an internal focus in relation to historical memory since there 
is emphasis on interpreting the past more positively. South Korean elites have framed 
Japanese action in regards to history as initiating events. As such, Japanese elites have 
most commonly utilized response to challenges as a means to exercise restraint in 
diplomatic relations to lessen the escalation of potential conflict as well as defending 





In South Korea, the elite have currently found a niche with the history of Comfort 
Women with which to campaign. This is especially evident beginning with Lee’s 
Administration and has continued during Park’s election campaign and Presidential term. 
By raising the profile of Comfort Women, the government promoted the idea of 
unresolved history by pressuring the Japanese government for a specific resolution. This 
pressure aids in crafting an image of the elite as a champion of the nation through its 
work to achieve the solution on behalf of the population. Elites utilizing a specific 
message of historical memory during a campaign also illustrates politicians navigating 
the population’s accepted boundaries of collective memory.  
While the issue of Comfort Women was available to Roh and Kim since the 
concern came to the forefront of public knowledge in 1991 (Tanaka, 2002), they 
leveraged the history of Yasukuni Shrine, in part, due to the media attention that had been 
drawn to official visits by Koizumi’s campaign for office (French, 2002). Roh and Kim 
influenced the memories of forced labor and conscription in the same way that Lee and 
Park have used the remembrances of Comfort Women in that both Administrations 
promoted the idea of an unresolved crime with specific terms of resolution required from 
Japan. Roh and Kim created an image of the government as being a champion for the 
nation as they stood against the “Japanese commemoration” of atrocities committed 
against the Korean public. The construction of the image of champion by South Korean 
Presidents through selective memories is in contrast to the history of victimization that 
has been selected for the population’s remembrance.  
Compared to the South Korean government, the Japanese government is molding 





“restoring the country’s self” (Fackler, 2013). Many within the LDP have worked for a 
more positive remembrance of history through actions such as high profile visits as well 
as providing offerings to Yasukuni Shrine (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013). Classifying such 
events as a person’s, including government officials’, right to do so also bolsters the 
acceptability of not only official visits but pride in the past. As evidenced through history 
textbooks, the LDP has worked to approve texts that promote a more positive 
interpretation of the past, citing, again, a population’s right to be proud of that nation’s 
history. The Japanese elite championing pride in the past is juxtaposed to the memories 
of shame that are being selected for remembrance.  
Memorials and offerings were the least used of the three mediums to influence 
historical memory. Memorials, as well as museums, are powerful influencers of 
populations as demonstrated by scholars such as Zheng Wang and Marek Kucia, Marta 
Duch-Dyngosz & Mateusz Magierowski. The only two notable memorials and related 
offerings were the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul and the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.    
South Korea is home to museums dedicated to the history of the Military Mobilization of 
Sexual Slavery that were sponsored by the population through individual donations and 
non-profit organizations (Jung, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015). By leveraging the 
Comfort Women history and the statue that was created and funded by the population 
themselves, the government is working within the boundaries of the collective’s historical 
memory. Likewise, the Japanese elite utilize the historical memory of Yasukuni Shrine as 
a place of commemoration, which reaches back to the Meiji era for Japan (O’Dwyer, 





interpretation of history through attendance and offerings at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi, 
2013).   
However, where the South Korean government had large involvement from the 
population in creating statues and museums that the elite were able to leverage, no 
evidence was found of the Japanese population being involved with the creation of 
statues or museums. The elite have used existing structures that were created by past 
elite, such as the Yasukuni Shrine.  This difference in public involvement could stem 
from the disparity in the collective memories held between the South Korean and 
Japanese public. Where the South Korean public holds a clear interpretation of 
victimization from past events due to atrocities from colonialization and WWII, the Japan 
public collective memory may not be as clear due to the elite control of events within the 
20
th
 century and the manipulation of information presented to the public. 
Elites in both countries have demonstrated manipulation that is acting within the 
constraints of the populations’ collective memories; with such limitations described by 
Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (2014). The South Korean public illustrated a collective 
memory of Comfort Women through the work of the Women’s Movement and 
corresponding organizations. While the Lee and Park Administrations have worked 
within the population’s accepted memory boundary of Comfort Women, Roh and Kim’s 
involvement with Yasukuni Shrine was also similarly navigated. Both Roh and Kim’s use 
of Yasukuni Shrine directed the population’s collective memories of Japanese forced 
labor during colonialism towards the Shrine as a remembrance of such atrocities. The 





Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea) work on seeking reparations for 
Korean forced labors bolstered this selective remembering, most notably under Roh.  
Similar to South Korea, Japanese Prime Ministers have also had to navigate the 
boundaries of the population’s collective memories. The Japanese Prime Ministers have 
had to contend with a difficult history post-World War II (WWII) that is not equally 
accepted throughout the Asian region’s population. The controversies surrounding such 
events as Prime Ministers attendance at Yasukuni Shrine was met with demonstrations 
from regional neighbors. Newspapers also documented outcries from within Japan such 
as lawsuits filed on behalf of foreign and Japanese citizens as well as individual 
testimonies of criticism. However, despite the turmoil against Prime Ministers attendance 
at the Shrine, the longevity of Koizumi’s tenure as Prime Minister as well as the 
continued election of LDP party members for office illustrate that the majority of the 
population accepts the LDP’s interpretation of history that is continuing to be presented 
by the party.  
History textbooks often challenge elites and push the limitations of populations’ 
historical memory. In both Japan and South Korea, protests have erupted within the 
population over history textbook content. Both protests citied historical facts related to 
the disagreement over textbooks, such as in the 2001 New History Textbook publication 
(French, 2001) as well as the 830 state mandated textbook revisions (Nam, 2013). Such 
protests exemplify the accepted boundaries of collective memory as well as the 
objectiveness of scholars in helping to identify a distortion of history. The upcoming state 
issued history textbook in South Korea has created an interesting point of elite use of 





pride in the past through selective remembering while the main opposition party, the DP, 
is portraying the book to be similar to those created by the state under the authoritarian 
rule of Park Chung-hee (Choe, 2015). Both political parties are using different selective 
elements of the collective’s memory to justify or denounce this current program.  
While it is evident that both governments are operating within the boundaries of 
the population’s accepted historical memory, they are also freely maneuvering within the 
confines of democracy. Both elites have utilized historical memory within election 
campaigns as shown especially by Park, Koizumi, and Abe. The use of selective 
remembering has been a tool by elites to bolster the incumbent’s image through the 
interpretation of history to justify political programs such as textbook publications. 
 Interestingly, the most events regarding historical memory throughout the case 
studies in Japan occurred during Koizumi and Abe’s Administration; as both 
Administrations had 21 events, as of this writing, while the other 16 Prime Ministers 
averaged 1.25 events during their time in office. Similarly, in South Korea the most 
events relating to memory occurred during Lee’s Administration with 22 events and is 
currently closely followed by Park’s with 21 events. President Roh had 12 events while 
Kim Dae-jung had ten, and Kim Young-sam had two.  
 While both Koizumi and Abe are members of the LDP, they have also pushed for 
some large changes within Japan. This includes Koizumi’s support for the privatization 
of the postal service (Faiolia, 2005) and Abe’s goal of increasing the amount of women in 
the workforce through his economic program commonly referred to as “Abe-nomics” 
(Rafferty, 2015). Abe has also championed the campaign of revising Article 9 of the 





ability to hold offensive capabilities (Japan Today, 2014). Their large amounts of action 
within the collective’s memories also correlate with their time in office. Before Koizumi, 
the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988 was Takeshita Noboru, who served as 
Prime Minister for three years. The following nine Prime Ministers averaged one and a 
half years in office. Koizumi is currently the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988 
with his six years in office (as of mid-2016). Abe is the second longest serving and is 
currently continuing to serve after four consecutive years as Prime Minister.  
South Korea has had similar experiences to Japan, as there is a correlation of 
historical memory to support while in office. The manipulation of the Comfort Women 
history aided Park’s election through the ability to craft an image of champion. While her 
campaign developed an image with the use of collective memories, she was also 
associated with negative remembrances due to her father’s role as Dictator. Additionally, 
it is notable that Park Geun-hye obtained office as she is South Korea’s first female 
president. This feat is made more notable give the information presented from the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report which rates South Korea’s Global Gender 
Gap index at 117 out of 142 total countries rated (World Economic Forum, 2014). Park 
was able to utilize historical memory not only to craft an image but to also counter 
balance negative attributes and memories associated to her.  
Other Presidents also used historical memory to support difficult programs they 
were undertaking. Roh had the third most amount of memory events, his Administration 
saw the most transparency and liberalization of governmental records regarding tenuous 
periods such as the Korean War as well as greater liberalization in education as compared 





the same time as he implemented a dramatically different engagement plan with North 
Korea, known as the Sunshine Policy (Choe, 2009).  
Japan and South Korea have displayed many similar actions in the use of 
historical memory, however, there are some differences in how the two countries utilize 
this concept. Both governments are led by the Executive in a program of addressing 
collective memories. As such, it is common for governmental departments to incorporate 
the historical memory issues, such as responding to the history of Comfort Women and 
creating sanctioned government texts, into their respective duties.  
However, in South Korea the elites have created a government that is focused on 
the issue of collective memories through the establishment of multiple departments which 
includes the Commission, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) which 
incorporates the Comfort Women as a major role, and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. The centering of government on historical memory illustrates an investment 
by the elites in controlling the message being presented. The South Korean government 
has been able to compel the population into accepting that it is the elite’s duty to contend 
with unresolved history therefore a legitimate government actively works for the specific 
resolution promised. Such actions were exemplified through the creation of the 
mentioned government bureaus sequentially beginning in 2001 and cumulating into 
pressure from the population for continued work by the government on redress through 
the 2011 Constitutional Court Ruling (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). 
The South Korean population has also been motivated to support a government 
that utilizes more of an assertive recourse such as threats of diplomatic war and ending 





in 1988. The history of oppression that the selective remembering emphasizes is a 
justification of a more assertive response in that while the previous government failed to 
protect its citizens in the past, the current government is utilizing every means possible to 
protect those who are alive today, such as the surviving Comfort Women and forced 
laborers. These actions of a more assertive government response also continued to bolster 
the image of the elites as a champion for the nation. 
Whereas the South Korean government has created a structure that is more 
focused on collective memories, the Japanese government has leveraged the existing 
governmental structure to address collective memories. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as well as the MEXT have been active in addressing the issue of unresolved history, most 
notably within response to challenges from South Korea. The Japanese elite maintain a 
somewhat passive response to historical memory in comparison in that there were no 
threats of repercussion to diplomatic relations issued. Yet, such supposed passivity aligns 
with the elite objective of manipulation in that it is leveraging the common order of 
government which supports the idea promoted by Abe and the LDP that it is natural for a 
country to honor its past. The elites acting with historical memory are following the 
common structure as it is the natural order of any government. Thus, responding to 
challenges promotes the idea of defending the nation in their right to remember.   
In addition to framing collective memory for specific objectives, elites view the 
three topics as either internal or external issues which influences how each government 
responds to challenge. For Japan, history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine are internal 
issues that are related to national sovereignty in the way that a country educates their 





responses to criticism as the elite believe they have the right to freely act within these 
topics. The Comfort Woman issue is viewed more as an external issue in that regional 
neighbor’s petition for Japanese governmental response whereas the Japanese elite view 
the issue as closed through the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement. The majority 
of the three topics are viewed as internal issues within Japan which correlates with the 
perception of the seemingly passive response.  
For South Korea, Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine are external issues. All 
three topics require outside involvement from Japan as the sole aggressor for resolution. 
While the history of Comfort Women plays a role in internal matters such as in relation to 
the identity of the South Korean population and the social services provided to survivors, 
the predominate concern and resolution lies outside of the state. Yasukuni Shrine is 
wholly an external issue given the location of the Shrine as well as the contention 
centered on governmental visits. In the same way, history textbooks are also an external 
issue where Japan is being portrayed as a potential threat through misinforming their 
youth. The elite have worked to combat the external potential threat through additional 
information internally within compulsory education, however, the Park Administration 
has also portrayed this topic as being an internal issue through creating a more positive 
understanding of history. The majority of the three topics are viewed as external issues 
which correlate with a more aggressive response to historical memory, particularly when 
coupled with a targeted out-group.  
Japan and South Korea have displayed elite use of historical memory to achieve 
specific objectives. As use of manipulation by elites has been demonstrated throughout 





Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks, may not all be exploitation but a 
governmental response to the population.  Democratic governments have a relationship 
with their population such as in the form of constituents. In South Korea, the issue of 
Comfort Women was first brought before the government by non-profit organizations. 
This leads to the understanding that the government could have been initially responding 
to requests of the population for the government involvement in pursuit of resolution. 
However, the South Korean government has created specific demands of what constitutes 
a resolution which has continually been used to continue the ongoing struggle for an 
unresolved history. Similarly in Japan, various public criticism against the continued 
apologies for ongoing international historical issues as well as public support for 
Yasukuni Shrine, may bolster the Japanese government in supporting the idea of pride in 
the past as well as elite visits to the Shrine.     
IV. The Importance of Historical Memory and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
The research presented two countries with different structures of democracy and a 
shared contentious history. Both governments acted in similar ways in how they 
addressed collective memories; both manipulated remembrances to craft an image of the 
elite and the dominant political party as a champion of the in-group to win political 
power and to advance governmental programs. To advance these goals speeches and 
pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorial and offerings were utilized. The 
case studies presented three topics in which the elites could react either by manipulating 
or ignoring the memories. In this research similar in regards to some authoritarian states, 
Japan and South Korea have demonstrated that consolidated democracies will manipulate 





Wang’s work (2012) illustrated that authoritarian governments have the ability to 
manipulate memories to increase legitimacy. For democracies, the works of Brewer 
(2008), Hewer & Roberts (2012), and Pridham (2014) demonstrate that historical 
memory is a vital tool in the transition from an authoritarian state and consolidation for 
the new democratic government. But democracies’ reliance on historical memory does 
not end when the new democratic state is consolidated. Manipulation of historical 
memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites within consolidated democracies. 
The strategic influence on the collective memories is a powerful motivator of the 
population to act in specific ways, such as voting for a particular candidate or supporting 
a certain policy.  
Authoritarian governments employ similar stimuluses of historical memories to move 
a population just as democracies, albeit, for similar as well as different objectives at 
times. The research shows that the manipulation of historical memory is not confined to a 
specific government type but that it can be utilized by various forms of government as 
every population maintains a collective memory, as detailed by Eric Langenbacher and 
Ines Gabel. As collective memories build into a person’s identity and the understanding 
of the collective, potentially every country has the ability to utilize historical memory for 
specific objectives.  
This research has shown that historical memory is a powerful concept in that it moves 
populations to act for the identifiable objectives of the elite. While this concept offers 
descriptive information of what moves a population and how a nation navigates past 
atrocities, historical memory also provides information on how consolidated democracies 





Historical memory can and has been used similar to the idea of marketing in that elite 
utilize this concept to frame political programs and political candidates either positively 
or negatively to achieve specific ends. Elites in South Korea have exemplified such 
attributes in this study as well as in Norway where the out-group was reframed in a more 
positive light through a new textbook (Hovland, 2013).  
Historical memory appears to be the strongest when associated with the most 
poignant memories and those past events that are the strongest remembered. Some of the 
most sensitive memories touch upon a collective’s identity. The memory of Comfort 
Women has become nearly a representative icon of the suffering of the whole South 
Korean nation during colonialism. Many of the South Korean population have a female 
relation, such as a grandmother or great grandmother, who experienced some sort of 
repression by Japanese forces during colonialism, and as such the elite as well as the 
population have affectionately referred to surviving Comfort Women as grandmothers 
(Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012).This selective remembering and the 
potential family connection to the past coupled with the collective’s identity of 
victimization through multiple traumatic events in the 20
th
 century has produced a 
sensitive collective memory that is shaped and manipulated by elites.  
Historical memory has the potential of being stronger in South Korea as compared 
to Japan. The South Korean population holds an overall generally accepted understanding 
of past events stemming from a concrete point of view. Many South Koreans either 
directly experienced atrocities during the 20th century such as colonialism and WWII or 
have direct relations who did and have heard firsthand accounts and seen suffering 





of the past events, specifically relating to atrocities, enables the collective memories to be 
solid and nearly universally accepted for the South Korean population. The 
“concreteness” of South Korea’s collective memories provides elites with a powerful 
motivator in which to mobilize the population. In contrast, the Japanese collective 
memory is somewhat murky in relation to past events. The incidents that occurred during 
the 20
th
 century, notably colonization and WWII, where elite driven with limited input 
from the population. The population was directed by government leaders through the 
manipulation of history textbooks and propaganda as well as additional indoctrination 
tactics. Due to the elite directed actions, the Japanese population has been left with an 
unclear remembrance of these past atrocities. Thus, the elites’ use of historical memory 
may not be as great as in places such as South Korea given the “murkiness” of the 
collective memory.  
It is evident by the literature and the case studies under review that post war and 
revolutionary societies maintain strong and highly motivational historical memories as 
demonstrated through Soviet successor states and the Asian region. Such patterns have 
become a trend within the 20
th
 century due to the vast amounts traumatic events during 
that period of time. The study of historical memory has centered on this type of state, 
such as Japan and South Korea as post war, in part due to their abundance after WWII as 
well as Cold War. However, there are numerous studies conducted on states that have 
sustained traumatic events, which brings to question the influence of the idea of triumph. 
Does a history of triumph hold similar influence over a population, or does trauma have a 





historical memory can reach. Do more recent events have a stronger impact on historical 
memory or is the manipulation of elites more important to this concept?  
Future research should not disregard the influence of historical memory on 
governments and people as Japan and South Korea have illustrated that strategic 
manipulation of memories can aid in the obtainment of legitimacy and policy. This 
concept has descriptive attributes with such abilities to identify what motivates a 
population to action and elite goals as well as how a nation navigates the past and defines 
itself. Currently, the study of historical memory is dominated by descriptive research, this 
provides opportunities for continued study of strategic manipulation and its relationship 
to government. As this concept continues to expand with new understanding and 
research, it increases the ability to interpret pressures on relations between states and 
interactions between elites and the population. Since historical memory is guided and 
constrained by typically unspoken believed truths, a cultural understanding and fluency in 
the native language serves to enhance research within this area. The ability to potentially 
gauge what policy or legislation will be passed due to a memory referenced or 
manipulated as well as a political candidate or party’s potential to win office provides 








A. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono 
on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women"   August 4, 1993 
   The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime 
"comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of 
that study. 
   As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in 
extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of 
comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military 
authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in 
the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort 
women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private 
recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has 
revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, 
coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in 
the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. 
   As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, 
excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. 
The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, 
transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, 
coercion, etc. 
    Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of 
the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of 
Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and 
remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and 
incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. 
   It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, 
while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. 
    We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading 
them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm 
determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our 





As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this 
issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this 
matter, including private researched related thereto.In a speech to South Korea's National 
Assembly, Mr. Miyazawa 
“In a speech to South Korea’s National Assembly, Mr. Miyazawa said: ‘Recently, 
the issue of ‘comfort women’ in the service of the Imperial Japanese Army has come into 
light. I cannot help feeling acutely distressed over this, and I express my sincerest 
apology.” 
 
B. Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro to the 127th Session of the 
National Diet             August 23, 1993 
 
“Self-awareness as an International State and Contribution to the International 
Community”  
August, when my Cabinet was formed, is a month that Japan will never forget. 
Going back just four turns of the twelve-year cycle, it was with the end of the war in 
August 1945 that we realized the great mistake we had made and vowed to start anew, 
resolutely determined never to repeat the wrongs of the past.  
Forty-eight years later, Japan has now become one of the prime beneficiaries of 
world prosperity and peace. Yet we should never forget that this achievement rests upon 
the supreme sacrifices made during the war and is the result of the great efforts made by 
previous generations. I believe it is important at this juncture that we state clearly before 
all the world our remorse at our past history and our renewed determination to do better. I 
would thus like to take this opportunity to express anew our profound remorse and 
apologies for the fact that past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial rule, 
caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people and to state that we will 
demonstrate our new determination by contributing more than ever before to world 
peace.” 
C. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 
on the occasion of the establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund" 
              July 1995 
 I would like to share with you my sentiments on the occasion of the 
establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund." 
   This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, an event that caused many 
people, both in Japan and abroad, great suffering and sorrow. During these past 50 years 
we have worked hard to cultivate, step by step, friendly relations with our neighboring 
Asian countries and others. However, the scars of war still run deep in these countries to 
this day. 
The problem of the so-called wartime comfort women is one such scar, which, 
with the involvement of the Japanese military forces of the time, seriously stained the 
honor and dignity of many women. This is entirely inexcusable. I offer my profound 
apology to all those who, as wartime comfort women, suffered emotional and physical 
wounds that can never be closed. 
   Established on this occasion and involving the cooperation of the Government and 





the Japanese people toward these women and supports medical, welfare, and other 
projects. As articulated in the proponents' Appeal, the Government will do its utmost to 
ensure that the goals of the Fund are achieved. 
    Furthermore, to ensure that this situation is never again repeated, the Government 
of Japan will collate historical documents concerning the former wartime comfort 
women, to serve as a lesson of history. 
    Turning from yesterday to today, we still see many women suffering violence and 
inhuman treatment in many parts of the world. The "Asian Women's Fund," as I 
understand it, will take steps to address these problems facing women today. The 
Government of Japan intends to play an active role in this regard. 
    I am convinced that a sincere effort on the part of Japan to implement these 
measures will further strengthen the true relationships of trust we share with our 
neighbors in Asia and other nations around the world. 
    The Government of Japan intends to cooperate, to the greatest extent possible, 
with the "Asian Women's Fund," in order that its aims are achieved. I call on each and 
every Japanese citizen, asking for your understanding and cooperation. 
D. Letter from Prime Minister to the Former Comfort Women                       1996 
  
Dear Madam,  
On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the 
Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the 
former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my personal feelings as well.  
The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at 
that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.  
As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse 
to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered 
incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.  
We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our 
responsibilities for the future.  
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with 
feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and 
accurately convey it to future generations.  
Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and 
other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.  
Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of 
your lives.  
 
Respectfully yours,  
 
Ryutaro Hashimoto  
Prime Minister of Japan  








E. Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi                   August 13, 2001 
 
  The day after tomorrow, August 15, is the fifty-sixth anniversary of the end of the 
war. Looking back to the last war at the very beginning of the twenty-first century, 
solemn feelings fill my heart. During the war, Japan caused tremendous sufferings to 
many people of the world including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy 
during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and 
aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the 
neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the 
region. 
  Sincerely facing these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer 
my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war. 
  I believe that Japan must never again proceed a path to war. Every year, before 
the souls of those who lost their lives in the battlefield while believing in the future of 
Japan in those difficult days, I have recalled that the present peace and prosperity of 
Japan are founded on the ultimate sacrifices they made, and renewed my vow for peace. I 
had thought that people of Japan and those of the neighboring countries would 
understand my belief if it was fully explained, and thus, after my assumption of office as 
Prime Minister, I expressed my wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15. 
  However, as the anniversary of the end of the war came closer, vocal debates have 
started at home and abroad as to whether I should visit Yasukuni Shrine. In the course of 
these debates, opinions requesting the cancellation of my visit to Yasukuni Shrine were 
voiced not only within Japan but also from other countries. It would be totally contrary to 
my wish, under these circumstances, if my visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 could, 
against my intention, lead people of neighboring countries to cast doubts on the 
fundamental policy of Japan of denying war and desiring peace. Taking seriously such 
situations both in and outside of Japan, I have made my own decision not to visit 
Yasukuni Shrine on that day, and I would like to choose another day for a visit. 
  As Prime Minister, I deeply regret withdrawing what I have once said. However, 
even if I have my own views on a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, I am now in a position to 
devote myself to my duty as Prime Minister, and to deal with various challenges, taking 
broad national interests into consideration. 
 If circumstances permit, I would like to have opportunities as soon as possible to have 
face-to-face meetings with leaders of China and the Republic of Korea, in order to 
exchange views on the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region of the future 
and to talk about my belief mentioned above. 
 Furthermore, as an issue for the future, I think that we need to discuss what could be 
done in order for people at home and abroad to pay memorial tribute without discomfort, 
while respecting the feelings of the Japanese people toward Yasukuni Shrine and 
Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery. 








F. Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine                    April 21, 2002 
 
 Today I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine. 
  The purpose of my visit was to mourn sincerely all those who lost their lives for 
their country, leaving behind their families in spite of themselves, during the course of 
our country's history since the Meiji Restoration. I believe that the present peace and 
prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost 
their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the 
resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic 
war. 
I consider it to be natural for me to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which has 
become over the course of many years, a central institution for many people of Japan to 
mourn those who sacrificed their lives for the country. 
It is not my intention to once again cause anxiety and elevate tension in Japan and 
abroad by visiting Yasukuni Shrine on or around the day of anniversary of the end of the 
second world war. After careful consideration, I decided I could sincerely express my 
honest feelings by visiting the shrine on this day, on the occasion of the Annual Grand 
Festival in Spring. I believe that this would be fully understood by the people of Japan. 
 
G. Speech by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan 
           April 22, 2005 
 
Honorable Chairs,  
Distinguished participants, 
 
It is a distinct pleasure to attend this historic meeting, at which the countries of 
Asia and Africa have gathered together for the first time in fifty years. I extend my 
deepest appreciation to the honorable co-chairs from Indonesia, our kind host for this 
gathering, and South Africa. I have come to this meeting to do two things. One is to look 
back upon the road we have traveled together, realizing anew once again the strong ties 
that have connected us during these last fifty years. I have come to this meeting also to 
participate in frank exchanges of views about what the countries of Asia and Africa must 
do to enhance the peace and the prosperity of people around the globe in the 21st century. 
Fifty years ago, Japan stood before the Asian and African nations assembled at 
Bandung to declare its determination to develop itself as a peaceful nation. That spirit of 
fifty years ago remains steadfast to this day. In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule 
and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many 
countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of 
history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology 
always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of 
World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of 
resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force. Japan once 
again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future 






The development of Japan over these last fifty years has come about as the result 
of the untiring efforts of the Japanese people. Yet we were first able to realize 
development through the assistance extended to us by the international community. Japan 
will not forget this fact. The Japanese people rose from devastation after World War II. I, 
as a representative of that generation, hope to walk together with the people of Asia and 
Africa, who are striving to improve their lives by the sweat of their brows. 
Based on this thinking, Japan has been extending its development assistance to the Asian 
and African regions with emphasis on human resource development, infrastructure 
building, and health and sanitation measures, including issues of safe water and infectious 
diseases. Japan has also been making efforts to improve trade/investment environment. 
Today, I would like to focus on three points as to what we should do together 
hand in hand from now on: first, economic development, second, peace-building, and 
third, promotion of international cooperation. 
First, Japan places great emphasis on the strengthening of partnerships in the 
areas of poverty reduction and development. To achieve nation-building, the most critical 
thing is each nation's determination to bring about development through its own will and 
its own efforts. Japan respects and supports such efforts. Japan will continue its efforts 
towards the goal of providing official development assistance (ODA) of 0.7% of our 
gross national income in order to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals. From 
this point of view, Japan will ensure a credible and sufficient level of ODA. In addition, 
Japan will be seeking concrete actions to further expand market access to products from 
the least developed countries in order to support their self-reliance. 
Asia has made great strides forward over these past fifty years. Yet a number of 
important challenges remain, including redressing of disparities in levels of development, 
promotion of economic partnerships, implementation of disaster prevention and 
mitigation measures based on the recent experience of the large-scale earthquake off the 
coast of Sumatra and the resulting tsunami, and strengthening of anti-piracy measures. 
Japan intends to formulate concrete policies and create new partnerships in Asia. We will 
be providing more than 2.5 billion US dollars over the next five years in assistance for 
disaster prevention and mitigation, and reconstruction measures in Asia, Africa and other 
regions. 
This year is the "Year of Africa". Japan has advanced cooperation towards Africa, 
based on the solidarity between Africa and the international community, through the 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. I would like 
to take this opportunity to announce that Japan will hold TICAD IV in 2008, and that in 
the three years to come Japan will double its ODA to Africa, with grant aid continuing to 
be its central feature. 
Moving on now to the theme of strengthening of cooperation between Asia and 
Africa, the one most fitting for this gathering, Japan proposes creating an Asia-Africa 
Young Volunteers program, by which Asian young adults would meet, interact with, and 
promote human resource development among the youth of Africa. Furthermore, Japan, 
through public and private sectors, will provide assistance in applying to Africa the 
knowledge garnered through Asia's movement towards higher productivity. I am pleased 
to announce that, through such efforts, Japan will foster human resources in ten thousand 





Second, Japan considers the peace-building to be of great importance. It is, 
indeed, peace and security that constitute the requisite basis for economic development. 
Japan has been working hard towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the prevention of terrorism. Japan has also been making efforts towards 
the peace-building such as in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. Japan will be 
actively providing assistance to the Palestinians for the promotion of peace in the Middle 
East, and to Africa, which is demonstrating dynamic movement towards peace. We 
should all play an active role in preventing disorderly trade in weapons, as well as in 
disseminating universal values such as the rule of law, freedom, and democracy. 
Third, as the globalized world pursues a new international order, Japan will 
promote further international cooperation, enhancing its solidarity with Asia and Africa. 
The United Nations should continue to serve in the centermost role in international 
cooperation. Yet, in order for it to respond effectively to the various challenges that the 
world now faces, the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, needs to be 
reformed, so that the organization reflects the realities of the today's world. Japan will 
cooperate to the fullest to take a decision on the reform of the Security Council before 
September, as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
As we fortify the partnership between Asia and Africa, it will be critical to share our 
experiences and our knowledge through dialogues between civilizations, between 
cultures, and between individuals. Japan will host the World Civilization Forum in July, 
to share the experiences of the countries to preserve tradition while moving to 
modernization.  
Honorable Chairs, 
Last year, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded for the first time to an African 
woman, Professor Wangari Maathai, Assistant Minister for the Environment of Kenya. 
This great honor reflects recognition of her contributions to sustainable development 
through the planting of trees. Professor Maathai was present at the opening ceremony of 
the 2005 World Exposition Aichi in Japan, whose theme is "Nature's Wisdom." Citing 
the Japanese notion of mottai nai, Professor Maathai emphasized the importance of the 
efficient use of resources and environmental conservation. Using things with care, using 
them to the full, and reusing things whenever possible-- these are the heart and soul of 
these words mottai nai, which Professor Maathai understood completely. Asia and Africa 
are blessed with a richness of nature that yields enormous potential. I believe that through 
the progress of science and technology, it is possible to create a vibrant and dynamic 
society in which environmental conservation and development are both achieved. In 
conclusion, I would like to state Japan's resolute determination to spare no effort to create 
just such a society. 
I thank you for your kind attention. 
 
H. Statement by Prime Minister Abe  -Pledge for everlasting peace-  
December 26, 2013  
 
Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, 
paid my respects and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and 
made ultimate sacrifices.  I also visited Chinreisha, a remembrance memorial to pray for 





not enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. While praying for the souls of the war dead, the 
preciousness of peace Japan enjoys today really came home to me. 
The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are 
living today.  The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices 
of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their loving 
wives and children, and thinking about their fathers and mothers who had raised them. 
Today, I have contemplated on this, and paid my deepest respects and gratitudes on my 
visit. 
Japan must never wage a war again.  This is my conviction based on the severe 
remorse for the past.  I have renewed my determination before the souls of the war dead 
to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage a war again. 
I have also made a pledge that we must build an age which is free from the sufferings by 
the devastation of war; Japan must be a country which joins hands with friends in Asia 
and friends around the world to realize peace of the entire world. 
For 68 years after the war, Japan created a free and democratic country, and consistently 
walked the path of peace.  There is no doubt whatsoever that we will continue to pursue 
this path.  Under the spirit of international cooperation, Japan will discharge its 
responsibilities for the peace, stability and prosperity of the world. 
Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political 
and diplomatic issue.  Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to 
war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my 
administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my 
administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never 
wage a war again.   
It is not my intension at all to hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people.  
It is my wish to respect each other’s character, protect freedom and democracy, and build 
friendship with China and Korea with respect, as did all the previous Prime Ministers 
who visited Yasukuni Shrine. 
I would like to ask for the kind understanding of all of you. 
I. Basic Position of the Government of Japan 
Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi's Visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
October, 2005 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan's present peace and 
prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the 
war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who 
had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance 
of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan, which those who died in the war 
were unable to witness; and to uphold Japan's pledge not to engage in a war. He makes 
the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity. 
It is erroneous to view that Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
are an attempt to glorify Japan's past militarism. The Prime Minister has stated clearly 
that the purpose of his visits to the shrine is to express respect and gratitude to the many 
people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not visit for the sake of the Class-A 





for the Far East. He has acknowledged that Japan, "through its colonial rule and 
aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, 
particularly to those of Asian nations." The Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that 
Japan should squarely face "these facts of history in a spirit of humility, and with feelings 
of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind" and asserted Japan's 
"resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world, prizing the relationship of 
trust it enjoys with the nations of the world." He recently conveyed this message to the 
international community in his speech at the Asian-African Summit in April 2005 and 
reaffirmed it in his statement on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War in August. 
East Asia today is increasingly well placed to become one of the most developed 
regions in the world. The formation of a future East Asian community is a common goal 
for the countries of the region. At this historic turning point, Japan is determined to 
contribute constructively to the future of East Asia and, to that end, places great 
importance on its friendly relations with neighboring Asian countries, including China 
and the Republic of Korea. Japan has demonstrated this spirit through its actions over the 
past 60 years. The task of further strengthening its relations with neighboring countries 
and contributing to the peace and stability of the East Asian region is one of Japan's most 
important policy priorities. 
J. Comparison of Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine; full chart   
 
 This chart was created by selecting passages from political leaders’ statements 
concerning the Yasukuni Shrine. Some statements were taken from larger messages, 
while others were short statements themselves. I chose the statements under review based 
on their expression of Yasukuni Shrine. The sections within the chart that are italicized 
have been identified as especially important to the understanding the portrayal of the 
Shrine to each country. 
 The categories of Official Government Statement and Statement to Newspapers 
were chosen to differentiate between how statements and ideas were delivered to the 
public. Statements to Newspapers categorize casual comments made to various 
newspapers by political leaders. It was found through the review of multiple comments 
by Japanese leaders that the dominate medium of delivery were from statements to 
newspapers. Often, these statements were gathered by journalists who claimed they stood 
outside the Yasukuni Shrine to specifically interview Japanese politicians. While many 
statements incorporated the idea of honoring those who “died in the battle for country” or 
as a “promise to never wage war again,” which are charted in the summary chart in 
Figure 4, these statements did not necessarily impact or sway the message from the 
Japanese government who messages were similar to each other in stating that visits to the 

























































Governmental Official       Statement or declaration            Yasukuni Descriptors       Medium of delivery 
PM Koizumi “Statement of Prime Minister 
Junichio Koizumi” Japan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Aug. 13, 2001 
… Sincerely facing these deeply 
regrettable historical facts as they 
are, here I offer my feelings of 
profound remorse and sincere 
mourning to all the victims of the 
war… I had thought that people of 
Japan and those of the neighboring 
countries would understand my 
belief if it was fully explained, and 
thus, after my assumption of office 
as Prime Minister, I expressed my 





PM Koizumi “Observation by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit 
to Yasukuni Shrine” Japan 
Ministry of Foreign April 21, 
2002 
“The purpose of my visit was to 
mourn sincerely all those who lost 
their lives for their country, leaving 
behind their families in spite of 
themselves, during the course of our 
country's history since the Meiji 
Restoration… I believe that this 
would be fully understood by the 






















Foreign Affairs  
“Basic Position of the 
Government of Japan 
Regarding Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s Visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine.” Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs October, 2005  
“Prime Minister Koizumi is of the 
firm conviction that Japan's present 
peace and prosperity are founded on 
the noble sacrifices made by those 
who lost their lives in the war. He 
visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and 
offer his respect and thanks to those 
who had to lay down their lives on the 
battlefield against their will; to 
reaffirm the importance of ensuring 
the present peace and prosperity of 
Japan, which those who died in the 
war were unable to witness; and to 
uphold Japan's pledge not to engage 
in a war. He makes the visits as an 







“Japan Premier Visits Shrine to 
War Dead.” The New York 
Times July 30, 1996 by 
Kazuaki Nagata 
Visit reconfirmed her belief that “we 
should never have a war. Peace is 
not something that naturally exists-it 




PM Abe “Japan’s Abe visits shrine for 
war, dead, China South Korea 
angered. Reuters Dec. 26, 2013 
by Antonia Slodkowski and 
Linda Sieg 
while there is criticism “I visited to 
report to the souls of the war dead 
on the progress made this year and 
to convey my resolve that people 





PM Abe “Statement by Prime Minister 
Abe –Pledge for everlasting 
peace-“ Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Dec. 26, 2013 
“Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine and expressed my sincere 
condolences, paid my respects and 
prayed for the souls of all those who 
had fought for the country and made 
ultimate sacrifices…. Some people 
criticize the visit to Yasukuni as 
paying homage to war criminals, but 
the purpose of my visit today, on the 
anniversary of my administration’s 
taking office, is to report before the 
souls of the war dead how my 
administration has worked for one 
year and to renew the pledge that 











The statements issued by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT) all follow a similar structure. The first paragraph contains a statement of 
regret, condemnation or disappointment toward the actions by the leaders of Japan. The 
second paragraph provides various details which the negative reaction from the South 
Korean government stems from, such as the aggressive militarist past that the Yasukuni 
Shrine represents. The third paragraph is typically a recommended action or more 
detailed feelings toward the action. Since the MOFA statements vary in length only 
Government 
Official 





“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan 
honoring the dead or insulting 
the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26, 
2013 by Madison Park 
“How the war dead are 
commemorated is determined 
according to each country’s own 
culture and tradition. This long 
tradition of homage and 
commemoration is a matter of 
national sovereignty and should 
not be subjected to distortion by 







“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan 
honoring the dead or insulting 
the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26, 
2013 by Madison Park  
Did not wish to anger regional 
neighbors, only to fulfil his duty 
as a national Diet member by 
praying for peace of Japan and 




PM Abe “Three ministers visit Yasukuni 
on surrender day anniversary; 
Abe refrains.” The Japan Times 
Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida 
Offering to “extend sincere 
condolences to the people who 
fought and died for the state and 






“Three ministers visit Yasukuni 
on surrender day anniversary; 
Abe refrains.” The Japan Times 
Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida 
“It’s only natural to extend 
sincere condolences to people 
who dedicated their lives to their 





PM Abe “It’s ‘natural’ for leaders to 
visit Yasukuni, Abe says” The 
Japan Times Feb. 18, 2015 by 
JiJi 
“It is natural for the nation’s 
leaders to want to visit Yasukuni 
to pay their respects to those who 
died for the country. Abe said he 
believes Cabinet members should 
decide for themselves whether to 




Minister Armura “Ministers visit divisive war 
shrine on 70
th
 anniversary of 
war end.” Japan Times August 
15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki 
and Reiji Yoshida 
“I offered my prayers in the hopes 
that Japan will continue to make 
efforts to contribute to the safety 






“Ministers visit divisive war 
shrine on 70
th
 anniversary of 
war end.” Japan Times August 
15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki 
and Reiji Yoshida 
Yasukuni Shrine has a different 
significance than other shrines 
due to its history and that the act 
of visiting Yasukuni does not 








statements that fluctuate from the typical structure have been compiled for review. These 
statements have typically been taken from the 3
rd
 paragraph. 
 The presidential speeches from the National Liberation Day celebration where not 
compiled for this figure as they did not expressly address the Yasukuni Shrine.   
 















Statement or declaration Yasukuni Descriptors  Medium of 
delivery 
Ambassador to 
Japan, Choi Sang 
Yong  
“At Japan’s war shrine, wounds 
unhealed; Koizumi plans visit 
despite condemnation from 
Asian neighbors.” The 
Washington Post July 28, 2001 
by Kathryn Tolbert and Doug 
Struck 
“I can only presume that Prime 
Minister Koizumi does not 
understand what kind of impact 








“Statement by MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine.” August 13, 2001 by 
MOFAT 
“If Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi is willing to cultivate 
genuine friendship and 
cooperation with the neighboring 
states, we reiterate that he should 
respect the positions and 
national sentiments of the 
countries concerned based on a 








“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine.” May 8, 2002 by 
MOFAT 
“We believe that if Japan is to 
establish genuine friendly 
relations with its neighbors, it 
should, on the basis of a true 
recognition of history, respect 
the national sentiments of 
neighboring countries which 
have suffered as a result of 
Japanese invasion and 
imperialism. We therefore call 
for a sincere response from 
Prime Minister Junichiro 





















“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine.” May 8, 
2002 by MOFAT 
“We believe that if Japan is to 
establish genuine friendly relations 
with its neighbors, it should, on the 
basis of a true recognition of 
history, respect the national 
sentiments of neighboring countries 
which have suffered as a result of 
Japanese invasion and imperialism. 
We therefore call for a sincere 
response from Prime Minister 








“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.” January 
14, 2003 by MOFAT 
“The ROK government cannot 
understand the logic of paying 
homage to war criminals who 
destroyed peace while insisting it is 
a prayer for peace. We therefore 
call for a sensible determination 
from Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi and the Japanese 
Government so as not to damage the 
sentiments of the Koreans who 








“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.” January 
1, 2004 by MOFAT 
“…and paid homage even to war 
criminals who led the past Japanese 
colonial rule and invasion and 
thereby destroyed world peace and 
inflicted indescribable grief and 
pain on the people of Korea. 
“…and express much 
disappointment and anger that the 
national sentiments of the Koreans 
have been damaged once again.” 
“…We therefore strongly call for 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 











“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.” 
October 17, 2005 by MOFAT 
“…we have continued to urge Japan 
to halt acts that nullify its apology 
and reflection of past wartime 
atrocities.” 
“…it must show that it is gravely 
reflecting on its past as well as take 
on corresponding acts. Once again, 
we strongly urge the Japanese Prime 
Minister as well as other leaders of 






























“Statement by the MOFAT 
Spokesperson on Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.” August 
16, 2006 by MOFAT 
“…it must first build mutual trust 
with its neighboring countries by 
facing up to the historical truth and 
taking on corresponding acts.” 
“Once again, we strongly urge 
Japanese leaders in responsible 
position not to hinder the 
development of friendly relations 
between Korea and Japan as well as 
the maintenance of peace and 
cooperation in Northeast Asia by 








“Honoring War Criminals: 
China, South Korea Harbor 
Bad Feelings For Japan’s 
Yasukuni Shrine.” 
International Business Times 
October 18, 2012 by Michelle 
FlorCruz 
“It is regrettable to hear about the 
irresponsible behavior that ignores 
the feelings of the people in 
neighboring countries, who have 
been victimized by Japanese 














Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
“1
st
 Vice Foreign Minister 
Summons Japanese 
Ambassador to the ROK over 
the Issue of Japan’s Wrong 
Perception of History.” April 
25, 2013 by MOFAT 
“…It is completely 
incomprehensible that Japan, 
which deeply values honest and 
trust, turns a blind eye and a deaf 
year to excruciating loss and pain 
that Japan inflicted on neighboring 
countries through its aggression 
and colonial rule.” 
“…urged Japanese leaders to 
reflect on Japan’s past aggression 
and colonial rule in an honest and 
humble manner through the mirror 
of history, and to correct their 
retrograde perceptions, comments, 




Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
“MOFAT Spokesperson’s 
Commentary on Japanese 
Prime Minister’s Offering and 
Japanese Officials’ Visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22, 
2013 
“…urges the Japanese government 
to immediately stop its retrograde 
behavior which ignores history, 
and to behave responsibly based on 





Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
“MOFA Spokesperson’s 
Commentary: Until When do 
Japanese Politicians Intend to 
Lock Their Country up in the 
Yasukuni Shrine?” Aug. 15, 
2013 
“…urges Japan to work proactively 
to win trust from neighboring 
countries by facing up to its history 
with courage and sincerely 





President Park  “China, South Korea angry 
after Japanese PMs visit 
controversial war shrine.” 
Aug. 16, 2013 by Australian 
Broadcasting Corp. 
“Japan needs to face up to the 
issues of history, I expect the 
country to take responsible and 
sincere measures to alleviate the 
agony of those living in pain, and 




























“Japanese PM Abe visits 
Yasukuni war shrine, drawing 
sharp rebukes from China and 
South Korea.” Dec. 26, 2013 
By Mari Yamaguchi et. al 
Abe’s visit was an “anachronistic 
act” that “hurts not only the ties 
between South Korea and Japan 
but also fundamentally damages 

































































Commentary on the Japanese 
Prime Minister’s Offering to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.” Oct. 17, 
2014 
“…Japan’s political leaders should 
be well aware that their paying 
respect and homage at such shrine 
is nothing less than an action 
denying the international order 
and nullifying the basis of Japan’s 
post-war return to the 
international community. 
“Japan, instead of confining itself 
to its dark past, should take steps 
forward into a bright future based 
on serious reflections on and deep 








Commentary on Japanese 
Leaders Sending Offerings to 
and Paying Tribute at the 
Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22, 
2015 
“…the ROK strongly urges Japan 
to show heartfelt remorse and 
apologize for its past wrongdoings 
and thereby meet the aspiration of 
the peoples of the two countries for 









Commentary on the Japanese 
Prime Minister Sending a 
Cash Offering to the Yasukuni 
Shrine.” August 15, 2015 
“…only when leading figures of 
Japan sincerely carry out self-
reflection and demonstrate their 
remorse through actions, will 
Japan be able to win trust from its 
neighboring countries and the rest 








Commentary on the Japanese 
Prime Minister Sending an 
Offering to the Yasukuni 
Shrine.” October 18, 2015 
“…only when Japan demonstrates 
through action its humble 
reflection and remorse based on 
correct recognition of history with 






K. Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History 
Textbooks       August 26, 1982 
The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact 
that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the 
peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and have 
followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must 
never be repeated. Japan has recognized, in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique of 1965, 
that the "past relations are regrettable, and Japan feels deep remorse," and in the Japan-
China Joint Communique, that Japan is "keenly conscious of the responsibility for the 
serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and 
deeply reproaches itself." These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination 
which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day. 
This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique and the Japan-China Joint 
Communique naturally should also be respected in Japan's school education and textbook 





criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building 
friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these 
criticisms and make corrections at the Government's responsibility. 
To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will 
revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook 
Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned 
above. Regarding textbooks that have already been authorized, Government will take 
steps quickly to the same effect. As measures until then, the Minister of Education, 
Sports, Science and Culture will express his views and make sure that the idea mentioned 
in 2. Above is duly reflected in the places of education. 
Japan intends to continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop 
friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the 
peace and stability of Asia and, in turn, of the world. 
L. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the war's end"   August 15,1995 
The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I 
remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is 
overwhelmed by a flood of emotions. 
The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to 
arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of 
which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom 
and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again 
my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by 
the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also 
delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today 
with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the 
countries of Europe. 
Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the 
pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the 
horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join 
hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the 
Asia-Pacific region -indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, 
that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided 
by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange 
Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into 
relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and 
elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will 
continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from 
the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those 
countries. 
Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, we 
should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, 
and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human 





During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken 
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a 
fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage 
and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In 
the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these 
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and 
state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning 
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history. 
Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international 
coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, 
advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to 
have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in 
areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my 
conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of 
those who perished. 
It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of 
remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make 
good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow. 
M. Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda on the 
history textbooks to be used in junior high schools from 2002 
April 3, 2001 
With respect to the history textbooks that are to be used in junior high schools 
from 2002, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has 
recently decided to officially authorize a total of eight books which were submitted.  
Japan's textbook authorization system is founded on the basic principle that a 
diverse range of textbooks employing the creativity and originality of private sector 
authors and editors will be published, and without the Government defining specific 
historical perspectives or outlooks. Historical perspectives or outlooks represented in 
textbooks should not be identified as those of the Japanese Government. The standards to 
be applied are, first and foremost, whether the book to be authorized is appropriate as a 
textbook in accordance with the Regulations of Textbook Authorization. What the text 
approval system considers fundamental is to ensure that flaws, such as obvious mistake 
or a lack of balance, to be eliminated and remedied in light of objective academic 
research and appropriate reference material at the time of authorization.  
During the process of the recent authorization of textbooks, various concerns have 
been expressed from neighboring countries. However, the authorization was carried out 
impartially based on the Regulations of Textbook Authorization, including the Course of 
Study and the "Provision Concerning Neighboring Countries."  
  In this connection, the Japanese Government's basic recognition of its history is 
reflected entirely in the Prime Minister's statement issued on 15 August 1995 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan humbly 





suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, through 
its colonial rule and aggression, and expresses its deep remorse and heartfelt apology for 
this. Such recognition has been succeeded by subsequent Cabinets and there is no change 
regarding this point in the present Cabinet. 
Japan would like to endeavor to promote mutual understanding and trust with its 
neighboring countries and contribute to peace and prosperity not only in Asia, but in the 
rest of the world too.  
 
N. Statement by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
of Japan on the October 12 International New York Times article "Japan's 
Divided Education Strategy"       October 13, 2014 
 
  An October 12 International New York Times article criticized Japan’s education 
strategy for being “divided.” The article claims that, “Japan’s simultaneous embrace of 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism is generating ambiguous signals from its education 
policy makers. They are rewriting textbooks along what they call ‘patriotic’ lines, 
alienating their Asian neighbors in the process.” This is completely counter to our 
understanding. 
  A dramatic change in the direction of education is underway in Japan in order to 
respond to globalization – not to promote nationalism. The reforms we are undertaking 
center on three main areas: foreign language education, the internationalization of 
Japanese universities, and the teaching of Japan’s traditions, culture, and history to 
strengthen students’ sense of identity.  
  Regarding foreign language education, we intend to have elementary school 
students begin learning foreign languages at an earlier age – starting at the third grade 
from the current fifth – and to raise the level of English language education in middle and 
high school. 
  Although reading, listening, writing, and speaking are the four necessary 
competencies for English language education, the university entrance exams administered 
by the National Center for University Entrance Exams to over half a million students 
around the country each year focus almost exclusively on reading, with slight coverage of 
listening and almost nothing on writing and speaking. 
Many Japanese people cannot speak English despite receiving six years of 
English language education in middle and high school. The reason is the problem with 
Japanese school education. This is why we are moving ahead with reform not only to 
start English language education earlier, but also to introduce university entrance exams 
that balance the four competencies mentioned above. 
At the same time, we are promoting the internationalization of high schools and 
universities in order to develop human resources that can compete on the global stage. 
Through our Top Global University Project, which provides financial support to 37 
universities, we intend to promote the internationalization of Japanese universities with a 
specific target of seeing ten Japanese universities placed in the top 100 in global 
university rankings within a decade. 
Japan has sent a large number of students overseas, but the number has 
unfortunately declined to around 60,000 in 2011 after peaking at 83,000 in 2004. In 





50,000 in 1999 to around 20,000 (or 40% of the peak) in 2011. To address this trend and 
the risk of becoming overly inward-looking, the government intends to double the 
number of students studying abroad from 60,000 to 120,000 by 2020. We also plan to 
increase the number of foreigners studying in Japan from the current 140,000 to 300,000 
by 2020, by financially supporting students and universities. 
To succeed as a truly globalized person, however, requires a sense of one’s own 
identity. To nurture that identity, the learning of Japanese traditions, culture, and history 
– the elements that make up the Japanese identity – is essential. Without this knowledge, 
we cannot discuss many matters of substance concerning Japan, including our traditions, 
culture, and history. Indeed, a commonly cited problem is that many Japanese students 
cannot explain aspects of their own country while overseas. Inadequate foreign language 
ability is one part of the problem, but the weak sense of identity many young students 
possess is also a factor. Unfortunately, Japanese young people often come up against this 
problem.  
I do not believe that it is a problem with Japanese students individually, but rather 
that Japanese schools have not properly taught Japanese traditions, culture, and history. 
There naturally exists differences between various nations and ethnicities, and it is 
important to respect such differences. To nurture such an attitude of respect for 
differences, it is surely indispensable to teach one’s own country’s values. 
The International New York Times criticized Japanese education for becoming 
“nationalistic” and undergoing a “rightward shift.” However, teaching Japan’s traditions, 
culture, and history, which are the foundation of the Japanese identity, is intended only to 
foster an attitude of love for one’s country and native environment; it is not meant to 
promote nationalism or education that evokes contempt for other countries, especially our 
neighbors. In the 7th century, Prince Shotoku instituted the Seventeen-Article 
Constitution, one of the earlier constitutions in the world. The foundation of that 
Constitution is Japan’s long-held “spirit of harmony.” It is this value that underpins much 
of our educational reforms. 
I believe the people of the world recognize that bonds among people, 
thoughtfulness, and a spirit of harmony are at the core of the Japanese spirit, as 
exemplified by the actions of the victims in the aftermath of the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
That is to say, the Japanese traditions, culture, and history taught at schools are 
not synonymous with the idea of “nationalism.” There is no contradiction between Japan 
placing great value on its traditions, culture, and history on the one hand, while 
coexisting in the international community on the other. We believe rather that providing 
education that deepens the understanding of Japan is important for Japanese to succeed in 
a globalized world. 
The role that Japan and the Japanese people must serve in the international 
community in the 21st century is based on the “spirit of harmony” and the “spirt of 
hospitality” that have been cultivated in Japan since ancient times. We intend for the 
2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games to show this spirit to the people of the 
world. We wish to promote reforms through the education I have described, so that the 








Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
October 31, 2014 
 
O. Revision of History Curriculum Press release on May 12, 2010 National 
Curriculum Planning Division                  May 12, 2010 
  
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) announced the final 
version of the revised history curriculum, which put more emphasis on the historical fact 
about Dokdo, on May 12, 2010.  
   According to the Revised National Curriculum 2009, history subject is mandatory 
for primary and middle school students, and is elective for all high school students. In the 
course of the revision, the need for reinforcing the content on several historical facts 
including the Dokdo islets has been raised.  
   Accordingly, MEST decided to revise the history curriculum as follows:  
   
①     The basic framework of history curriculum of the Revised National Curriculum 
2007 and 2009 will remain unchanged, except the following:    
   
②     History curriculum for the middle school students will be focused on nurturing the 
basic history literacy that is required for all Korean citizens.  
   
③     With the subject name changed from history to Korean history, the curriculum for 
high school students has been restructured so that the content would be suited to the 
new title of the subject.  
   
④     The content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the 
wrongfulness of Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise 
students’ awareness on Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an 
informed view of history.  
   
MEST commissioned the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation to 
conduct the research on the draft for the revised history curriculum between January and 
April in 2010.    
And then, on April 9, a seminar was held to hear advice of the outside experts on 
the draft. The revision was finalized after going through the deliberation of the council on 
national curriculum.    
   The revised history curriculum will start to be incorporated into high school 
textbooks from March 2011 and middle school textbooks from March 2012. 
 
P. Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in Japanese History 
Textbooks         May 8, 2001 
1. Mr. Han Seung-soo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea 





Korean Government's item-by-item demand for correction in the controversial 
Japanese history textbooks. The demand is the latest in the series of effort made by the 
Korean Government regarding the Japanese history textbooks, following the 
statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman on April 3 and the expression of 
profound disappointment by Minister Han to the Japanese Ambassador to Korea on 
April 4.  
 
2. The Korean Government's demand is based upon a thorough and in-depth analysis 
of the textbooks by a team of history researchers. The team's report was then 
evaluated by the National Institute of Korean History and reviewed by an advisory 
council of     experts in the related area. Although the analysis found 
the Japanese history textbooks to contain numerous problems, the Korean Government 
has limited its demand for      correction to only the parts which are clearly false, 
obscuring, distorting and/or          misleading. The list of the Korean Government's 
demand is composed of 35 items: 25 in Fusosha textbook, ten in seven 
other textbooks.  
 
3. In conveying the aide-memoire to the Japanese Ambassador in Korea, Minister Han 
pointed out that the problematic contents in the textbooks are out of step with historic 
1998 Joint Declaration on a new Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century as well 
as with the pledges Japan has made before the international community such as the     
1995 Statement by Prime Minister Murayama and the 1982 Statement by the Minister  
of Education on history textbooks. Furthermore, the textbooks in question go against   
the fundamental stance of the international community on history education, as           
enshrined in the 1995 UNESCO Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on 
Human Rights and Democracy Education for Peace. Minister Han urged the Japanese 
Government to take prompt and effective actions in the spirit of these international  
pledges and agreements to correct and prevent the distortion of history.  
 
4. In making the demand for corrections, the Korean Government has no intention to   
interfere with the education of history in Japan. The demand is made of the concern     
that textbooks in question may reopen the wound incurred upon the Korean people by 
the unfortunate past in the relationship between Korea and Japan, damage the              
amicable ties that have developed between the two countries and negatively affect the  
regional situation in Northeast Asia.  
 
5. In the belief that an objective understanding of history is the cornerstone of friendly 
and cooperative relations between Korea and Japan, the Korean Government will        
continue with the multi-faceted and steadfast diplomatic efforts in the international     
arena in parallel with bilateral efforts toward Japan, so as to clear the textbooks of the 
problematic contents.  
 
6. In addition, the Korean Government will demise mid-to-long-term measures to 
prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer the world an accurate 





Government will consider reinforcing history education in the schools 
and establishing a permanent body within the Government to promote the exchange of 
historians between Korea and Japan, to prevent future misunderstanding of history and 
to strengthen the understanding of Korean history in the international community. 
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